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CONTENTS

The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency — *Harry Eckstein* 451

Soviet Islam and World Revolution — *Martha Brill Olcott* 487

When Misperception Matters — *Arthur A. Stein* 505

Dissident Marxism in Eastern Europe — *Thomas Oleszczuk* 527

Research Note

Patrimonialism — *Robin Theobald* 548

Review Articles

The Palestine Problem — *Ann Mosely Lesch* 560

Human Rights and Foreign Policy — *Jack Donnelly* 574

Index to Volume XXXIV 597

The Contributors ii

Abstracts iii

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ABSTRACTS

The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency

By H. ECKSTEIN

Recent work on political development fails because it does not address the fundamental questions of "developmental theory." The questions, answered in the essay, are: What "grows" in the passage from rudimentary to "modern" polities? What is the polity in its rudimentary form? Why is advancement from the primal to the advanced form ineluctible? Through what stages does it pass? What forces move it through its passage? Political development is conceived as the necessarily increasing politicalization of society through six stages; and, along with this, as the gradual transformation of ceremonial, theatrical polities into "efficient," managerial ones.

Soviet Islam and World Revolution

By M. B. OLCOTT

The relationship between Soviet Islam and the Islamic revival outside the U.S.S.R. is neither unidimensional nor definitionally antagonistic. Although bogged down in a costly civil war in Afghanistan, the Soviet leaders have tried to maintain a public stance of tolerance toward Islam. Recent Soviet writings reflect a new sophistication, which demonstrates unblinkered consideration of Islam as both a social and a political force. The quiescent state of Islam in the Muslim regions of the U.S.S.R., where indigenous populations practice a nondoctrinal, heavily ritualistic religion, further makes it unlikely that the Soviets are following aggressive policies in Southwest Asia because they fear Islamic fundamentalism at home.

When Misperception Matters

By A. A. STEIN

This essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception—the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor's preferences—in international relations. The author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy, although it can affect that actor's expectations as long as both actors are self-interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs. Misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations, and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences. An actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other's misperception of its preferences, and thus to avoid conflict—not to create it. Three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive, and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable. In a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises, misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war.

Dissident Marxism in Eastern Europe

By T. OLESZCZUK

An examination of the major motifs of dissident political literature from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary in the 1970s reveals a certain commonality of understanding and suggests that dissent is itself a complex, multicausal phenomenon likely to pervade the region for some time to come. Criticisms of the existing system are based on a rejection of dictatorship and its concomitant intellectual rigidity, eco-

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nomic inefficiency, and social alienation. The dissidents' vision of a better socialist society, in contrast, is one of decentralized decision making and of plural centers of power operating within the context of respect for human rights. The tactics put forward by the dissidents derive from these ideas: open discussion, mass mobilization within a legal framework that respects the rights of minorities, and pressure on established elites to make the necessary changes.

Patrimonialism

By R. THEOBALD

During the last decade, the concept of patrimonialism has become firmly embedded in political science and the sociological literature, being used primarily to explain the operation of bureaucracies in the underdeveloped world. This research note examines some of the usages of the term and attempts to assess its explanatory value. It is suggested that, as employed in much recent literature, "patrimonialism" has not contributed a great deal to the understanding of underdeveloped polities. The author argues that this is primarily because the literature has generally ignored the broader structural factors of which the phenomenon of patrimonialism is a manifestation. Taking account of these structural factors and locating patrimonialism within the broader context of underdevelopment will better equip us to understand the character and operation of Third World bureaucracies.

The Palestine Problem

By A. M. LESCH

The contradiction between Israeli and Palestinian goals and Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization have caused a profound diplomatic impasse. Moreover, the PLO's dependence on Arab hosts has embroiled it in secondary-level conflicts with Arab states. Although the PLO has gained their moral, diplomatic, and financial support, it has posed a threefold challenge: rulers resent the military cost of confronting Israel; Palestinian raids precipitate Israeli retaliatory actions against host territories; and the presence of autonomous Palestinian political and military forces undermines the host regimes' sovereignty and legitimacy. The review essay explores the ramifications of these Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian-Arab dilemmas, and assesses the likelihood of a compromise settlement by creating a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Human Rights and Foreign Policy

By J. DONNELLY

Five recent books reveal the beginnings of important new work in conceptualizing the place of human rights concerns in national foreign policies. The moral force of claims of human rights requires that they be given serious consideration in foreign policy. Philosophical analysis also shows that categorical moral distinctions between personal (or civil and political) and economic and social rights must be abandoned. Any justifiable priority for one class of rights must rest on strategic or political, not conceptual or moral, grounds. Since human rights are only one of many foreign policy concerns, tradeoffs with other goals, interests, and values will be necessary. However, human rights and the national interest are often complementary. The "tradeoffs" actually made should be principled, instrumental decisions, rather than apparently *ad hoc* or cynical sacrifices of human rights.

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

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THE IDEA OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

From Dignity to Efficiency

By HARRY ECKSTEIN

FROM one point of view, the study of political development is a major area of achievement in recent political inquiry; from another, which matters more, it is a conspicuous failure.

What has been achieved is great and rapid growth. The study of political development, in contemporary form, started barely two decades ago.[1] In short order, an extraordinary boom occurred in publications on the subject. By 1975, a standard overview listed over two hundred pertinent works. Accretion became especially rapid after 1964, though it seems to have "peaked out" (at a high level of production) in 1970-1971.[2]

The negative side is that the result is mostly muddle. The study of political development has all the traits of too-rapid, jerry-built growth, and of its concomitant, "decay."[3] The muddle is especially pronounced where it does the most harm: in regard to the very meaning of political development. Even scholars who were conspicuous in pushing the boom along are now viewing the matter of definition with dismay. Thus, Huntington and Domínguez start their review of the literature with remarks about loaded and wishful definitions—an "alarming proliferation" of them—and the consequent "superfluity" of much work on political development.[4] It stands to reason that, if a concept is encumbered with many meanings, theories using it also will vary alarmingly, because they are not about the same thing.

[1] The salient exploratory works are Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), and Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Among the pioneers, two others also stand out: Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *Political Science Review*, Vol. 55 (September 1961), 493-514, and Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[2] Samuel P. Huntington and Juan I. Domínguez, "Political Development," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, III (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 98-114.

[3] The term decay is used in Huntington's sense, as an antonym to "order." See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chap. 1. Earlier, Huntington had used "decay" as an antonym to "development"; see "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

[4] Huntington and Domínguez (fn. 2), 3.

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The study of political development thus is at a critical juncture. One can let it decay further or, not much different, choose to abandon it—Frank Lloyd Wright's prescription for what to do about Pittsburgh (and, I think, Huntington's for political development). Or one can try a project in conceptual and, through it, theoretical renewal. In this essay, I develop a basis for renovation. Abandonment might, of course, be the wiser course. But the present conceptual muddle in studies of political development seems to me due to avoidable causes; the early explorers of the subject were getting at something worth getting at—if it was attainable.

Critical Analysis of the Concept of Political Development

The reasons for the muddle about the meaning of political development start with a strange inversion of the proper and usual relations between concepts (labels), objects, and subjects.

Normally, one begins with observations or ideas (or both). Concepts are used to make statements about them: "messages" that convey information. In making statements, difficulties may arise. More or less misinformation, or "noise," may be conveyed. Unless conventional language has been seriously abused, the fault can hardly lie in the words. Messages will be unclear to the extent that observations or ideas are crude or fuzzy. To achieve greater clarity, it is usually not to the point to revise the definitions; the obvious remedies are more exact observation and more lucid thought. The exceptions that call for abandonment are concepts that turn out to be vacuous because they label ignorance itself—like "phlogiston" or "having the vapors."

If, then, one asks what a concept means, the answer ought simply to be that it means what it is intended to mean. If disputes about the labels we ourselves have devised concern meaning as such, one can be sure that something went wrong at the first move. But, in point of fact, nothing is more discussed and debated among specialists in the study of political development than what the concept means. Huntington and Domínguez put their finger on the reason in pointing out that scholars first became concerned with a "thing" called political development, and that this concern "naturally" (*sic*) led them to try to define what the thing is.[5] Trying to find a proper bottle to attach to a label had a predictable result: the "alarming proliferation" of meanings mentioned earlier. One sees this best in overviews of the literature on

[5] *Ibid.*

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political development which generally present lists of meanings—lists that tend to be lengthy as well as different from one another.[6]

Why this topsy-turvy procedure of putting concepts before meanings? The explanation seems to me apparent in the actual unfolding of studies of development since the early fifties. At first, the term "development" became fashionable policy language for describing economic differences between Western (and other) societies and the assumed aspirations of Third World countries. In the economic sense, the concept was reasonably informative: it referred to levels of material abundance and processes of raising the levels. When political scientists appropriated the label, they also referred to assumed aspirations in the Third World, and differences between it and the West; they then searched for a special content for the concept. Since "political abundance" has no immediately apparent meaning, the results were bound to be odd and eclectic.

The search for a political version of abundance is most evident in attempts to define political development in terms of capabilities—levels of them; "crises" regarding them; changes in them; various capabilities (as in Almond and Powell); or some particular kind (as in Organski).[7] This tack, however plausible, turned out, at best, to be problematic. Capabilities being potential, it is intrinsically difficult to be precise about them. More important, the notion of capability only removes the problem of definition by one step. We now ask: Capability to do what, and how?

In most cases, the definition of the "thing" called political development was sought in a manner even more likely to lead to conceptual entropy. From the outset, development was, as stated, a norm-laden concept, distinguishing "us" from "them," Western achievements from non-Western aspirations—much like the earlier, less euphemistic word civilization. The difficulty here is not just parochial bias, but the tendency to conceive political development simplistically—as what exists in the West and had gone on in its history (especially its recent history), and what was sought to be replicated, or was bound to occur, in "backward" societies. Since a great many things have gone on in Western history, scholars were virtually compelled to choose for emphasis some aspect, or aspects, of Western history. They could—

[6] A prototype (ten definitions) is in Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 33-45.

[7] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 28-29, 190-212; A.F.K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York: Knopf, 1965), 7.

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perhaps had to—choose by opinion. And so we get eclectic catalogues of meanings, which, taken altogether, simply spell Western history.

Thus, political development has been especially associated with increasing "democratization"; with growing "bureaucratization"; with the professionalization of politics (what Weber called living "off," not "for" politics);[8] with the "formalization" of politics (actions based on explicitly prescribed legal rules); with the decline of "ascription" and the rise of "achievement" in political roles; with the growing "clarification" and "resolution" of political jurisdictions (the gradual vanishing of parallel or overlapping functions, like those of the Church, principalities, and other traditional corporations, and the clearcut rank-ordering of roles and structures, contrasted to the messy lack of hierarchy produced by infeudation).[9] The very fact of the building of nation-states has also been equated with political development ("nation-building" once was the most common meaning), as has the increased "penetration" of societies by governmental authorities, and the increase in "redistributive" policies. The list can easily be extended. History is enormously multifaceted.

Granted, development is not a sensible concept unless used in a historical sense. But if the concept remains closely tied to concrete history, there is no need for it. We already have a more intelligible concept for development *as* history: namely, history. Development must surely stand for something more abstract and "ruleful" (theoretical)—something that is manifested *in* histories (plural).[10]

Why not, then, simply abandon the idea of "political development"? In the first place, the present literature on political development simply does not represent "developmental" inquiry properly. In fact, little but the label itself (plus some other, mostly misused, concepts culled from developmental thinkers) links that literature to genuine developmental thought. The state of the literature, consequently, is irrelevant to assessing the utility of theories of development, properly constructed. (It might be added that the disjunction of the label from the theorizing it represents is ironic, because developmental thought occurs at the

[8] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 84-86.

[9] Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development* (Princeton: van Nostrand, 1966), 57-58.

[10] Although Binder surely was right in writing about political development that "it cannot be expected that Western scholars could wholly escape the influences of their own political cultures," there is no evidence at all for his views that this need not "eventuate in a narrow parochialism" or that a "general theory of political development" can "emerge from a specific history." Leonard Binder and others, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 67.

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very origin of modern social science in the 19th century, and was devised to deal with its core issue: what it is to be "modern.") Secondly, the core issue that gave rise to developmental thought has hardly been transcended by later history. It remains obtrusive and urgent, and is still very much a puzzle. Finally, the potential of developmental thought for unravelling the puzzle it was meant to solve has hardly begun to be realized. The failure is the result of misunderstanding its intention. Very summarily, this intention was to understand our own societies (and, by extension, others) by finding their location in social time as a critical theoretical dimension.

The Nature of Developmental Thought

SOCIAL TIME AND THE PUZZLE OF MODERNITY

Societies exist in, and "move" through, history—and social history differs from other sorts of history. Obviously, then, social theories must somehow come to grips with the nature and significance of "social time." One issue that is thus posed is how to think of the flow of history: whether to treat history annalistically, as a continuous thread, or as passing through distinct phases—as Geertz puts it, "a medium through which certain abstract processes move."[11] A further issue arises if the latter tack is chosen: how to think of history as an abstract medium. For the most part, that question has been dealt with via picturesque metaphors, above all that of organic growth and decay.[12] Developmental thought is preeminent in trying to transcend mere imagery in the treatment of social time,[13] as well as in the extent to which such time is treated as a puzzle and a key to understanding.

The context in which developmental thought appeared had much—perhaps everything—to do with its animus. Developmental theories

[11] Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre-State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 5.

[12] The standard work on this subject—and, surprisingly, the only history of thought centered on conceptions of social time—is Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). Nisbet's work treats at considerable length, and splendidly, what I discuss very tersely in this section. His book can elucidate anything that seems obtuse here. I have drawn a great deal on his study, as anyone writing about social and political development must. But I differ from Nisbet in some respects, one of which is especially important. Nisbet holds that all Western thought is developmental. Different theoretical accounts of social change in history seem to him to be only variations on a continuing theme, already present in classic myth. I think this argument is forced and impedes understanding of the idea of development. Theories of social development, it seems to me, are more notable for their novelty than for anything they have in common with previous thought.

[13] This, *pace* Nisbet, is a fundamental aspect of its novelty.

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began, simplistically, early in the 19th century and attained their apogee early in the 20th. Roughly, the period runs from Comte, the first volume of whose *Cours* appeared in 1830, to Durkheim and Weber; this period was, as we know, one of rapid, tumultuous, broad-scale, and above all almost wholly unprecedented changes, in scope and in kind, in the West. The changes need no elaboration. They include the spread of industry; the rapid growth of science and technology; the "disenchantment" of the world, as Weber called it, through rational perceptions and behavior; growing bureaucratization; democratization and its many concomitants (the appearance of political parties, changes in the composition of elites, and so on); nationalism and the emergence of new states; vastly increased social mobility; great cities; transformed networks of transport and communications; revolutions; reaction; and much else. Such extraordinary changes, especially while still novel, were bound to pose profound puzzles. They were also bound to unhinge established ideas about the nature of societies' movement through time. And they were, at the least, likely to make the proper understanding of historical process appear fundamental to all worthwhile social understanding. The belief in the critical significance of social time, and of the location of particular societies in it, emerges most categorically in Durkheim's sociology. For Durkheim, all was time-bound and, therefore, culture-bound: not just social facts, but even the "epic" issues of moral philosophy (because moral imperatives are senseless out of their historical context) and those of validity and truth (because no universal mind exists, only particular cultural *consciences collectives*).[14]

Thus, the core problem of developmental thought was the puzzle of modernity. That puzzle had numerous related facets. Where were Western societies on the continuum of history? How did they get there? What forces had moved them from some long-past primal condition to the present? Where was historical process taking them? These questions differ from the way the problem of modernity is put now. In its earlier version, the subject was Western society: "we" rather than "they"; modernity rather than achieving modernization. Comparisons with pre-modern societies might, of course, help in finding solutions, but "we" were the problem. It follows that developmental theories could hardly have conceived of modernity in terms of the general

[14] This much misunderstood concept is the foundation of the most profound attack on all moral and epistemological absolutes. Nevertheless, Durkheim is nothing if not a moral philosopher and believer in verities. The paradox is resolved by Durkheim himself in the preface to his first masterpiece, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

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condition, or selected facets, of "advanced" societies. Their first task was to diagnose that condition itself, in contrast to other conditions of societies.

In order to come to grips with the problem of modernity, and with the more general problem of passage through social time, the developmental theorists devised a mode of theory as unprecedented as the social conditions that they tried to understand—a change in thought perhaps as momentous as the appearance of Newtonian mechanics and cosmology in the physical sciences. To understand their mode of theorizing, it is particularly necessary to grasp two things at the outset. One is that the developmental theorists tried, in essence, to find patterns in pervasive novelty and seeming flux—to get bearings in a world devoid of all fixity and precedents. The second involves the nature of conceptions of social time available for them to find such patterns—conceptions they rejected as inadequate for their task. Discussion of these earlier conceptions should help to clarify the nature and novelty of developmental thought by contrast; and discussion of perceived shortcomings in the conceptions should clarify the animus of developmental theory—and thus also the traits such theory should possess.[15]

NONDEVELOPMENTAL THOUGHT

Universal-abstract theory. The strict antithesis of developmental theory is a body of social thought not far removed from it in history, and still its chief competitor. For want of a conventional label, I will call it universal-abstract thought. In such thought, there is no temporal dimension at all, or at least none that matters.

Although societies and polities exist in history, it is possible to theorize about them as if they did not. Many social and political issues are universal. In politics, the manifest universal issues are those of authority and subjection: the origin or basis of governmental authority, its proper domains, the obligations and rights of subjects and princes, the nature of justice, and so on. Since these issues arise wherever a polity exists, it may seem simple logic to seek their solutions independent of contexts, including temporal contexts. Before the 19th century, sociopolitical theory was addressed chiefly to such "universal" issues and aimed at such atemporal solutions.[16]

[15] The subject of predevelopmental conceptions of social time, plus critical analysis of them, no doubt deserves a full essay, or—as in Nisbet—most of a considerable book. In an earlier version of this essay, the part that follows was, in fact, a sizable article. I have severely reduced it, since my purpose is not to write a history of thought, but to work toward a renovated theory of political development.

[16] I do not mean to say, of course, that noncontextual theorizing ceased in the 19th century. It has remained with us—during the 19th century chiefly in Utilitarianism

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If issues are not tied to contexts, it will seem plausible to seek solutions by methods that also ignore contexts. The systematic method of abstract thinking thus is deduction, and, in fact, the prototypical method of universal-abstract thought was social geometry. One invoked axiomatic truths and deduced theorems (mostly to serve as normative imperatives) from them. Both the axioms and deductions often were odd, and hardly involved tight geometric reasoning. Sometimes, to be sure, premises were stated as explicit postulates, as in the opening of the Declaration of Independence. More often, they made apparently empirical assertions, especially about human nature: that human life is "nasty, poor, brutish, and short," or that people have a "natural identity of interests." Or they postulated some alleged primordial sociopolitical event—usually a social and/or governmental "contract." At best, the links between the postulates and theorems also were quasi-mathematical; but the spirit of universal-abstract theories certainly was geometric.

Geometry, of course, is wholly abstract. It is a tool for imposing logical exactness on understandings of experience. If geometry as such is made into theory, the world that is theorized about will necessarily seem static, timeless, ahistorical, and noncultural. The universal-abstract theories of Hobbes or Locke (among many others) do seem to pertain to a sort of clockwork social universe. Time exists in it; but societies move in time like planets through their orbits.

Such a theoretical world can only be plausible if one's sense of social life is fundamentally one of fixity. Surely this at least partly explains the historical location of sociopolitical geometry. It postdates the upheavals of the Renaissance and the Reformation. It played a major role in the *philosophie* of the *ancien regime*. It was, in short, the characteristic thought of embryonic "modernity" not yet become mysterious and perceived as a sort of permanent, if still youthful, maturity. Therefore, developmental thought should be understood, above all, in counterpoint to universal-abstract social and political theories. To repeat, Durkheim insisted on temporal answers even for the seemingly timeless issues of such theories.

Of course, there existed, alongside universal-abstract thought (indeed, long preceding it), modes of social thinking in which time does play a role, sometimes a considerable one. It would be strange if this were not the case. None of these modes of thought, however, could

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and its derivatives (including modern Economics) and, not quite so clearly, in Idealist thought.

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be suited to the goals of developmental theory—though one came close in time and traits, and may be considered its flawed precursor.

Social time in classical and Christian thought. In Greek and Roman philosophies, as in the early myths which the classic philosophers rationalized,[17] all time is cyclical: the myth of Demeter made into rational philosophy. The cycle manifestly is fundamental to political philosophy in Aristotle ("the same opinions appear among men infinitely often") and underlies history in Polybius. It was perhaps inevitable that early thought about social time should use the imagery of cycles. The obvious reason is that the perception of time as a cycle surely is the most immediate experience of our personal time as organisms, and of the organisms all about us, in the recurrence of germination, growth, withering, and rebirth.

The idea of organic *growth* is not incompatible with developmental thought. Perhaps it even is the prototype of all developmental thinking, as Nisbet argues.[18] Growth and development have always been inseparable ideas. But this does not apply to the notion of organic *cycles*. The idea of cycles, after all, is close to being atemporal: it involves infinite repetition—changeless change. The idea may be a useful *deus ex machina* for historical explanation: things happen, as they often do in Polybius, because the time is ripe for them; or they do not happen because their season is not yet. But the notion obviously will not do if the *explanandum* is considered unprecedented. In fact, when the Greeks and Romans thought of the emergence of their own civilization, they used a quite different imagery: that of a gradual trajectory, so to speak—from an age of childish ignorance and contentment to philosophic wisdom and serenity.[19] The inconsistency can be explained by the fact that the classical philosophers, quite unlike the developmentalists, knew their historic place: despite imperfections and corruption, they considered themselves to be at the end of "advancement"—certainly not on a novel journey to an unknown destination.[20]

The conception of history as a trajectory, essential in developmental thought, is, of course, the basis of the Christian idea of social time. The

[17] See Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1954), chaps. 2-3.

[18] Nisbet (fn. 12), chap. 1.

[19] The alternative to thinking in terms of cycles and trajectories is used in Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, I (London: John Murray, 1901), 141.

[20] I agree here with J. B. Bury, *contra* Nisbet, that the Greeks had no (philosophic) idea of "progress." See *The Idea of Progress* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 19.

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Christian trajectory is a pilgrim's progress. This is especially explicit, before Milton, in St. Augustine: "The education of the human race . . . has advanced . . . through certain epochs or, as it were, ages, so that it might gradually rise from earthly to heavenly things."[21] The pilgrim's advance, though, was gloomy, as befit the time of Alaric's sack of Rome; it was an advance through corruption toward apocalypse. Such a vision could hardly speak to thinkers in a hopeful age. But, more important, what makes the Christian idea of history irrelevant to developmental thought is, again, what is most basic in the latter: puzzlement over social time as a variable. The Christian (and especially the Augustinian) thinkers also knew their historic place: at the nadir of time, when an old world had died and a new one had not yet germinated. It is difficult to think of anything less appropriate to the mystifying ferment and burgeoning of the developmental theorists' world.

Progress theory. A considerable, and familiar, body of thought that lies much closer to developmental theory certainly does not share Christian gloom, nor does it envisage the apocalyptic transformation of a dying world: progress theory. The nature of theories of progress (from Fontenelle and Leibnitz, through the greater intricacies of Kant, to the detailed "sketch" of Condorcet, and beyond) surely needs no discussion here. Progress theory is one of the staples of academic political education.[22] What does need discussion, and a fair amount of it, is why progress theories do not measure up to the developmentalists' task, and therefore differ from developmental thought.

We must be especially careful to distinguish progress theories from developmental theories because it is common to think of progress theory as an early version of developmental thought. No doubt there are continuities and resemblances. They occur contiguously in time, and the line of division between late progress theory and early developmental thought (like Comte's) is blurred. But, seen whole, progress theory differs from developmental thought in crucial ways—especially in ways that are important for dealing with modernity as a puzzle.

Most significant, neither the future nor the past really were treated as a puzzle in progress theory in the first place; consequently, the present also was considered to be transparent to clear minds. Even if any specific location on the path of history might be hard to fix exactly, the path itself was known. It was, typically, defined by the continuous growth of human knowledge, not least through the waning

[21] *The City of God* (New York: Random House, 1950), Book X, 14.
[22] The recognized *summa* on the subject is Bury's *Idea of Progress* (fn. 20).

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of superstition and magic. Such a belief seemed plausible, even obvious, when only the lighter side of modern secular history was in evidence.[23] Although in most progress theories, the future was a vague, poetic vision, the theories at least were of paradise glimpsed, if not yet gained. In any case, paradise was certain.

To be sure, there were, as always, thinkers of skeptical disposition (like Hume and Voltaire) who did not so much dissent as abstain; there were also the gloomy-minded. But it was not until the French Revolution and its aftermath that the simplistic, sunny theory of progress wobbled. In the context of developmental theory, pretty visions of constant progress toward Utopia were as out of place as doomspeaking. The world was growing richer, more knowledgeable, busier, more secure. But much of what was novel also was patently ugly, and novelty coexisted with reaction.

Also important was the belief of progress theorists in a certain fixity in change itself. That is why some progress theorists fit well into the category of abstract-universal thought. Fixity existed especially in "human nature"; history was the social realization of that nature over time. In retrospect, we ourselves can discern a considerable temporal puzzle here. But that the theorists of progress did not do so is evident in their tendency to write what has been called "conjectural history," the prototype of which is the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. It is still more evident in their searches for the essence of their own refined identity in rude or savage peoples. (Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* is the outstanding case in point).

Surely there is all the difference in the world between theories that profess to understand the present through the remote past and those in which the nature of the trajectory from past to present to future consists of deeply sensed mysteries. Granted that developmental thinkers, like theorists of progress, made much of rudimentary societies and did so in order to understand themselves and their own times. But developmental theory did not seek the sophisticate in the savage. Rather, like Melville, developmental theorists stressed contrast. Above all, where progress theorists wrote with certainty about the flow of social time, developmental thinkers puzzled and theorized.

DEVELOPMENTAL THOUGHT

We can now outline the essential traits of developmental thought (its "form"), in contrast to earlier treatments of social time.[24] Each trait

[23] Nisbet (fn. 12), 105.

[24] It should be noted that developmental theories fall into two fairly distinct subtypes. One comprises what we generally identify as social evolutionary theory. Comte,

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can be related to some facet of the puzzle of modernity. And, in each case, the point can be substantiated that contemporary work on political development represents developmental thought inadequately.[25]

Inherent change. The foremost trait of developmental thought is that it proceeds from the premise that change is inherent in society. Thus, social statics and dynamics coincide, and the dichotomy between order and change is false; order, as Comte said, is order-in-change.[26] All other traits of developmental theories follow from the first in some fashion. The sheer scope and obviousness of change in the context in which developmental theories were formulated demanded that change be regarded as inherent, and thus ubiquitous, in social life.

What is most important theoretically about the premise of inherent change is that it involves an explicit choice at the fundamental dividing line between all theories; the primary branchpoint at which alternative theories occur. I have made this argument extensively elsewhere,[27] so I will be sketchy about it here. In explanation, the matter to be explained can be considered inherent or contingent. If contingent, it occurs because of abnormal (literally aberrant) conditions that happen fortuitously. If inherent, it occurs ineluctably, unless impeded or diverted by chancy conditions. (Thus, our deaths are inherent, our illnesses contingent.) Everything in theory depends on the choice made at this branchpoint. As a familiar example, I would cite the fatefulness of the change from the Aristotelian conception of motion, which was contingent, to the Galilean, in which motion is considered to inhere in matter. Developmental theory was, potentially, just as revolutionary.

How does the premise of inherency set developmental thought apart from other modes of socio-temporal thinking? First, in early ideas of social time, change was inherent in society only as changeless change, as repetition; or else, necessary change was a "one-shot" apocalyptic transformation. Even in progress theories, the trajectory

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Spencer, and Morgan, among others, are members of the earlier species, not yet quite liberated from progress theory; note, for instance, Comte's vision of a "final" positive-industrial Utopia. Nisbet calls the other subtype "neo-evolutionism" (fn. 12, 223-39). It includes, roughly, Ferdinand Toennies's *chef d'oeuvre* of 1887, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber. One might simply call this species mature developmental thought—less simplistic, and with the tendentious and ambiguous aspects of the earlier species cleaned up.

[25] For distilling the general traits of developmental thought, Nisbet's treatment of the "premises" of socio-evolutionary theories is invaluable (fn. 12, 166-88). I draw on him—though not on his vocabulary, for reasons not really necessary to spell out here.

[26] *Ibid.*, 166-67.

[27] Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence," in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1980), 138-42.

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of social time always came, inherently, to rest—and rest was never far off.

In all thought before developmental theory, then, social motion was Aristotelian. It tended toward a *telos*: a literal end. Also (Thucydides is typical), the events of concrete history tended to be explained largely by manifestly contingent causes: by the particularities of acts, contexts, wise or unwise choices, and the like. Historical philosophy and explanation were bifurcated and inconsistent. In the former, cyclical necessity prevailed; in the latter, accidents. This bifurcation is still evident even (or especially) in Marx as a philosopher of history and interpreter of particular events.

The first task of developmental thought, then, is to formulate a really general theory of social time; the next is to apply it, as explanation, to particular cases at particular points in particular histories. "Really general" means abstract theory regardless of time, place, and circumstance—theory that spans the whole of history, from primal origins to modernity. Clearly, the contemporary literature on political development does not come close to discharging that task. In much of it, even our own development seems to have begun only in the 19th century, or not long before.[28]

Dimensional change. It is necessary in developmental theory to construct what Simmel called "abstract grammars"[29] with which to make sense of the immensely complex actual flow of social time, and to locate concrete cases in such time. These grammars, in Kantian terms, are forms of history that fit the contents of particular histories. If social change is regarded as inherent, that flow must be along a continuous dimension—although aberrant conditions might slow down movement, or produce apparent rest, on the dimension.

To define such a dimension, developmental theorists had to characterize its poles: the nature of the primal and of the fully advanced conditions of society—the latter not really "final," but a vision of the future that could link with present and past. Only in this way could developmental theorists hope to find their own place in history, in relation to the remote past and the uncertain future. The polar conditions seem simplistic, and indeed they are so, intentionally. Maine, for instance, considered the poles of the continuum of history to be relations based on status and on contract; he explicitly called them formulas—abstract

[28] Huntington is an exception: he goes back all the way to the Tudors. (See fn. 3, 1968, 122-39.)

[29] Kurt Wolff, transl. and ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), 22.

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tools for constructing "the law of progress."[30] The polar types of Toennies were community (*Gemeinschaft*) and association (*Gesellschaft*): abstract concepts constructed to correspond to "external" (viz., concrete) association; to describe old and new; and to find underlying themes in familial, economic, political, religious, aesthetic, and scholarly life.[31] Durkheim's orienting concepts referred to polar modes of social solidarity, the mechanical and organic;[32] these concepts, again, were used as highly abstract forms to make sense of concrete cultures, by a theorist preeminently aware of their variability. Weber's poles were traditional and rational systems of action: pure types that were useful for describing and explaining impure (concrete) cases.[33]

In regard to the construction of such continuous dimensions, the contemporary literature on political development again falls dismally short. Writers tend to take positions on modernity (as we saw, simplistically), but not explicitly on pre-modernity, and least of all on the primal conditions from which development flows. Huntington just tells us that traditional political systems vary.[34] And Lerner, typically, says no more than that traditional systems lack modern traits.[35]

Growth and stages. If social change is dimensional, all cases fall between minimal and maximal poles. Historic flow along a dimension thus involves changes in degree, or quantitative growth. Throughout the corpus of developmental thought, change in scale in fact played a major role. In Toennies, for example, *Gemeinschaft* involved small-scale units (household, kinship, village, neighborhood, town); *Gesellschaft* was associated with large entities (city, nation, cosmopolitan life, markets, industries, scientific fields). In Durkheim, organic solidarity was associated with growth in the sheer "volume" of society and in "moral density": the number and variety of interactions in which people participate. "Lower" societies were spread out sparsely, lacked cities, had few and slow modes of communication and transport; "higher" ones had the opposite traits, and, above all, denser networks of interaction as a result.[36] In Simmel, the quantitative element played a critical role even more explicitly. Virtually the whole of Sim-

[30] Sir Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (London: Murray, 1861).
[31] Ferdinand Toennies, *Community and Society*, trans. by Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 231-32.
[32] Durkheim (fn. 14), 70-132.
[33] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 24-26, 215-20.
[34] Huntington (fn. 3), 148.
[35] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958), esp. chap. II and pp. 85-89.
[36] Durkheim (fn. 14), 275-80.

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mel's thought was based on a distinction between two-person (dyadic) and three-person (triadic) relations. This distinction was, for Simmel, a metaphor for small and large—a basis for showing that even a change merely from a relation of two to three would have enormous consequences.[37]

An essential premise of developmental thought, nevertheless, is that not just change (singular) is inherent in societies, but also changes (plural). The developmental conception of social change is typological.[38] Just as the premise of inherent changes responded to the obtrusiveness of change in the developmentalists' social world, so the positing of qualitative changes accommodated their sense of novelty—of new species being originated. Size and growth do matter, but chiefly as bases of generic changes. Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity clearly was typological; but the long process by which organic solidarity replaces the mechanical type results from quantitative change. At the outset, there is a growth of what Durkheim called "moral density"—of the volume of interactions (and hence of regulative mores). As this occurs, conflicts increase—if only through proximity, like conflicts among animals living off the same parts of a tree. The chief mechanism available for reducing conflicts caused by proximity is a kind of distancing: the division of labor separates people and, as a bonus to harmony, makes them more mutually dependent. In this way, a generically quite different kind of solidarity replaces that of early societies. In the latter, solidarity results from the sameness of their parts; in advanced societies, its source is just the opposite: differentiation.[39]

If social change is *both* quantitative and typological, an obvious issue arises: how to reconcile the two. The developmentalists' solution (the only solution possible) was to think of the flow of social time as involving stages: critical thresholds at which growth in degree generates changes in kind. Comte posited three such stages: theological, metaphysical, and positive. Spencer considered social change to be more obviously continuous, but also to involve typological change: from homogeneous to heterogeneous societies.[40] Obviously such change is quantitative, but Spencer himself referred to the result as "transformations."

The idea of social stages, essential in developmental thought, sharp-

[37] Wolff (fn. 29), 145-69.
[38] Nisbet (fn. 12), 162.
[39] Durkheim (fn. 14), 256ff.
[40] Herbert Spencer, *Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative* (New York: Appleton, 1891), 60.

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ly distinguishes such thought from progress theories.[41] In theories of progress, change is the growth of some desirable aspect of society (typically, rational knowledge) and a concomitant zero-sum decline in its obverse (superstition or ignorance). Progress theorists thus could, and did, envisage a final resting place for society: in the elimination of its defects. If, on the other hand, the inherency of typological changes is posited, social time must be open-ended. A historical process not conceived in simple monotonic, zero-sum terms can hardly arrive at absolute completion. The resulting theory is gloomier, appropriate to a time of puzzlement about society.

Again, contemporary work on political development has virtually nothing to say about how quantities (and which quantities) flow through political time and become converted into generic transmutations at critical stages. The imagery of developmental thought is much used: for instance, "takeoff." So is terminology that seems typological —above all, the labels "traditional" and "modern." I have already commented on the vacuity of both. If the polar types are vacuous, it follows that "takeoff" and intermediary types (e.g., transitional society) also must be mere imagery. The essential task of developing a theory of political stages—linking changes in degree and kind—remains unfulfilled.

Ruleful, necessary change. One way to orient thought to a world inherently in transmutation, in which all is perceived as time-bound and culture-bound, is to treat all cultures as having "meaning" only in themselves. In that case, understanding consists merely of interpretation. It is no accident that *Kulturwissenschaft* and the method of *Verstehen* came into being when developmental thought also flourished. As universal-abstract thought best represents the perception of underlying social fixity and uniformity, so interpretative sociology—"thick description," or cultural aesthetics—is one major response to the perception of social flux and variability.[42]

Cultural science, however, provides no orientation to the general flow of history, and offers no solution to the puzzle of modernity. Changes (and differences) may be inherent in societies, but no account of the process of change is provided. The alternative—and the fundamental difference between social science and cultural interpreta-

[41] This is said *pace* Condorcet. It seems to me that in the *Sketch* the notion of stages is simply a literary convenience.

[42] I consider Clifford Geertz to be its outstanding present practitioner. See *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973)—especially 3-30 (on "thick description") and 412-53 (on the social meaning of Balinese cockfights).

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tion—is to proceed from the premise that societies pass through the stages of social time in a ruleful manner. In that case, modernity—as a stage or passage to a stage—may become comprehensible, in comparison to other cultures, as a particular location on a general and necessary socio-temporal continuum. Also, in this way, comfort can be provided in a still ugly, unfinished world. The tumult of early modernity may be regarded as the onset of a higher stage in which, as in any pure type, all will at last fit coherently. At the same time, the naive optimism of believers in finality can be avoided.

Thus, again, it is a critical task of developmental theory to construct a comprehensive theory of history—one that identifies distinct stages in a continuous flow of social time which links primal to modern society. Such abstract history must, of course, especially describe and explain how changes on the dimension of time have produced whatever is qualitatively distinct about modernity.

As we have seen, though, the puzzle of modernity did not just involve location in historical time. It also involved questions about how we arrived at our temporal location and others at theirs, and about where history was taking us and them. A related task of developmental theory, then, was to identify, alongside uniform motion, the uniform forces pushing societies ineluctably along the continuum of history—especially forces inherent in societies. Only thus was it possible to see the necessity of what had occurred since primal times, and only thus can one have a sure sense of direction in looking ahead—orientation to present, past, and future.

All developmental theories posit such an underlying moving force (and special forces at different stages) that pushes societies through time. Specifying such a force—describing historical gravity, so to speak—is, needless to say, a very difficult task. What force could possibly do what was theoretically needed? Obviously, it had to be absolutely fundamental—something "essential" in the very nature of societies, and thus always present as a dynamic force, through qualitative changes. The early evolutionists saw the problem, but they tended to circumvent it, because they wanted a quick fix to make sense of change. Their circumventions involved truisms—resort to unspecified "properties of our species," as Comte put it[43]—that is, to human nature. But as evolutionary thought itself evolved, the solutions became less vacuous. In Spencer, for instance, the driving force behind social change was the desire for social efficiency, which Spencer equated with complexity of structure. In Durkheim, it was something even more obviously

[43] Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, II (London: George Bell, 1896), 229.

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essential: social existence as such—the need for solidarity among the elements of society.

Here, once more, contemporary theorists of political development fail dismally to live up to the form of developmental thought. Not only is their continuum of political time truncated, but the force supposedly driving underdeveloped societies is, generally, little more than an unexplained urge to be more developed. At bottom, this is a truism *à la* Comte; it involves an assumed intrinsic "property of our species," reinforced by the extrinsic accelerator of cultural diffusion. What is absent, above all, is a theory of the fundamental force, or forces, that brought "us" to our political condition, and continues to push us through political time.

Conclusion. It should be obvious that the mysteries of modernity, as I said above, still are very much with us. For a long time, in contemporary political inquiry, they were shifted to the Third World. But now, again, they arise in reference to ourselves: e.g., in the concerns with the nature and future of postindustrial societies, and their governability. Developmental thought was itself developed to deal with these puzzles. Surely, it is uniquely suited to do so; thus, it is sensible to take such thought seriously—that is, to try to construct developmental theory properly. Hence this section, as groundwork for the next.

The quintessential developmental theorist, Durkheim, best summarized the spirit of the developmental mode of thought:

> Every time we explain something human, taken at a given moment in history . . . it is necessary to go back to its primitive and simple form, to try to account for the characterization by which it was marked at that time, and then to show how it developed and became complicated little by little, and how it became that which it is at the moment in question.[44]

I propose now to do this, in broad strokes, for the political aspect of human experience.

Sketch for a Revised Theory of Political Development

The passage from Durkheim succinctly describes what is needed to renovate the idea of political development. A more detailed agenda of questions to be dealt with follows from the summary of the traits of developmental thought:

[44] Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), 3.

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(1) What conception of continuous growth can plausibly describe the long passage from primal to highly advanced polities?

(2) What is the essential nature of polity in its "primitive and simple" form?

(3) What forces make the "advancement" of primal polities toward "higher" forms ineluctable (or at least highly probable)?

(4) What distinctive stages lie along the trajectory of political time? In what ways do these stages involve both quantitative growth and change in kind?

(5) What forces move polities from stage to stage?

(6) What do the answers to these questions imply for polities that are at present less developed, and for "advanced," modern polities?

1. *What Conception of Continuous Growth Describes the Passage from Simple to Highly Advanced Politics?*

I have argued that contemporary theories of political development are historically myopic. Even in Georgian England—hardly remote history—the traits now most widely associated with political development were still embryonic. Democratization was certainly not far advanced. The suffrage was severely restricted; leaders (e.g., M.P.s) either were nobles and gentry or their handpicked clients, bound to serve their patrons' interests.[45] In regard to bureaucratization, administrative and judicial roles remained entangled, nationally and locally; recruitment was highly ascriptive; specialization and formalization were elementary.[46] Among the more familiar conceptions of political development, only the "clarification" of societal authority was mature, for the messiness of corporate jurisdictions had certainly been cleared up by the 18th century.

How, then, can one characterize a continuum of political time on which the Georgian polity itself belongs to a rather advanced period? Recall that such a continuum must involve quantitative growth, and must be a "form" that can contain much variable content. Moreover, the dimension involved must be anchored in time by minimal and maximal poles, one corresponding substantially to rudimentary cases, the other a vision that links perceptions of modernity to its remote and nearer past and, still more important, to an approximated future.

I suggest that the most serviceable way to characterize such a

[45] Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Knopf, 1962), 22-31.

[46] D. L. Keir, *The Constitutional History of Modern Britain* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1938), 292-320.

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continuum is also the simplest: *what grows in political development is politics as such*—the political domain of society. Through political history, political authority and competition for politically allocated values have continually increased. Using Durkheim's terminology, we might regard this as growth in "political density," perhaps as a special aspect of a growing "moral density." More and more political interactions occur, overall and in place of nonpolitical interactions.

To avoid confusion about what is being argued here, a conceptual distinction must be made. One can think of "the political" as any relations that involve, say, legitimate power, or conflict management, or the regulation of social conduct, and the like. In that case, "politics" may simply exist throughout society and not be located in any clearly defined social domain or institution. Or one can think of "politics" as the functions and activities of such a concrete domain: that of the heads of societies, the princes, chiefs, or kings (for, in its modern sense, politics is associated with government, and government and social headship are synonymous). What I argue is that, through political time, the "princely domain" has constantly grown—increasingly penetrating society. And, in conjunction, political activities and relations in the less concrete sense have also grown. Expropriation by "princes" and expansion of political activity occur in conjunction.

One pole of the dimension of political time thus might be called the *social polity*. In the social polity, as a pure type, there exists a "princely" domain: some institution of headship of society, chieftaincy, firstness. That domain, though, is little differentiated from others, in the sense of having separate organizations and administrative staffs; it is anything but a subsociety—neither a "machine" nor a "system" in itself. Above all, next to nothing is done by princes, at least as we understand political activity: there is almost no active princely management of society. The society is virtually all and the polity virtually nothing. Relations of power exist, regulations of conduct and of conflicts occur; but they do so throughout society, not in special relation to chieftaincy.

At the other pole is *political society*. In political society as a pure type, "private" relations have been wholly preempted by the "public" domain of the chiefs. The institutions of that domain are highly differentiated and separately organized; governmental officers and staffs constitute a large subsociety. That subsociety is a complex system in itself, while at the same time it permeates social life.

The passage from social polity to political society can be described summarily: The domain of princes, who at the outset do virtually nothing, has great, indeed irresistible, potential for growth: power

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resources. Over a long period, these power resources are gradually realized. The chiefs of society convert headship into primacy, and primacy into actual control—at first very slowly, then with gathering, ultimately runaway, momentum. The momentum results from the fact that, as power resources are converted, they are not used up, but in fact increase. As this process unfolds, growth in degree corresponds, at specifiable periods, to transmutations of type. In our own modern period, we approach a condition in which the distinction between polity and society has again become blurred—not because the public realm is minimal, but because it has virtually eliminated all privacy. This, though, is not an end, but itself a stage in a continuing process. The political society generates its own dynamics; and we should at least be able to discern the forces likely to move it, even if not yet where it is destined to go.

This conception of political time has been anticipated by other theorists. It parallels Durkheim's view of more general social development. The minimal pole of the continuum is grounded in the anthropologists' notion of "stateless" societies.[47] The conception of political development as expropriation is in Weber: the emergence of the modern state was, for Weber, a process of continuous expropriation by princes of "autonomous and 'private' bearers of executive power," resembling the expropriation by large capitalist enterprises of small, independent economic units.[48] In his publicist essays written shortly after the Russian Revolution, Weber envisaged the further, accelerating, and continuous expropriation by the political domain of economic life, and then also of the more intimate, and the scientific and cultural, spheres—a remarkable prevision. The idea of "total" politics now also is a recurrent theme in works on modern democratic states. Sharkansky, for example, refers to runaway governmental growth "in response to incessant demands for more services," and repeatedly alludes to the erosion of the "margins" of formal government as a consequence.[49] The vision of political society informs especially the critiques of modern governments by perspective (if also hotheaded) "libertarians": Hayek, Oakeshott, Ellul, Nisbet, and others.[50]

[47] See, for instance, Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1962), Part I—especially the chapter on "Minimal Government" (61-77).

[48] See Gerth and Mills (fn. 8), 82.

[49] Ira Sharkansky, *Whither the State?* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1979), throughout.

[50] See, for example, Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr., ed., *The Politicization of Society* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979).

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2. *What Is Polity in Its "Rudimentary" Form?*

To sustain the thesis that what grows and changes in political development is the political domain *per se*, one must, first of all, characterize that domain in its "primitive and simple form," from which advancement proceeds. None of the many structural or functional notions that political scientists have used to define the essence of polity seem to make sense for its very early forms.[51] What seems distinctive and universal to the princely realm in its simplest form is that its occupants and practices represent the very fact that society exists. Chiefs, khans, liegelords "embody" society. They are figures through whom societies personify themselves or sometimes (much the same) the ideal order of things imperfectly reflected in social order. They stand for the fact that a common, thus moral, life exists, and they celebrate the common life and make it compelling.

Surely that is fundamental in society, if anything is, because societies are nothing if not collective entities with which members identify—that is, define themselves. Thus, ceremony and symbolism—what Bagehot called the dignified parts of government—are not to be regarded as mere pretty trappings of power; nor are consummatory (expressive) and instrumental polities,[52] or "sacred" and "secular" ones, distinctive types at all developmental stages. At the "simple" stage (thus, perhaps, always), symbolism is the very nature of the princely, not a guise. That is why, to us, the primal political domain seems empty. Primal "symbolic politics" does not stand for "real politics." It stands for society.

The evidence suggesting that primal politics is symbolic[53] is considerable. For instance, in Schapera's study of sub-Saharan tribes[54] the following points emerge: The chiefs, as heads of societies, do not do much at all; they are simply marked out from others (e.g., in costume), exalted (in special rituals), subjects of rejoicing and of eulogies.[55]

[51] For a catalogue of such notions, see Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (December 1973), 1142.

[52] These are Apter's terms; see David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 24ff.

[53] I do not use the term entirely as does Murray Edelman in *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). Edelman considers political symbolism to be an aspect of political practices that "condenses" them (and thus evokes emotions) or provides simple "references" to complex facts (his example is accident statistics). At times, Edelman comes close to what I mean by symbolic politics; see, for instance, 16-17. This is not to say that his use of the notion is wrong. It is different—mainly, much more diffuse.

[54] I. Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (London: Watts, 1956).

[55] *Ibid.*, chap. 4. Varying "powers" are associated with chiefliness (102ff.). I will refer to the most common below. But simply being "chiefly" is clearly the heart of the matter.

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Tribes are often defined simply by identification with chiefs, not by territoriality or even kinship. Sometimes no abstract tribal name exists, only that of the chief. Often, tribal names are the inherited names of the ancestors of chiefs, and at times chiefs are named by the tribal name. In some cases, any injury done to a member of a tribe is regarded as an injury to the chief (as we talk about crimes against society). In short, the collective and the personal are thoroughly joined in the chief's personage. Much the same comes out in Lucy Mair's studies of primitive governments and African kingdoms.[56] Mair argues, indeed, that the substantive wielding of "power over the conduct of public affairs" generally is not so much the chief's or the court's function as that of lesser figures, for whom kings are mouthpieces.[57] Lowie's work on North American Indian tribes makes a similar point.[58]

More important from the developmental point of view, we find this to be true also in the primitive condition of a prototypical advanced society—English society. (England may be considered as a good concrete approximation of an idealized case of continuous development: something close to an experimentally contrived universe—free of uncontrolled, deceiving contingencies—which any theory of sociopolitical development should fit closely.)

Anglo-Saxon society approaches the extreme of what I have called social polity.[59] If a "public sector" existed in that society, it could only have been that of king, *folkmoot*, and *Witan*. The king was principally a source of social identity, as were all lesser chiefs of the English tribes. His one significant activity was leadership in the common enterprise of making war, and practically no other common enterprise was engaged in. The *folkmoot* originally was not a council, but simply a local muster of warriors. By 900, local moots had pretty much been displaced by the *Witan*, a "national" council of "wise men." But the *Witan*'s essential function simply was to advise the king on the nature of "unchanging custom." Here the primacy of society is espe-

[56] Mair, *Primitive Government* (fn. 47), and *African Kingdoms* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).

[57] *Ibid.*: *Primitive Government*, 63, 69; *African Kingdoms*, 107-8.

[58] R. H. Lowie, "Political Organization among American Aborigines," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 78 (February 1948), 1-17.

[59] Dating poses difficulties here, but a sensible point in time for looking at the Anglo-Saxon polity surely is circa 900 A.D. A sense of an English society had crystallized out of the diverse identities of Teutonic tribal invaders and become personified in a single chief, Edward of Wessex. *Beowulf* remains the best primary source for understanding Anglo-Saxon life. See also J.E.A. Jolliffe, *Constitutional History of Medieval England* (New York: Norton, 1967), Parts I and II; Sir Frank Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943); Dorothy Whitelock, *The Beginning of English Society* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1952).

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cially evident: while the king embodied its consciousness of itself, the *Witan* kept him honest, as the guardian of its mores.

Much the most perceptive study of primal politics as I conceive it is Geertz's magnificent book on the 19th-century "theatre-state" in Bali, *Negara*.[60] Geertz alone seems to have grasped fully the critical significance of political ceremony and ritual: of the "poetics" of power as against its "mechanics"—as Bagehot alone discerned that the dignified parts of English government were not mere vestigial histrionics, but essential to its "efficiency." Geertz does temporize between regarding theatre as essential in polities as such and considering Bali an exotic alternative to politics as efficient power.[61] But, at least in Bali, "power served pomp, not pomp power."[62]

3. *What Forces Make the Growth of Primal Polity Ineluctable?*

Chieftaincy in primal polities is much indulged and rewarded, with awe and with goods. But that does not immunize chiefs (much less their retainers) against the appetite for mundane power; and, perhaps just because the chiefs are symbolic figures—awesome rather than powerful—power struggles are pervasive in primal societies.[63] For the purpose of developmental theory, it is necessary to show next that in such struggles the princely domain has overwhelming resources for subduing rivals and enlarging its effective control over society. What, then, are its power resources?

By itself, the representation of societies is an essential resource for power—perhaps the one seed that is capable of growing into political society. Societies are requisites of personal identity, safety, the satisfaction of material needs. But, though necessary, they are highly intangible. They are complex even when they are rudimentary. Seeing them as networks, or complexes of roles, or fields of interaction, or patterns of exchange—these are major feats even for modern professionals. Even if the task of abstract understanding were less difficult, such understanding would hardly move affections, which surely are needed for identification and legitimacy. So the personal symbols of society derive potential from the fact that they perform the most necessary of societal functions: making society appear "real."

It is true that there are other ways of making societies tangible. Primal societies, in fact, are always personified in their gods, through

[60] Fn. 11.

[61] *Ibid.*, 127, 135.

[62] *Ibid.*, 13. (Geertz's book appeared some months after I wrote the first draft of this paper for the NSF Conference on Economic and Political Development, Wayzata, Minnesota, October 1980.)

[63] E.g., *ibid.*, 24.

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rites and magic. Thus, priests and magicians are the logical (and actual) main rivals of the chiefs for principal power. But the chiefs themselves are generally presumed to have special links to the supernatural, magical world—for instance, as rainmakers, healers, invokers of prosperity, possessors of sacred objects (fishing spears and the like), and as wielders of curses.[64]

These links to the supernatural not only reinforce secular symbolism (or make it sacred), but also associate chiefliness and "potency," for the magical world is a world of fateful powers. Chiefs are also considered especially potent figures in the material sense of prowess. All societies have collective business of some sort—in primal societies, for instance, moving camp and herds.[65] The function of making decisions about societal business naturally tends to be lodged in the locus of collectiveness. The one universal collective business of rudimentary societies is warfare: in defense against predatory others, for conquest (slaves, tribute, etc.), or, often, simply as a ritual.[66] So chiefs, though they have rivals in heroes,[67] generally are the main loci of potency as prowess. This accounts for the strange duty of chiefs in some tribal societies to be in good health, as well as for the use of wars of succession (in which the strongest survive), and for the frequent use of the phallus as a symbol of chieftaincy.

To exist, and to carry out collective enterprises, societies must, of course, be harmonious in some degree. Conflicts must be managed, quarrels mediated, crimes avenged. There is a universal social need for adjudication, and, again, a "natural" tendency to associate that necessary function with society's embodiments. The actual management of conflicts and deviance tends, in fact, to be decentralized and dispersed in primal societies—a matter of self-help in feuds, revenge, and exacting reparations. But the chief always has at least some vague special responsibility in regard to justice. For instance, we are told by Traill that a basic function of the Anglo-Saxon kings was to go about the kingdom putting down "evil customs." Traill's catalogue of judicial duties actually is a list of things kings could *not* do; and it seems evident that kings were little more than especially prestigious "oath-helpers."[68] Still, justice and chieftaincy had special, even if largely hortatory, links.

[64] See Mair (fn. 56): *Primitive Government*, 65, 66, 76; *African Kingdoms*, 39. Geertz (fn. 11) considers the link to the supernatural order the very basis of Negara: see pp. 17-19, 104-5.

[65] Schapera (fn. 54), 211ff.

[66] Geertz (fn. 11), 24.

[67] See, for example, Daniel Biebuyck, *Hero and Chief* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[68] H. D. Traill, ed., *Social England*, I (New York: Putnam, 1894), 134.

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The moral, surely, is evident. The primal princely domain is ages removed from the monopoly of legitimate power. But where could there be greater potential for eventual monopoly than in a domain standing for society itself; for potency, military, and magic; and for justice? "Dignity" and "efficiency," granted, are obverse faces of politics—but also interchangeable resources.

4. *What Are the Stages of Political Time?*

The fact remains that in primal polities, whatever the chief's potential, one can barely detect an active public core. Our own political world could hardly differ more. At "our" location in political time, as stated, it is difficult to find anything that is clearly private. I am not referring to "totalitarian" polities, or only to those, but (less categorically) to the other typically modern form of polity: popular democracies. (Modern democracies, in historical perspective, simply are the gentler twins of totalitarian rule, mitigated by open competition, free communications, and a sense of rights and liberties—which, compared to earlier times, no longer really divides the public from the private, but is a sense of political decency.)

I have described the extraordinary pervasiveness of political authority in contemporary British society elsewhere, and need not dwell much on details.[69] To convey the flavor of the matter, suffice it to say the following: (1) The national government (as in other modern democracies) now directly controls about half of GNP, and indirectly plans, guides, and channels most of the remainder. (2) Parliamentary sessions, once convened only occasionally, fill up the whole available legislative work-year, and even this at the cost of large omissions—uncontrolled "executive legislation," and a severe decline in the role of private members. (3) The Cabinet has virtually disappeared; as I wrote in 1958:

> Cabinet functions have become dispersed to an almost unfathomably complex administrative and deliberative machinery. Decisions once made collectively in the Cabinet are now made by cabinet committees, by individual Ministers, bureaucrats, the Treasury, official committees, party machinery, and even private associations; and, most often, by interaction among all of these bodies. If power is concentrated anywhere in the British machinery of government it is concentrated not in the Cabinet but in this complex framework of decision-making.[70]

One can argue that what mainly mitigates the darker aspects of fully

[69] See Samuel H. Beer and Adam Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government*, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 10.

[70] *Ibid.*, 235.

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politicalized society is the very inability to control such a concentration of functions, due to sheer diversity and overload. The gentle myths of liberal rule surely help, but perhaps not as much as the fact that monolithic authority itself is too large to manage. Privacy, in political society, is found in the interstices of authority; it is, perhaps, itself mainly a product of the structure of the public realm.

How did this transmutation to something close to "political society" come about? What lies beyond the primal polity's potential for growth? This is an enormous question, and we have not even the beginning of a plausible answer. As such a beginning, I suggest a six-stage process. The process is "logical" in that each stage manifestly is a condition for the next. The stages also make sense in the context of the English polity—our standard case for observing gradual, evolutionary "unfolding" (the literal meaning of *développer*) in politics. For this reason I will use English history—in gross summary—to exemplify the stages.

The politics of primacy. I have already treated the first stage, primal polity, using Anglo-Saxon England to illustrate its nature. The second stage involves what might be called the struggle for, and achievement of, primacy. The forces that push polities to and through that stage (and later stages) will be discussed presently. Here, it must suffice to say that nothing in political development can possibly come before the clarification of a distinct public domain that, in regard to "efficient" functions, is minimally *primus inter pares*. Without this, there is nothing that may grow. One may suppose that the establishment of a realm of substantive primacy—one that involves more than symbolic headship—will not be a tranquil process, but will involve stubborn conflicts over domination and autonomy. Aside from chiefs, there are others who have politically convertible resources: religious, economic, and military. But, as we have seen, the chiefs generally have much weightier resources for providing political goods—not least, safety, in a context of continuous struggle among social domains: Hobbes's good, and no doubt the fundamental value.

This general stage fits, in England, the period of *feudal monarchy*, say of the 12th century. The feudal monarchy certainly was quite different from the Anglo-Saxon, despite the fact, generally agreed, that the Conquest caused no sharp break. The domain of the Angevin and early Plantagenet princes, to be sure, remained mainly on the level of symbol and pomp; its practical authoritative functions were sparse. What is most conspicuous about the period is struggle for "dominion" as such. The histories portray incessant turmoil. But the

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tumult was not about policy, in our sense. It involved competition about spheres of autonomy and subjection; and the fundamental source of that struggle was a lack of clarification and resolution of the functions of the great and small corporations of society—all authoritative in their own domains, and constantly striving to expand or protect them.

Corporate boundaries now, though, mattered for more than symbolic reasons. They mattered because the princely domain had begun to acquire a critical function: material extraction—a condition of all effective action, and thus an obsession in feudal monarchy. The Treasury preceded all other political institutions in development. The classic account of 12th-century royal "administration" is FitzNeal's *Dialogue on the Exchequer*, the exchequer being its one great administrative creation. It regularized the royal revenues, and the great pacification under Henry II was, at heart, a matter of reestablishing the central revenues in face of embezzlement by the barons. Extraction increased political "density," and the latter changed institutions.

Still, Henry's charter upon his coronation was little more than an assurance of liberties, grants, and customs. Petit-Dutaillis' study of feudal monarchy tells us that the King's *concilium* attended to "all sorts of business";[71] but, as to particulars, he lists only personal issues (e.g., marriages) and familiar matters of peace, war, loyalty, treason, and the administration of justice.

The last is important, however. Judicial activities now were much enlarged and wholly reorganized—coequal with pomp and war as the core of royal primacy. Indeed, aside from finance and war, the whole royal establishment now looked like a sort of national judiciary. The King's "prime minister" was the Chief Justiciar; the Curia had become a "normal court" for the kingdom, not just an occasional tribunal; the judicial circuits, administering Common Law, had been established; and central justice had largely expropriated the seignorial jurisdictions, of which only "a few islets" remained.[72]

The feudal monarchy thus achieved, gradually, a considerable legal and extractive permeation of society, as a material basis for primacy. Contestation persisted for a long time, but in an increasingly muted, one-sided way. The nascent monopoly over extraction, the increasing practical responsibility for the management of conflicts, and the emergence of specialized institutions to handle these functions, real-

[71] Ch. Petit-Dutaillis, *The Feudal Monarchy in England and France* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1948), 128.
[72] *Ibid.*, 138.

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ized a potential already present in the primal polity; but, more important, all this added to the growth potential of the prince's domain.

The "prophylactic" polity. Substantive primacy, especially when added to symbolic headship, is both gratifying in itself and a supremely valuable resource for acquiring additional resources. Once it is established, struggles for its possession inevitably occur. One of the fundamental tasks of politics is to institutionalize such struggles in order to defuse them—a basic function, for instance, of competition among political parties. But institutionalization is always gradual—a sort of subtheme of development. Early on, contestation for possession of the domain of primacy must involve—in greater or lesser degree—unregulated, brutal conflicts. Lacking institutionalization (or the transformation of real and deadly conflicts into ritualized competition) damage can be limited only by prevention: prophylaxis.

In the prophylactic polity, the overriding objective of the prince is to detect and disarm usurpation, while that of others is to seize or control principality. To protect principality, it is functional to place it in a tangible physical domain and to draw potential usurpers into that domain. Hence, the identification of primacy with the prince's court. It is there that the game of trying to get and keep primacy and its perquisites is played; politics turns inward.

To a degree, however, prophylactic politics must also reach out into society, further than before. Courtly politics cannot be wholly isolated, because the discontents of society might play into the hands of usurpers. Therefore—rather than for altruistic reasons—the princely domain begins to furnish something else that is valuable to society: a degree of controlled social order, as prophylaxis in everyday life against society's *misérables*. The result is both a qualitative change in the nature of politics and the increased penetration of society by its political domain.

In England, *the era of the Tudors* illustrates the stage. The late medieval and Renaissance political struggles in England increasingly had a flavor different from those of feudalism. They were epitomized, and pretty much ended, by Tudor rule, for which "absolutism" is an egregious misnomer. Nothing really was absolute. Rather, the Tudors —especially Elizabeth—successfully coped with conspiracies *within* the realm of princely authority. If anything authoritative was absolute it was courtly absolutism, which transformed Lords into mere courtiers. Concomitantly, political competition was courtly competition—scheming within the firm.

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Nevertheless, one can discern a threshold in the permeation of society by authoritative policy. Outside of the royal palaces, authoritative regulation was still sparse; but before the Tudors (conflict management and extraction aside), authoritative space, outside its royal core, had been virtually empty. A good many histories refer to an abundance of "proclamations" by the Crown, and subservient parliaments and courts, in Tudor times.[73] Elizabeth's parliaments did indeed pass 429 bills. The figure is often mentioned to impress. Actually, it brings out only the limitations of policy making. Elizabeth's reign lasted 45 years; nowadays, British legislative output runs to about a hundred bills a year. Much of Elizabethan "legislation" had to do with issues of diplomacy, foreign intrigues, war, and extraction. Some of the regime's authoritative activities, however, involved a novel extension of authority into society: the systematic maintenance of roads and bridges, the licensing of alehouses, controls over wages, the mobility of labor, entry into trades, dealings in commodities, interest rates, and—most familiar—a uniform law to care for the poor.

Growing political density surely is evident, especially since this reaching out into society supplemented unprecedented ceremonial activity (royal equipages and pageantry) and an even greater increase in foreign adventurism, war, and defense. The primacy of feudal monarchy clearly was now being put to use as a generalized resource. Perhaps this was a response to much-increased "social density": the manufacturing revolution in textiles, mining, iron-making, and petty trades (perfumery, barbering, etc.)—a response, in general, to a busy society of promoters, speculators, patentees, dramatists, composers, astronomers, astrologers, physicians, surgeons, alchemists, sorcerers, explorers. What Black calls "the chaos of society,"[74] however, did not engender policy as an attempt to impose any sort of rational order. Rather, the point of authoritative "outputs" seems to have been an extension of the defusing of courtly intrigues: the prevention of social discontents and marginality that were potentially threatening to the security (and isolation) of the courtly domain. The increased permeation of society under Tudor rule aimed, above all, at prophylaxis: controlling vagabonds, dealing with food riots, limiting speculators, usurers, and drunkards. The Poor Law and the relentless pursuit of religious recusants are all of a piece in this effort. A valuable resource was now being hoarded—though not yet much used for additional gain.

[73] Keir (fn. 46), 98.
[74] J. B. Black, *The Reign of Elizabeth: 1558-1603* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936), 217.

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The polity of interests. When principality no longer needs to be preoccupied with usurpation, but has been institutionalized at least in accepted rules of succession, politics can turn outward for reasons other than prophylaxis. The primacy of a social domain above other domains and, even more, the "distancing" of courts from societies, inevitably lead to a conception of princely power and social order (not "orderliness") as being somehow unrelated. The initial extroversion of the princely domain thus can hardly be concerned with such matters as engineering social harmony or just distribution. In introverted politics, these are matters for natural order or divine ordination. When politics turns outward from the court, then, the purpose is initially not so much to manage society as to exploit primacy as a safe resource: the gainful use of primacy by privilege. In the polity of interests, competition overshadows majesty. Though it in no sense involves democratization, the arena of politics as competition becomes much enlarged and structurally altered. It still takes place in the court, but now also in institutions associated with the court (e.g., parliament) and, to a degree, in society. Through the "outputs" sought by patrons and their clients, the polity, as Durkheim would say, markedly "condenses." Royal administrative and judicial institutions become a rather complex "machinery" government.

In England, such acquisitive exploitation of established primacy—and through it the much enlarged penetration of society—is the essence of the *Georgian period.*[75] One sees the scope of the 18th-century British polity best in the activities of its local officials. The Justices of the Peace were broadly charged with collecting and delivering revenues; assuring the proper practice and flow of trade; looking after the poor, the food supply, prices, and wages; licensing brewers and drinking-houses; supervising gaols; establishing asylums and confining lunatics; seeing to the lighting of streets, their paving, policing, and cleaning. All this required at least an embryonic differentiation of political labor—though bureaucratization had hardly yet begun. There were now distinct judicial and administrative sessions, distinct highway and licensing councils, as well as individual specialists, like road surveyors and constables. Late in the century, new statutory authorities, with special duties, appeared: for instance, turnpike trusts, corporations for

[75] The great work on the Georgian polity is Sir Lewis Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London: Macmillan, 1957); the standard history is J. Steven Watson, *The Reign of George III: 1750-1815* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960); and the best concise political perspective on the period is provided by Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Knopf, 1965).

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administering relief to the poor, and, above all, a growing number and variety of improvement commissions.[76]

This expansion of activities, and of organizations for performing them, was not intended to manage society. The overriding trait of the Georgian polity was that it was a marketplace of influence and spoils. The central level did not really manage society, yet there was extraordinary jockeying among parliamentarians and, as a result, ministerial instability. According to Namier, men went into parliament partly out of a sort of "predestination" (men of "political families"), but even more as clients looking after patrons' interests: as placemen and as purveyors and receivers of favors (there was, says Namier, a "universal . . . plaguing of Ministers on behalf of friends and relations");[77] to advance themselves in the military and administrative services or reap rewards from service; to obtain contracts, jobs, subscriptions, loans, and remittances. The Enclosure Acts and what Beer calls "canal politics" epitomize this extraordinary politics of interests.

The politics of incorporation and of incumbency. When the domain of politics is used chiefly for acquisitive purposes by privileged groups, other groups will try to become incorporated into the game as players, rather than be excluded from it as passive victims. As the stakes grow (that is, the spoils increase) so, one may suppose, does the appetite for shares. Certainly the pervasive theme of early modern (19th-century) British politics is democratization. Tilly depicts the process as one in which excluded subjects first become "challengers," and then, through challenge, incorporated "members" of the polity:[78] voters, of course, and eligible to hold office. The transformation of challenge into membership occurs because the challengers have resources of their own that can be effectively mobilized—such as strikes, violence, and the like.

As the polity's membership expands, and thus becomes more diverse in interest, the political penetration of society necessarily grows rapidly in scope; when "civic incorporation" is virtually total, so is the politicization of social life—but not just in the sense of universal citizenship. Two other processes occur that rapidly transform social into political space. One is familiar: as new members are incorporated, the volume of political demands grows, and with it, the volume of outputs; with outputs, the network of committees, agencies, departments, boards,

[76] Keir (fn. 46), 312-16. [77] Namier (fn. 75), 76.
[78] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

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to define and deliver them; and, with such organizations, their own demands: "withinputs," as David Easton calls them.

Perhaps this chain reaction sufficiently explains the rapid development of political society out of acquisitive politics. I would suggest, though, that a second process supplements the demand-response relation, and perhaps is more consequential. It bears at least a vague resemblance to the Tudor preoccupation with political prophylaxis. To put it starkly: political primacy in the modern polity clearly is more than ever worth possessing and keeping in possession; however great the resources of princes before, they were puny compared to the fully realized monopoly over legitimate power. The theater of political struggle, though, is no longer confined to the small stage of the court; it comprises society as such. Thus, the modern counterpart of coping with conspiracy in order to retain control over the princely domain is either mass suppression or the search for mass support (plus the special support of the more powerful, better organized interests). Mass support is elicited, at least in part, by going *beyond* responsiveness: by "redistributive" policies that make large public groups into clients—collective placemen. The unparalleled scale both of repression in authoritarian modern polities and of the political provision of all sorts of goods in welfare states serves the maintenance of incumbency. No doubt welfare policies and other distributions of benefits result from good intentions; but surely, they also provide benefits, in the form of political support, for their providers. At any rate, here is a parsimonious explanation of the substantial consensus on social policy in the contemporary British welfare state. The politics of incorporation leads logically to that of incumbency.

"Political density" during these stages grows rapidly toward its maximal pole. The vastness of the business done by the machine of government requires, as Durkheim realized, more and more internal complexity of structure, in large part just for keeping things sorted and coordinated; it requires the development of a political "system,"[79] which is not at all the same as a machinery of government. Structures of political competition also become highly organized and institutionalized networks of organizations. In gist, the pomp of primal chiefliness virtually disappears within the systems and networks of the polity.[80]

[79] I use "system" here in the manner of general and political systems theorists; the latter seem to me pertinent only—or anyway, chiefly—to "modern" polities. See, for instance, James G. Miller, "Living Systems: Basic Concepts," *Behavioral Science*, x (July 1965), 193-237; David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

[80] The elevation of the leader in totalitarian polities can certainly be regarded as a reaction against the fathomless sobriety of typical modern political systems. It is,

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Two important questions should be raised about the abstracted stages to determine whether they indeed constitute a general developmental sequence. First: Do the stages occur, *mutatis mutandis*, in other longitudinal political processes, and do they furnish a good typology for the "cross-sectional" classification of polities in the present? If so, we can assert (in the manner of early exponents of the "comparative method" —Ferguson, Comte, Tylor, Morgan)[81] that typological differences among polities are basically developmental: viz., that there is history, not just histories. Second: Would a schematic treatment of political functions, goals, and structures by stages indeed show qualitative distinctions in each class, along with the quantitative growth of the political domain? These questions cannot be treated briefly; they are posed here as items on an agenda to follow up this essay.

5. *What Forces Move Polities from Stage to Stage?*

In the preceding section, I have tried to show sequential connections between stages of political development: how the earlier stages are preconditions for those that follow, and how these, in turn, are latent in preceding stages. (An important, familiar issue for *praxis*—too large to be tackled here—is raised by the question whether stages can be skipped, without the occurrence of pathologies, and without regression.) This demonstration, though, says nothing about the forces that propel polities from stage to stage. We need at least a summary answer to complete our sketch for a theory of political development.

In developmental theory, one wants, ideally, to identify a general motive force that operates throughout developmental time (akin to physical inertia) and also special forces, generated in each earlier stage, which similarly lead to each later stage.

The general motive force at work in the sequence of stages I have described is surely the drive for the direct and indirect benefits of "efficient" primacy in and over society—the direct benefit of social elevation and indirect perquisites, such as material goods. That drive characterizes most directly the transformation of primal, ceremonial polity. The maintenance of primacy for getting other values follows in the polity of interests, and leads to the challenges that incorporate excluded groups in the domain of primacy. The possession of higher positions—primacy in the domain of primacy—animates political motion in the most advanced stage.

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of course, more satanic than sacred. And surely the "system" uses the leader, perhaps more than vice versa.

[81] Nisbet (fn. 12), 189-208.

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Although primacy-seeking is the essence of the initial developmental transformation of polities, it is clear that struggles for establishing an "efficient" principal domain are only resolved when an urgent societal need for such resolution arises. In the West, that need arose from the differentiation of society into distinct but overlapping "corporations" in virtually continuous collision. One may surmise, more generally, that an initial locus of efficient primacy will emerge when it is functionally critical to social integration that this occur—that is, when the integrative force of "mechanical solidarity" no longer works. The theatrical chiefs are destined to win struggles to perform the integrative function, and to reap its benefits.

If there is such a thing as "pure" power politics, it occurs when struggles for primacy have been resolved. Pure power politics is about possessing primacy, not about establishing it. Once the domain of the prince itself is safe, a different propulsive force emerges; we might call it resource conversion.[82]

The results of converting political into other goods now come to pose a quite different, but again functionally critical problem of integration: not of society but of the political domain itself, for the sake of its effective operation. The need for political integration has two facets. As new groups are incorporated into the polity, the plethora of interests and demands they generate must be coordinated: in Almond's terminology, a need exists to aggregate interests, so that demands may be effectively pressed and responded to. More important, as society is greatly politicalized through processes of civic incorporation, the machinery of government grows into a complex system; as a result, efficient management of the system itself must increasingly become a *sine qua non* of political goals, even exploitative ones. Without efficient political management, social life itself is imperiled, precisely because the polity pervades it; and, without such management, power itself is a chimera. In this way, we can see in political development a diminution, if not a metamorphosis, of pure power politics—and still avoid the "fault" of tendermindedness.

Thus, while struggles for primacy propel politics throughout developmental time, at each stage they take different forms and are reinforced by special forces: forces of greed and, more important, forces generated by collective functional needs. These themes of politics—primacy-seeking, power-seeking, greed, and integration—are familiar.

[82] Or, in language that used to be familiar in political science, turning political "base values" into other "scope values." See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 83-92.

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What is not familiar is the special roles they play at different stages of political development.

The process of political development moved by these forces is monotonic in two senses. I have stressed one—the politicalization of society. The long trajectory from social polity to political society can also be considered a modulation from "dignity" to "efficiency" (the most fundamental qualitative social change conceivable), and each stage of the process can be treated as a changing balance between the two. In parallel, polities change structurally from personage to court, to machine, to system.

Conclusion

The idea of political development, then, seems to me capable of renovation along the lines sketched. What I have tried to present is a design along proper "developmental" lines. The design is, and must continue to be, far from a completed theoretical structure. But if it proves to have merit, it helps to answer the final question raised above. It has important implications precisely for the issue that a developmental theory should illuminate: the puzzle of our own modernity. I will mention one such implication for a critical problem in modern political life.

We have lately heard much about a crisis of authority in highly advanced societies. The evidence is overwhelming that there is at least a malaise about authority. Strangely, that malaise seems to exist concurrently with the progressive growth of what people supposedly (and no doubt actually) want authority to be: decent, down to earth, participant, lenient, concordant, open to achievement. Might not the solution of this riddle lie in the "disenchantment" of theatrical politics (which moves affections), by rationally effective but too-drab systems? After all, society and polity remain intangible mysteries; the social sciences are devoted to their understanding. They have become all the more mystifying as they have grown in scale, density, and differentiation. At the same time, dignity has waned in relation to efficiency. More and more, our representative figures are capable but plain, managers but not princes: Fords, Carters, Wilsons, Heaths; in our families, schools, and workplaces, authority increasingly also has derogated rank. We want this, and it seems good; but can we live with it?

Perhaps that is what Weber saw when he forecast a political "polar night of icy darkness and hardness." Perhaps, too, the tension between the needs for what Weber called matter-of-factness and devotion is the force propelling us into the future of political time.

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SOVIET ISLAM AND WORLD REVOLUTION

By MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT*

FOR the past several years, Western observers have speculated about the impact of the revival of Islamic fundamentalism upon the Muslims of the Soviet Union.[1] The question has become more timely and of possible strategic importance since Islamic fundamentalists have come to power in Iran and have threatened the Marxist regime in Afghanistan. Some Western analysts have argued that this revival of Islamic fundamentalism is seen by the Soviet leadership as a threat to the security of their multinational state,[2] and that the quiescent religious identity of the Soviet Muslims will be awakened by the resonance of the religious revivals on their borders.[3] Moreover, such authors maintain that, while the invasion of Afghanistan could be justified on strategic grounds—i.e., to prevent the overthrow of a communist regime on the borders of the U.S.S.R.—a predominant factor in the Soviet calculus was the need to prevent the growing and potentially disloyal[4] Muslim minority within the Soviet Union[5] from becoming flanked by Islamic fundamentalists.

Such arguments are unsubstantiated, however, because the authors

* This article was completed while the author was a Fellow at the Mary Ingraham Bunting Institute of Radcliffe College.

[1] See esp. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Several Nations or One People: Ethnic Consciousness and Soviet Central Asian Muslims," *Survey*, XXIV (No. 3, 1979), 52-64; Bennigsen, "Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus," in Jeremy Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), 334-48; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Ethnic Autonomy in the Soviet Union," in Abul Said and Luiz Simmons, *Ethnicity in an International Context* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976), 150-76; Hélène Carrère D'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire*, trans. by Martin Sokolovsky and Henry A. Lafarge (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979).

[2] Both Iran and Afghanistan have large irredentist populations: in Afghanistan there are Tadzhik, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Kirghiz communities, and in Iran there are Turkmen and Azeri.

[3] See esp. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," *Problems of Communism*, XXIX (March-April, 1980), 38-51; Bennigsen, "Les Musulmans de l'URSS et la crise afghane" [The Muslims of the USSR and the Afghan Crisis], *Politique étrangère*, No. 1 (March 1980), 13-26. Also, Eden Naby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet Afghan Relations," *Asian Survey*, XXII (No. 3, 1980), 237-56; Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," *Orbis*, XXIV (Summer 1980), 201-18.

[4] See Carrère D'Encausse (fn. 1), chap. 8, for her discussion of "homo islamicus."

[5] It has been projected that by the year 2000 one out of every four Soviet citizens will be of Muslim background. See Murray Feshbach, "The Structure and Composition of the Soviet Industrial Labor Force," in NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs, *The USSR in the Eighties* (Brussels: NATO, 1980), 60.

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provide no evidence of religio-political dissent. It may be not only an error, but a dangerous miscalculation, to conclude that the Soviet Union would follow, or is following, a defensive foreign policy to forestall potential unrest in its Muslim regions. The assumptions that the Muslim minorities are potentially disloyal, and that Soviet leadership would invade a neighboring state to prevent the increased exposure of Soviet citizens to the forces of Islamic revival, underlie much of contemporary Western thinking about both the national question and the future course of Soviet domestic politics in general. For this reason, and in order to assess the future direction of Soviet foreign policy—particularly the likelihood that the Soviet Union will actively seek to expand its influence in the Middle East and southwest Asia—the validity of these assumptions must be tested.

Are Soviet interests in these areas necessarily only defensive? Is it not possible that the Soviets believe their developmental models to have been so successful with their own Muslim population that they can be expanded to other Muslim countries? The presence of more than 40 million Soviet citizens of Muslim ancestry need not be seen as a negative factor in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism comes at a time of increasing political discontent in the Muslim world—discontent caused in large part by the inability of many regimes to deal with the political and economic demands of their populations. The religious revival may itself be a response to political instability;[6] if the religiously inspired efforts at reform fail, it is impossible to predict in which direction the Muslim masses will turn. Certainly the Soviet Union will be eager to fill any political void that may come to exist in the Muslim world, particularly in the oil-producing states.

The existence of a large Muslim minority may thus be considered both an advantage and a disadvantage in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet leadership can legitimately claim to have a developmental model that has managed to achieve one of the highest rates of literacy, the best health care system, and the highest general standard of living found anywhere in the Muslim world. While critics can and do cite examples of religious persecution of Soviet Muslims, Soviet officials are quick to counter these arguments with chapter-and-verse quotations from the new constitution and various legal statutes that proclaim the right of religious practice, buttressed by supportive pronouncements by members of the official Muslim hierarchy at inter-

[6] R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Anatomy of Islamic Revival," *Middle East Journal*, XXXIV (Winter 1980), 1-12, at 3.

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national conferences.[7] It is unlikely that these counterclaims are sufficient to assuage the concerns of the most devout, but they may be good enough to convince the elites of economically depressed peoples who are in search of a new panacea.

The object of this article is to examine the complex relationships that exist between Soviet Islam and the Islamic revival going on outside the U.S.S.R. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I shall examine the attitude of the Soviet leadership and that of the official Muslim hierarchy in the U.S.S.R. toward the revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan. In the second part, I will discuss the potential threats of Islamic fundamentalism in the Soviet context, and whether any evidence exists of contacts between Soviet Muslims and more radical or fundamental Muslims abroad. The concluding section will consist of general statements about ways in which the Soviet Union might want to use Islamic fundamentalism to serve the purposes of Soviet expansion in the Muslim regions, and the liabilities that might be incurred at home by such actions.

The Official Soviet Attitude toward the Islamic Revival

Although there may be some disagreement among Western scholars as to the precise nature of Soviet goals in the Middle East, virtually all analysts agree that the policy is an aggressive one, designed to undermine the legacy of U.S. strategic domination in the region.[8] The Soviets are particularly interested in appearing to favor the rise of "progressive" (i.e., anti-Western and, especially, anti-American), forces wherever they come to power.[9] That is true even if, as is the case with some radical regimes in the Middle East, the primacy of Islam is included in the political self-definition of the state. The official Soviet attitude toward a "friendly" nation need not address the religiosity of the latter at all. However, since the Soviets seek to encourage very close ties with several of the radical Muslim regimes, they have chosen to depict the official attitude toward Islam both at home and abroad as relatively tolerant.

[7] There are four government-recognized Muslim Religious Administrations operating in the U.S.S.R. (one each for Central Asia, North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and European Russia-Siberia); only clergy associated with them are permitted to represent the Soviet Muslims abroad.

[8] See esp. Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East Since 1970* (New York: Praeger, 1978); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global* (Boston: Winthrop, 1981); Rubinstein, "The Evolution of Soviet Strategy in the Middle East," *Orbis*, XXIV (Fall 1980), 322-37; Karen Dawisha, "Soviet Policy in the Arab World: Permanent Interests in Changing Influence," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, XX (No. 1, 1980), 19-37.

[9] Rubinstein (fn. 8, 1980), 336, believes that this is characteristic of Soviet strategy for the past generation; it may well date from Khrushchev's initiatives of the mid-1950s.

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Furthermore, they seem to be maintaining a flexible attitude toward Islam as a political force in both Iran and Afghanistan.[10]

The Soviet leadership is quite clearly committed to portraying what Western observers have termed "militant Islam"[11] in a positive light, because its very militancy is in part a product of an anti-imperialist and anti-Western bias. For this reason, the leaders of the U.S.S.R. embraced the overthrow of the Shah of Iran; they have tried to depict the religious basis of the revolution as a manifestation of the anti-imperialist struggle, which, they maintain, was the underlying cause of the popular uprising against the pro-Western Shah. This rhetorical position has been followed fairly consistently for the past two years. It is argued most succinctly in a long article published in January 1980 in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*:

> It hardly needs to be emphasized that anti-imperialism as one form of the active struggle of the peoples of the foreign East against present-day neocolonialism is progressive in its very essence. Another point is equally obvious: in cases in which the struggle begins and continues under slogans that—by virtue of a given country's specific features—take on a religious coloring, the anti-imperialist essence of this struggle does not change. The struggle against neocolonialism is in the vital interests of all liberated states, and it deserves the utmost support.[12]

For the Soviets, the key seems to be whether the political opposition of the Muslims can be used to destabilize the position of the West in general and of supporters of the United States in particular. If so, the militant Muslims are progressive, i.e., anti-imperialist, and their religious opposition should be applauded because their understanding of Islam has led them in the desired direction. This decision to understand religion as a potentially positive force under certain well-defined conditions represents a new conceptualization of Islam by certain members of the Soviet academic establishment, who have turned away from earlier pat and formulistic rejections of Islam as definitionally a negative force.[13] They now substitute the idea that Islam is a complex and variable social and political force.[14] Proponents of this view seem to have gained at least temporary ascendancy within the academic estab-

[10] See Robert H. Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success or Failure?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980); Rouhollah Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975); Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[11] See G. H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (New York: Harper, 1979), 11.

[12] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXII (No. 3, February 20, 1980), 7.

[13] For an example of the earlier perspective, see L. Klimovich, *Islam* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965).

[14] For the more recent view, see T. Saidbaev, *Islam i obshchestvo* [Islam and Society] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).

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lishment, and to have, for the present, the ear of foreign policy makers. How important this view is in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy making is difficult to assess, but it seems to be a part of the calculus of decision making. One piece of evidence is a recent, widely distributed article by G. Kerimov of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences, in which the author argues that

> the green banner of Islam casts its shadow over fighters against imperialism, supporters of revolutionary-democratic transformations and the most doubledyed reactionaries. . . . Islam's rather flexible ideology makes it possible for it to be used by various political forces who sometimes pursue diametrically opposite goals.[15]

By adopting this more tolerant attitude toward Islam, the Soviets provide themselves with considerable flexibility in pursuing their foreign policy goals. They can hail the Iranian revolution in the name of anti-imperialism and support Khomeini as long as he is manifestly anti-American; and then, when he fails to ally himself closely with the Soviet Union, they can attack the fanaticism of the revolution by asserting that "prominent Muslim figures have been trying to subordinate the country's [i.e., Iran's] entire social, economic and political life to exclusively religious precepts."[16]

The standard of Islamic "progressivism" is thus set by the Soviets themselves. They therefore have the luxury of favoring those Muslim leaders who are serving the interests of the world revolutionary movement while condemning Islamic fundamentalism when it is contrary to Soviet strategic goals.

Pakistan is a case in point in the application of this technique. Whereas Western analysts usually consider Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq as an Islamic fundamentalist or "militant Muslim,"[17] the Soviets consider him "reactionary" because of his assertion that Islam and capitalism are natural allies. The issue of Soviet-Pakistani relations is quite a complicated one, and the present strongly religious orientation of Pakistan is only one of many factors promoting Pakistani-Soviet antagonism.[18] Not only are the Soviets quite friendly with rival India, but, since the Soviet occupation of neighboring Afghanistan, the Pakistanis have tried to mobilize strong Muslim opposition. The meeting of Muslim foreign ministers held in Islamabad in January 1980, and

[15] G. Kerimov, "Pod zelenym znamenem Islama" [Under the Green Flag of Islam], *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, XVIII (December 1980), 3; abridged in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXII (No. 52, January 28, 1981), 4 and 11.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] See Jansen (fn. 11).

[18] See William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972); and Donaldson (fn. 10).

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their subsequent condemnation of the Soviet invasion, led Moscow to conclude that the forces of reaction had gained control of the session. Those who criticized the actions of the U.S.S.R. were, according to Moscow, in fact attacking the legitimate and progressive Muslim forces of Afghanistan who supported the government of Babrak Kamal, and who had welcomed the Soviet invasion to protect his government.

It is natural that the meeting of foreign ministers of Muslim nations condemned the Soviet invasion. In their own eyes and in those of Muslims more generally, the Afghan rebels are fighting a *jihad* (holy war). The antireligious policy of former President Amin was part of a broader attack on their traditional society. Although Babrak Kamal has forsworn the former, he, like his predecessor, is a communist and hence a proponent of a new social order. In criticizing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the foreign ministers reflected a general hostility toward the antireligious policy of the Soviets and their communist followers.

This hostility is particularly widespread among the official Muslim religious hierarchy of most Middle Eastern states, which is yet another reason why Moscow has been favorably disposed toward radical Muslims: by necessity, the latter may have a more positive view of the Soviet Union. Still, the Muslim Religious Administration in the U.S.S.R. is permitted to publish an Arabic-language periodical,[19] and its members are encouraged to attend and host international meetings of Muslim clerics; but the Soviet leaders seem to accept that they will not convince most Muslim clergy of their official tolerance of Islam, and they therefore concentrate most of their efforts on trying to shape mass public opinion instead.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the question of the Soviet attitude toward Islam has become more sensitive, and both the Soviets and the new Afghan government have gone to great lengths to demonstrate that they are in support of the basic civil and religious rights of Muslim believers. This issue is of grave importance to the new regime, which cannot hope to achieve legitimacy until it convinces the Afghan masses that the socialist pro-Soviet government is willing to accept the integrity of Islam within the Afghan way of life. In his first address to the Afghan people, Babrak Kamal made it clear that the Revolutionary Council would respect the rights of "the holy religion of Islam" and its clergy.[20] The battle against the rebels was described as a holy

[19] The publication, *The Muslims of the Soviet East*, appears several times a year in English, Arabic, Uzbek, and French.

[20] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXI (No. 52, January 27, 1980), 3.

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war, a "just war of the Afghan people for true democratic justice, for respect for the sacred Islamic tradition. . . ."[21] A few days later, decrees were published which established freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and the right to perform religious rites. In addition, as a sign of good will, several thousand political prisoners were released, many of them clergy.[22]

However, there is little evidence that the efforts of the Soviet Union and the new Afghan leadership have been successful in convincing the population of their good intentions. Although in both the Soviet and Afghan press much attention has been given to the support received from the clergy, pro-regime clerics are few in number; without the backing of the majority of the clergy, popular support of the Kamal regime remains a distant and elusive goal. The Afghan clergy who oppose the rebels remain isolated in the Muslim world, supported only by the Muslim Religious Administration within the U.S.S.R. This establishment body supports the official position that Soviet troops entered Afghanistan at the express invitation of the legal government of that country, and that those who, as "defenders of Islam," oppose the Soviet action are really nothing more than innocent dupes of American attempts to "undermine solidarity between the Islamic countries and incite mistrust and hostility among Muslims."[23]

The Soviet Muslims and the Islamic Revival

It is not surprising that the official Muslim religious establishment in the U.S.S.R. supports the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, almost all evidence suggests that, save for a few defections by Central Asian soldiers,[24] there is little reason to assume that Soviet Muslims were hesitant to support the spread of Soviet-style government into Afghanistan. They were represented in the invasion army and also served as advisers to the three Afghan governments that have been formed since the revolution of April 1978. Because they have the requisite language and technical skills, and also because they genuinely seem to wish to share the advantages of Soviet rule with the Afghans, they are well suited to these tasks.[25]

[21] *Ibid.*, 1. [22] *Ibid.*, 5.

[23] From a statement by the preparatory committee of Muslim Organizations of the U.S.S.R., January 31, 1980, published in *The Truth About Afghanistan* (Moscow: Progress, 1980), 63.

[24] Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam" (fn. 3), 48, cites some evidence of disloyalty, but this seems to have been the exception. See Martha Brill Olcott, "The Soviet Military and Islam," in Kenneth Currie and Gregory Vauxhall, eds., *The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., forthcoming).

[25] Naby (fn. 3), 252.

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Many Soviet Muslims have undoubtedly found the Afghani resistance disconcerting and difficult to understand, since they do not perceive the same tensions between Islam and communism that the rebels do. After more than 60 years of Soviet rule, the very nature and practice of Islam has changed in all the Muslim regions of the U.S.S.R. The harsh and repressive policies of the 1920s and 1930s had their effect: the hundreds of seminaries now closed, the thousands of mosques now barred, and the tens of thousands of clerics now arrested can exert no influence. The Soviet leadership can thus afford to be more tolerant of Islam, and since the mid-1950s the anti-religious policy has been reduced in fervor. Consequently, many Soviet Muslims have encountered a regime whose understanding of religion does not depart much from their own relatively weak commitment to their faith.

For most Soviet Muslims, the identification with Islam is an attenuated one. Almost all the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tatars, Bashkir, Azeris, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and North Caucasian people would affirm that they were Muslims; this response, however, would not imply that they were either practitioners of the faith or conversant in the doctrinal beliefs of Islam. In the Soviet Union it is possible to be both an atheist and a "Muslim," because to claim to be a Muslim merely means that one is proud of having a Muslim heritage. It is difficult to know precisely what percentage of the population of the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union still practice the customs and rituals of Islam. The available information is contradictory. Until the seventies, most Soviet sources maintained that Islam was dying out, practiced only in the most remote rural regions, and then almost exclusively by the elderly. However, more recent ethnographic data have severely challenged the accuracy of this picture; some Soviet scholars claim that more than 50 percent of the Muslim rural population observe such rituals of Islam as daily prayer and fasting during Ramadan, and refuse to work on Muslim holy days. The practice of some Muslim customs, notably circumcision and religious burial, seems to be almost universal among them; party membership does not preclude people from wanting to "honor their relatives by burying them in consecrated soil."[26]

The regime, although desirous in principle of controlling and restricting religious practice, seems to have recognized how nearly impossible it is to wipe out Muslim ritual in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics. The Soviet Muslims themselves see Islamic practice

[26] Saidbaev (fn. 14), 192-221.

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as part of their national culture,[27] and local party officials are not only reluctant to police religious activities, but may themselves be believers.[28] While technically protected under the constitution, a believing Christian would find it almost impossible to be admitted to the party. Practicing Muslims, however, do join the party and serve in its local organs and in the state bureaucracy, although they would find difficulty rising to the top positions in their republics.

Nowhere is this situation more striking than in Turkmenistan, an area that borders on both Iran and Afghanistan, and is thus theoretically a prime candidate for contamination from abroad. The available materials on religion in Turkmenistan give little evidence of popular displeasure with Soviet policy; instead, they reveal that Islam is still a vital force in Turkmen society. Turkmenia was never a center of Muslim education, and Turkmen religious practice has always been strongly influenced by Sufi teachings[29] and the superstitions of Shamanism and other pre-Islamic beliefs. This appears still to be the case today. And while Sufism seems to be on the rise in Turkmenistan, there is no evidence that it is a manifestation of anti-Soviet attitudes. More likely, it is a sign of the pervasiveness of traditional values.

In a 1978 study, an atheistic Turkmen worker reported that the seclusion of women was still practiced in the Turkmen countryside,[30] and that in general women were still reared to follow their traditional social role. Although Turkmen women occupy positions in all sectors of the party, the government, and the economy, they are underrepresented in all but traditionally female pursuits, such as in the textile industry.[31] Here, 90 percent of all employees are women; 99 percent of all weavers and rug makers are women.[32] Turkmen society is still dominated by a strong patriarchal family structure which reinforces the continuation

[27] N. Ashirov, *Islam i natsii* [Islam and Nation] (Moscow: Nauka, 1975) is devoted to this theme.

[28] See D. Kunaev's speech before the recent Kazakh party congress in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, February 5, 1981.

[29] Sufis first emerged about a thousand years ago. They are Muslim ascetics who organize themselves in orders (*tarikas*) and travel among the Muslim masses preaching a return to a simpler, less corrupt Islam. They first came to the territory of the present U.S.S.R. in the 13th century. Sufi brotherhoods developed throughout Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the North Caucasus; they continue to be active today.

[30] N. Bairamsakhatov, *Novyi byt' i Islam* [The New Life and Islam] (Moscow: Politicheskoi literatury, 1978), p. 6.

[31] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVII (No. 11, April 9, 1975), 21.

[32] Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970* [Totals of the All Union Census of Population 1970], VI, *Raspredelenie naseleniia SSSR i soiuznykh respublik po zaniatiam* [Distribution of Population of the USSR and Union Republics by Occupation] (Moscow: Statistiki, 1973), 235-36.

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of traditional attitudes toward women. Few Turkmen women receive a higher education; the 1970 census reported that only 1.4 percent of all Turkmen females had had any higher education (as compared to 5.9 percent of the Turkmen males).[33]

More recent data do not suggest that this is changing as a new generation comes to maturity, and there is little reason to suspect that prevailing social patterns will be altered in the near future. Many traditional social customs are still common. The practice of paying a *kalym* (bride price) is widespread; a well-placed collective farmer can receive up to 10,000 rubles cash, 20 head of sheep, and 100 oriental robes for his daughter.[34] Not only do the local authorities close their eyes to these illegal practices (banned since the 1920s), but village party officials have been chastised in the Soviet press for defending the parents when Turkmen youth refuse to have their parents arrange their marriages.[35]

The present First Party Secretary of the Turkmen Central Committee, M. Gapurof, has admitted that there has been no decline in the number of people observing religious rituals in the republic.[36] Local officials not only tolerate religious practice, but sometimes facilitate the observance of rituals and customs. Thus, the use of official vehicles for organized pilgrimages to local holy sites seems to be quite widespread.[37] Various Sufi orders are well established in the countryside, and their activities have spread to the cities as well. In a recent study on Sufism in Turkmenistan, Professor S. Demidov describes the difficulty of making a film in Askhabad that was supposed to demonstrate that only backward people rely on charms and amulets to cure disease. Not only did the doctor on duty try to thwart the filming, but everyone who came to the children's outpatient clinic on the day in question prominently displayed some sort of amulet.[38]

The Turkmen are often chided in the party press for their devotion to Islam as well as for the generally low ideological level of their artistic and intellectual establishment. But despite the criticism of Turkmen practices, there is little evidence that the regime has devoted much attention to trying systematically to end the influence of religion in Turk-

[33] Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970* [Totals of the All Union Census of Population *1970*], IV, *Natsional'noi sostav naseleniia SSSR* [National Structure of the Population of the USSR] (Moscow: Statistika, 1973), 403.

[34] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVII (No. 11, April 9, 1975), 21.

[35] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVII (No. 38, October 15, 1975), 18.

[36] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXV (No. 16, May 16, 1973), 10.

[37] *Ibid.*, 21.

[38] S. Demidov, *Sufizm v Turkmenii* [Sufism in Turkmenia] (Askhabad: Ylym, 1978), 159-60.

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menistan, or in any of the other Muslim areas. The state no longer considers the eradication of Islam to be a priority. Extirpation was certainly attempted in the early days of the Civil War. The result was the long-lived Basmachi revolt—Turkestani resistance much like that of the Afghans today—which, although officially defeated in 1924, continued to flare up periodically until 1936.[39]

The goal of the Soviet leadership from that time on seems to have been to isolate and restrict the role of religion, to disarm Islam as a political ideology by permitting Muslim believers to continue to practice their rituals in a context where religious education is very difficult to obtain. There are only two Muslim seminaries in all of the Soviet Union, and very limited numbers of Soviet Muslims are permitted to study abroad. The number of mosques is also restricted, and there are only some 200 "cathedral-style" (i.e., large) mosques in the U.S.S.R. These are official mosques, under the control of the four religious boards, and staffed by clerics appointed by them.

The official Muslim establishment is able to do very little about the thousands of small mosques that are technically illegal but elude control because they are deliberately constructed to be as inconspicuous as possible. The activities of the Sufi *ishans* (holy men) are equally hard for the state to track. For precisely this reason, it is often unofficial Islam and not the state-regulated official religious establishment that has the greater impact on the daily lives of Soviet Muslims. But the unofficial clerics are not very threatening. Although they seem to be successful in keeping the degree of religiosity in the countryside high, most of them do not have a complete religious education and so stress ritual rather than dogma; almost all are isolated from the Muslim world beyond the Soviet borders and depend on the official Soviet religious establishment and its libraries for what information they have.

For its part, the regime seems willing to tolerate this situation so long as the Soviet Muslims content themselves with being culturally and not politically distinct. It is not easy to measure the political implications of the attenuated Muslim faith of these citizens. In recent years, the Soviet antireligious establishment (and it is important to remember that "antireligious" theorists are really sociologists of religion) has broken new ground in its approach to the problem of atheism and the political indoctrination of the Muslims. Some writers, in statements similar to those about Islam outside the U.S.S.R., are now arguing that

[39] See Martha Brill Olcott, "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-1924," *Soviet Studies*, XXXIII (July 1981), 352-69.

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even at home Islam can be and is identified with progressive social values. In a recent issue of *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* (Questions of Scientific Atheism) the results of a survey of Muslim workers in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan showed that nearly two-thirds of those surveyed identified their labor with communalist and collectivist ideals; only about a quarter of them linked their work to their religious orientation.[40] In their conclusions, the authors stressed that the Muslim believers do not really threaten the goals of the regime:

> Confronting the results of local investigations of religiosity allows the affirmation that an absolute majority of those considering themselves believers have nonreligious orientations. Muslim value orientations, including moral ones, cease being for them a criterion of decision for such values of life as the choice of professions, getting an education, and founding a family, and they do not spread into their productive activities.[41]

As long as the Soviet leaders can convince themselves that Islam does not provide a direct threat to the political goals of the regime, they will be relatively tolerant of practicing Muslims. While the Muslims are an increasing percentage of the total Soviet population, they are not demanding a greater share of the economic pie or inclusion in the central decision-making apparatus. To date, their chief demands have generally been for greater local autonomy, particularly with regard to cultural issues. Unable really to Russify these populations, the regime seems to be grudgingly allowing them more cultural self-determination—provided, of course, that it occurs within a Marxist framework.[42] Although the intellectuals would like to gain greater freedom of cultural self-expression, the vast majority of Central Asians and Caucasians seem relatively content and do not see Soviet rule as in conflict with their way of life—a way of life that combines their traditional (i.e., national and religious) culture with a strong socialist and Marxist world view.

For these people, Islamic fundamentalism would seem to have little to offer. Because they really are not deeply religious, the Muslim masses are not as seriously disturbed by the atheistic philosophy of the regime as they might otherwise be. They are Muslim by practice, but their faith is simplistic. They do not hold a Muslim world view, or

[40] N. M. Baltina, "Sovetskii obraz zhizni i protsess preodeleniia perezhitkov musul'manskoi morali" [The Soviet Form of Life and the Process of the Eradication of the Survivals of Muslim Morals], *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* (No. 23, 1978), 111.

[41] *Ibid.*, 123 (author's translation).

[42] Martha Brill Olcott, "The Development of Secular Nationalism in Kazakhstan" (unpub.).

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judge events by the moralistic yardstick of the true believer. Nor do they have a strong commitment to restore the primacy of *Shari'a* law, a commitment that is essential to most Islamic fundamentalists.[43] Hence, the arguments of a Khomeini or even of the Muslim Brethren are likely to be very difficult for them to understand, let alone endorse.

However, in the Soviet Union there is one small group of true Muslim believers—people who define themselves in a religious rather than a secular fashion. It is impossible to say how large the group is, and it would be a mistake to magnify either its numbers or its importance. But it does exist, and may well be heartened by what is going on abroad. Fahmi Hawaydi, a Kuwaiti journalist who traveled through Central Asia in 1980, describes an encounter with a small group of Muslim faithful who for nearly three generations have kept the traditions of Koranic study alive, and who live strictly by the tenets of *Shari'a* law. They were aware of the activities of Muslims outside of the U.S.S.R. and had read some of the writings of dissident Egyptian religious writers, such as Sayyid Qutb's *Ma'alim 'ala al-Tariq* (Landmarks along the Way) and Muhammed Qutb's *Shubhatun Hawai al-Islam* (Ambiguities Surrounding Islam), which they obtained from the library of the religious administration of Tashkent.[44] The fact that they had access to the library probably means that they were protected by the official religious establishment which sees itself as serving the entire community of believers. With access to the library, they can keep up with the affairs of other Muslims since the religious board receives newspapers and journals from the rest of the Muslim world on a regular basis.[45]

It is difficult to assess the impact of recent events in Afghanistan and Iran on these people. Even if they viewed the invasion of Afghanistan with dismay—which they may well have done—it is hard to imagine that they would have tried to mobilize opposition to it. As Hawaydi describes them, they are pious students of the faith and not political activists. The Iranian revolution may have encouraged some political activism in Azerbaijian, however: early in 1981, there were reports of the Central Committee of the Azeri Communist Party urging local party agencies to struggle more vigorously against the enemy's ideological sabotage.[46] This single report from Azerbaijian is the only

[43] M. E. Yapp, "Contemporary Islamic Revivalism," *Asian Affairs*, XI, Pt. II (June 1980), 194.

[44] Hawaydi, "Muslims in the Soviet Union: Journalist's Account," JPRS Report, USSR Political and Social Affairs 1058, 28. A translation of "World of Soviet Muslims," *al-Arabi* (Kuwait) (No. 254, 1980), 82-105.

[45] *Muslims of the Soviet East* (No. 2, 1978), 6.

[46] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXII (No. 52, January 28, 1981), 1.

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evidence of any short-term political impact of the Iranian revolution or Islamic fundamentalism on political life in the Muslim regions; it may have been nothing more than camouflage for an attempt by First Secretary of the Azeri Communist Party Aliev's faction to further strengthen its hold on the local apparatus.

Soviet Foreign Policy and the Islamic Revival

What, then, is the impact of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism on the Soviet Union? Does the Islamic revival pose a threat to the domestic stability of the Soviet Union? Or does the existence of new sources of radicalism, even if they are religious in their orientation, provide increased opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its presence in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia?

I would argue that the Islamic revival that the Muslim world is experiencing seems to be having little direct impact on Soviet Muslims. For the masses, the arguments of the religious opposition of Egypt and Syria, or of the ruling groups in Iran, would be difficult to understand; predictions of some Western analysts that a protracted war in Afghanistan might heighten religious opposition in the Soviet Union[47] have not been borne out by the facts. Although there is no evidence of Muslim religio-political dissent in the U.S.S.R., this does not mean that Islam is not a social force in the Soviet Union for the overwhelming majority of Soviet Muslims. It is a social force, but it is not a political force. By recognizing the almost definitional relationship of Islam and the national culture in the Muslim regions, the regime is forestalling—possibly indefinitely—the likelihood that the religious leaders will be able to function as a political pressure group, as they did when they perceived themselves under threat in the early days of Soviet rule.

While Soviet Muslims may not necessarily be satisfied with their situation, they are certainly well integrated into the Soviet social and political structure; both the masses and the clergy have developed a *modus vivendi* with the regime. For the official religious hierarchy, there seems to be at least an informal give-and-take relationship. Although they may ask for the opening of new mosques or increased access to foreign seminaries at times when the Soviet leadership is anxious to appear tolerant of religion, I doubt whether the Islamic revival abroad can serve as an occasion for any sort of basic redefinition of the official church-state relationship in the Muslim regions. The

[47] Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam" (fn. 3), 49.

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clergy realize that, as long as the Muslims are nonpolitical and relatively content with the status quo, the state will tolerate the practice of Islam. As Hawaydi concludes, the situation of the clergy in the Soviet Union may not be very different from that of Muslim leaders living in other states—states which are more tolerant of Islam but nonetheless see it as a rival political force.[48]

Still, doctrinal Islam in the U.S.S.R., although not dead, is certainly in very ill health. But the average Soviet Muslim—born, married, and buried within the precepts of the faith, and observing most of the important holidays—may not be as different from his coreligionists abroad as some of the Islamic revivalists might have us think. True, the reassertion of customary Islamic values, as represented by, for instance, the redonning of traditional garb by Egyptian or Iranian female students, is absent in the U.S.S.R. That is not so surprising, though, if one considers that in many rural areas in the Soviet Union traditional attitudes toward women prevail and traditional dress codes are still commonplace; women who go to the city and attend universities are few in number and are doing so in part as a demonstration of their opposition to the old ways.

To understand why Islamic fundamentalism has not gained, and is not likely to gain, widespread influence among Soviet Muslims, we must view the U.S.S.R. not simply as a communist state with a strong antireligious policy. It is such a state, but it is also a society involved in political and economic development. Nowhere is this more true than in the Muslim regions, and particularly in Central Asia. Whereas it makes good sense to talk about economic stagnation, low levels of agricultural output, and bureaucratic ossification of the Soviet Union when the focus is the U.S.S.R.'s economy as a whole and European Russia in particular, one is on weaker ground making these arguments about Central Asia. Here—unlike in Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey—one cannot talk about the breakdown of modernization, a factor that has contributed to Islamic revivalism in these countries.[49] Since at least the period of the Khrushchev thaw in the mid-1950s, the regime has improved conditions: health care and education have been made more accessible, and the population appears content. The political expectations of the population are quite low, but even here there is a greater sense of participation than previously. The traditional leaders are still running their communities, but are functioning within a new political framework; for the new elites who wish to serve the

[48] Hawaydi (fn. 44), 32.

[49] Dekmejian (fn. 6), 3.

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communist state actively, there are many opportunities for upward mobility within the regional, republic, state, and party bureaucracies.[50]

The generally positive experiences of the Soviet Muslims are put forward by the leaders when they seek to popularize the communist model in the Muslim world. But stressing economic and social achievements is not sufficient. The Soviets also realize that the religious factor is becoming increasingly important in the process of social development in Islamic politics. If the writings of E. M. Primakov (head of the Institute of Eastern Studies of the Academy of Sciences) are indicative of the political outlook of at least one group within the leadership, then interest exists in trying to understand this process in a way that will make the Soviet model more attractive than has previously been the case in the Muslim world. Primakov's emphasis is the "mutual understanding" that can be achieved between the two philosophies:

> It is a secret to no one that fundamental differences exist between Marxist-Leninism and Islam. But the existence of differences, and even disagreements, by no means rules out mutual understanding. Not everyone in the world holds the same beliefs. When the question of respect for state and national interests arises, one's thoughts keep going back to the idea of mutual understanding.[51]

In a recent well-argued article on Islam and social development, Primakov presents the thesis that the present Islamic revival is in itself proof of the failure of the Western model of development, a secular model that tried to integrate Muslim nations into the world economy and the Western culture. This attempt at integration led to a weakening of traditional values but not to the erosion of religion, largely because in most countries at least one significant part of the religious hierarchy was excluded from participation in the political order. Primakov maintains that the discrediting of the Western model will lead to a more general move away from capitalist development. The religious elements cannot rule alone, as there is no "religious" model of development, and they have rejected bourgeois partners (at least in the Iranian case), and will continue to reject them. Consequently, according to Primakov, the "progressive" elements should move in to try and fill this void.[52]

Although the Soviet leaders may eventually see this reasoning as a

[50] See Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet Republics* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic, 1978).

[51] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXII (No. 3, February 20, 1980), 24.

[52] E. M. Primakov, "Islam i protsessy obshchestvennogo razvitiia stran zarubezhnoga vostoka" [Islam and the Process of Social Development in the Countries of the Foreign East], *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 8, 1980), 60-63.

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blueprint for revolution in the Muslim world, they will have to do a lot of public relations work before they can hope to enjoy any great success abroad. Those who maintain this argument face a dual challenge: to convince skeptics at home that a more tolerant view toward religion, and particularly Islam, is in the interests of the Soviet Union both at home and abroad; and to convince Muslims outside of the Soviet Union that communism need not be antagonistic toward religion. The second argument is contrary to a long tradition of Soviet thinking; certainly, with Afghanistan as a constant reminder of the possible conflict between Islam and communism, it goes against practical wisdom as well. The Muslim countries view the Soviets with suspicion, but nonetheless as a useful source of arms and aid. The radical Arab states generally take a strong pro-Soviet foreign policy line, but they have all disapproved of the invasion of Afghanistan. For them, it was proof of the basic antagonism between Islam and communism.

In fact, if the goal of the Soviet leaders was to expand their influence in the Muslim world, the invasion of Afghanistan was probably the worst thing they could have done. Whether or not the regime of Babrak Kamal sincerely wants to seek a rapprochement with the clergy is almost irrelevant. As long as the Muslim clergy of Afghanistan remain vehemently against the communist revolution, the Soviets will continue to be seen as antagonistic toward Islam. It is probably at least in part for this reason that Moscow has given increased publicity to its pro-Palestinian stance which it has justified as a defense of the rights of all Muslim peoples to independence.[53] But the Soviets will have to find a more dramatic way to show their willingness to help an Islamic state achieve a socialist republic which preserves religious freedom if they are to counteract the strong negative impact of their activities in Afghanistan.

For most Muslims this condition is impossible by definition, and it is difficult to imagine such a regime emerging as the outcome of a popular revolution. Nonetheless, many minority regimes have come to power in periods of near-anarchy, and have subsequently managed to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the people. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia may be cited as one such case. This type of scenario seems the most likely one for the Soviets to achieve an Islamic Marxist state. Although the majority of Muslims may think this impossible, many Soviet leaders do not; if they can succeed in "encouraging" a disaffected segment of the elite of a Muslim country (preferably a neighboring state) to seize power, perhaps they will get their chance. If they

[53] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXII (No. 5, March 5, 1980), 4.

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do, it seems quite likely that they will learn—as they did from the failures of Hafizullah Amin's regime and the Afghan civil war—that a Marxist regime in a Muslim country has to achieve popular support by appeasing the religious forces before any program of radical economic and social reform can begin.

Whether the U.S.S.R. will ever be able to help "wish" an Islamic state into existence is hard to know; it will depend as much on the processes of internal political decay within the Muslim world as on any encouragement or aid that the Soviet Union will provide. If such a state should come into existence, the potential implications for the Soviet Muslims will become more complicated. Whereas religious revivalism in the nonsocialist world has had very little impact on their lives, they might well be influenced by the intellectual currents of a society that was both Muslim and socialist, particularly if it was located in a traditional center of Muslim learning. However, that possibility seems distant and quite removed from the minds of the Soviet policy makers; it would seem that they find little threat to their own populations in the present religious revival. With the failure of many Muslim countries to solve their political and economic problems, there is much to encourage their expectation that, in the long run, the Soviet Union may gain influence in that part of the world. Thus, it may well be that Western analysts should shift their attention from considering how the Islamic revival might lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union to what may be a far more pressing and immediate concern—i.e., how the rising level of political disaffection in the Muslim world may favor the Soviet Union's strategic interests in the Middle East.

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WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS

By ARTHUR A. STEIN*

INTRODUCTION

THE importance of misperception as a cause of international conflict, especially war, is commonly accepted. Whether as a primary determinant or a residual one, misperception has been linked with most 20th-century wars, including both world wars and the cold war.[1] Its importance has been emphasized by general work on the role of cognitive processes and by analyses of decision making in the study of foreign policy; yet a theory of misperception remains to be formulated. The most definitive work on the subject, by Robert Jervis, presents a categorization of types of misperception and provides illustrations for each.[2] But the final chapter of the book is entitled "In Lieu of Conclusions," and we still do not know what misperceptions occur, under what conditions, and with what consequences. All too often, the mere occurrence of misperception is taken as *prima facie* evidence that it affected the misperceiving actor's decision, and thus the outcome itself. Moreover, it is universally suggested that the result of misperception is conflict that would otherwise have been avoidable. Although international conflicts are often attributed to misperception, international cooperation never is.

This paper is a first step toward a theory of misperception. The focus here, as it is in most of the literature, is on one actor's misperception of another's intentions rather than on the misperception of capability. The conclusions suggest that misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome; that, when misperce-

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[1] Ralph K. White, "Misperception as a Cause of Two World Wars," in *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars*, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 3-33; Chihiro Hosoya, "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-41," *Journal of Peace Research*, v (No. 2, 1968), 97-115; Stanley Hoffmann, "Revisionism Revisited," in Lynn H. Miller and Ronald W. Pruessen, eds., *Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), 3-26; Ralph K. White, "Misperception in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXXIII (Winter 1977), 190-221.

[2] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

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tion does have such effects, it is in a narrow range of circumstances; and that misperception can lead to cooperation as well as to conflict. Further, the paper elucidates the assumptions about international relations that are implicit in any emphasis on the role of misperception in international politics.

Choices, Interests, Expectations, and Misperceptions

The importance of misperception would be evident if states were not self-interested actors but were, for example, altruists. If an actor chooses a course of action that is based on its presumed effect on others, then misperception can be important. One cannot be a successful altruist if one does not know the preferences of others. But if states in the international arena are self-interested individualists concerned with maximizing their own returns, then misperception matters only under certain circumstances.

Further, misperception can only matter in relations between interdependent states. If states are independent of one another—in the sense that one actor's decisions do not affect another actor's payoffs—then misperception is irrelevant. To borrow the analogy often used by international systems theorists, misperception is irrelevant if world politics approximates a competitive market in which states act as firms. In such a world, the decisions of one actor do not affect the payoffs of others, and an assessment of the intentions of others is unnecessary.[3] If, however, world politics revolves primarily around a few major powers and approximates an oligopolistic market with imperfect competition, then the actors can be seen as interdependent in the sense that the actions of any state affect those of others.

Finally, the belief that misperception is important necessarily implies that international politics is a variable-sum game. In any constant-sum game, an actor can determine another's preference ordering simply by recognizing the game as constant-sum and knowing its own preferences.[4] If the two actors' payoffs add up to the same constant in each of

[3] In a competitive market, an actor may misperceive the market and the nature of supply and demand conditions. But this does not involve misperception of any individual actor's intentions. The market analogy is prevalent in the works of Waltz and Kaplan: see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Morton A. Kaplan, *Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis* (New York: Free Press, 1979).

[4] If an actor knows not only its own preferences and the fact that it is in a constant-sum game but recognizes the game as zero-sum, then it can determine not only the other's preferences but its actual utilities as well.

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the four possible outcomes, then one actor's worst outcome must be the other's best, and so on. In other words, misperception, the incorrect assessment of another's preferences, cannot occur in situations of pure conflict in which one actor's gain comes at another's expense. Misperception cannot matter in such situations; it can only matter in relationships that combine elements of cooperation and conflict.

The argument that misperception affects an actor's decision presumes that the actor has a choice. Some maintain that actors do not always see that they have a choice, and misperceive others to have a wider latitude.[5] Indeed, national leaders may not have choices because of structural or systemic constraints, or because of their own cognitive processes. But if they see themselves as having only a single course of action, then their assessment of the intentions and preferences of others is moot, and their belief that others have alternative choices affects only their expectations. There is no reason to argue that they would have acted differently had they perceived others accurately.

Misperception need not affect the decision of an interdependent actor who does have a choice, even when it affects that actor's expectations. It would not, for example, affect the behavior of any actor with a "dominant strategy"—a course of action that maximizes its returns no matter what others do. Such an actor need not know or care about the preferences of others; at most, an inaccurate assessment (misperception) of another's preferences will affect its expectations.

The American-Japanese crisis of 1940-1941 illustrates the effect of misperception on expectations. In a study of this and other crises, Snyder and Diesing follow the convention of dichotomizing the choices of states as cooperation/concession and defection/standing firm.[6] Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between two states with those two choices, an interaction that will result in one of four different outcomes: either both actors cooperate (CC), both defect (DD), or one defects while the other cooperates (CD and DC).

Snyder and Diesing designate the American-Japanese crisis of 1940-1941 as a game of "deadlock" (Figure 2), in which both the Japanese and the Americans had dominant strategies—courses of action that they preferred no matter what the other intended to do. In addition, both

[5] L.L. Farrar, Jr., "The Limits of Choice: July 1914 Reconsidered," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XVI (March 1972), 1-23; Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis Escalation War* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).

[6] Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

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FIGURE 1

A GENERAL TWO-ACTOR GAME

		ACTOR *B*	
		C: Accommodative Strategy (*B* concedes or cooperates)	D: Coercive Strategy (*B* defects, stands firm, makes no concessions)
ACTOR *A*	C: Accommodative Strategy (*A* concedes or cooperates)	CC Mutual cooperation or compromise	CD *B* gets its way
	D: Coercive Strategy (*A* defects, stands firm, makes no concessions)	DC *A* gets its way	DD (war) Mutual defection or deadlock

The cell labels CC, DC, CD, and DD are derived from the individual strategies that combine to create that outcome. The DC outcome, for example, results from *A*'s choosing D while *B* chooses C.

most preferred to stand firm while the other capitulated. Next, each preferred war (both standing firm); then, mutual compromise. The least desirable outcome for each was to capitulate while the other did not. The outcome that emerged from their independent choices, made in line with their dominant strategies of standing firm, was mutual defection. This outcome was an "equilibrium" one—that is, an outcome from which no individual actor can shift unilaterally without making itself worse off.

FIGURE 2

DEADLOCK

		ACTOR *B*	
		Cooperate	Defect*
ACTOR *A*	Cooperate	2, 2	1, 4
	Defect*	4, 1	3, 3**

Cell numerals refer to ordinally ranked preferences:
4 = best, 1 = worst.

* Actor's dominant strategy
** Equilibrium outcome

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If the United States and Japan had accurately perceived the other's preferences, they would have expected war. Each might have believed, however, that the other had a dominant strategy not of defection, but of cooperation. In this case, each would have expected the other's capitulation. Alternatively, each might have believed that the other's strategy was not dominant, but contingent. The United States, for example, might have believed that the Japanese would stand firm only if it capitulated, but that they were certain to compromise if the United States stood firm. But because each knew that it would stand firm no matter what the other did, each could have expected only war or capitulation on the other's part. Knowing that it would stand firm regardless of the other's behavior, either side's misperception of the other's preferences would lead it to anticipate an outcome other than that which actually occurred. Because misperception could only affect expectations and not decisions, both sides may have been surprised to find themselves at war. But they would not have acted differently if they had perceived the other's preferences accurately.[7]

This distinction—that misperception can lead an actor with a dominant strategy to expect an outcome that is different from the actual one without affecting its course of action[8]—is an important one, especially in view of the recent interest in strategic surprise. Evidence of surprise, or of inaccurate expectations, cannot be used to infer that an actor would have acted differently if it had perceived the other's intentions accurately. Many examples of strategic surprise are cases in which the actors were clearly enemies, and in which the surprised state was supposedly vigilant in its continual assessment of its opponent. That it was, in fact, surprised is only evidence that misperception affected its expectations. One certainly would not conclude that it was

[7] This analysis provides an interesting perspective on the question of whether President Roosevelt acted to bring on the war with Japan. It is not accurate to suggest that he wanted war, for the most preferred outcome was Japanese capitulation to American demands. On the other hand, he did prefer war to either compromise or capitulation by the United States, and understood that the American commitment to standing firm made war a possible outcome. In view of his belief that Japan would capitulate, Roosevelt did not expect war to be the outcome, but he did intend to stand firm, the possibility of war notwithstanding.

An interesting revisionist challenge might then be the following: Roosevelt did not misperceive Japanese preferences, recognized the game to be "deadlock," and knew that war was coming. Although he continued to stand firm by American demands, he did not actively prepare for war because he did not want to be accused of wanting war or of bringing it about. He thus pretended to expect Japanese concessions, knowing full well that, given the context, war was inevitable.

[8] Misperception need not even affect an actor's expectations. An actor can assess the actual preference ordering inaccurately and still perceive another's dominant strategy accurately.

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misperception that led to a conflict which would otherwise have been avoidable.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provides a recent illustration. By all accounts, the Soviets were quite understandably surprised by the American reaction. Although they did not expect plaudits from the West, they did not foresee the depth and intensity of America's response. This surprise can be taken as evidence of misperception on the part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, one cannot conclude that it would not have invaded if it had forecast the American reaction accurately. The decision to invade was almost certainly *not* contingent on an assessment of the likely Western response. Rather, the nature of regional politics apparently dictated the Soviet decision. Again, surprise can be taken as evidence that misperception affected expectations, but not that it affected choice.

Misperception and Contingency

Misperception can only affect the choice of an actor whose decision is contingent on the actions of others.[9] By crudely dichotomizing foreign policy choices into cooperation and defection, we can delineate two possible contingent strategies. An actor may be a "reciprocator" —prepared to cooperate if others cooperate, and prepared to stand firm if others fail to bend. Alternatively, the actor may be an "opportunist" —prepared to stand firm if others cooperate, but prepared to cooperate if they stand firm. Each must assess the preferences and intentions of others because they are central to its own decision; its misperception may be one of two kinds: either that the other has a dominant strategy when it actually does not, or that the other has a contingent strategy when it actually does not.

When neither actor has a dominant strategy, there are four possible outcomes (see Figure 3): both actors reciprocate, neither actor reciprocates, one actor reciprocates while the other does not, and vice versa. In a world of mutual reciprocity (a "tit-for-tat" world), each party is prepared to respond in kind to the actions it expects the other to take, cooperating when the other cooperates and responding to defection

[9] Steven J. Brams, "Deception in 2 x 2 Games," *Journal of Peace Science*, II (Spring 1977), 171-203, analyzes the situations in which actors have an incentive to deceive others. One cannot simply call misperception the flip side of deception, however, and presume that situations in which the outcome is affected by deception constitute the universe of situations in which misperception affects the outcome. After all, misperception can occur even when the misperceived actor has no incentive to deceive. Moreover, the present paper is specifically concerned with assessing the implications of misperception for international conflict and cooperation, and the conclusions suggest that situations in which actors have an incentive to deceive are not the ones in which misperception results in otherwise avoidable conflict.

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with defection. In a nonreciprocal world (one exemplified by the game of "chicken"), neither actor is prepared to respond in kind to the other (each will cooperate when it expects the other to defect and will defect when it believes the other will cooperate); reciprocal situations are similarly characterized by no-conflict or two-equilibria games. Situations in which one actor reciprocates and the other does not are *always* games without equilibrium outcomes.

FIGURE 3

THE EFFECTS OF MISPERCEPTION WHEN NEITHER ACTOR HAS A DOMINANT STRATEGY

	The misperceived column actor has no dominant strategy, preferring: C when the other defects (and D when the other cooperates)	The misperceived column actor has no dominant strategy, preferring: D when the other defects (and C when the other cooperates)
The misperceiving row actor has no dominant strategy, preferring: C when the other defects (and D when the other cooperates)	CHICKEN WORLD Misperception emboldens (leading to DC outcome) or frightens (leading to CD outcome)	NO-EQUILIBRIUM WORLD Misperception leads either to CC or DD outcome
The misperceiving row actor has no dominant strategy, preferring: D when the other defects (and C when the other cooperates)	NO-EQUILIBRIUM WORLD Misperception leads to CD or to DC	TIT-FOR-TAT WORLD Misperception leads either to DD or its avoidance

MISPERCEIVING A DOMINANT STRATEGY

The implications of an actor's erroneous belief that the other actor has a dominant strategy are detailed in Figure 3. In only two of these cases can misperception result in unnecessary war, a DD outcome that would not have occurred had the actors accurately perceived one another's intentions. One of them occurs when the misperceiving actor is a reciprocator who mistakenly believes that the other has a dominant strategy of defection when, in fact, it too is prepared to reciprocate. It is exemplified by the vigilant status-quo state that believes another status-quo state to be an aggressor. In the second case of misperception that results in otherwise avoidable mutual defection, the misper-

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ceiver is an opportunist who believes the other actor to have a dominant strategy of cooperation. War results because the misperceiving actor cheats on an opponent believed certain to capitulate but actually willing to reciprocate. For instance, prior to World War I, Germany was perhaps an opportunitist in assessing British preferences in July 1914. Germany might have been deterred had it seen that Britain was prepared to reciprocate, but Germany's misperception of Britain as a cooperator led to an otherwise avoidable war. Other examples of misperception—such as the North's invasion of South Korea in 1950 and the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba—typically fall into this category of an opportunist's misperceiving a reciprocator as a cooperator.

In these cases, deterrence fails because the misperceiving opportunist incorrectly sees a reciprocator as a cooperator. The misperception causes an otherwise deterrable, and thus avoidable, conflict. But the previous deduction—that avoidable war is a result of a reciprocator's misperception of another reciprocator as a defector—suggests that deterrence can also fail because of misperceived hardness, and not just because of misperceived softness. In both cases, the *misperceived* actor is a reciprocator. When the misperceived actor is an opportunist, misperception does not lead to the DD outcome.

In these two cases, in which both actors have contingent strategies but one believes the other to have a dominant strategy, neither the misperceiving actor nor the misperceived one is likely to welcome the occurrence of a misperception that leads to mutual defection—not, that is, unless they most prefer to go to war. The misperceiving actor knows that its decision is contingent on what the other actor does. It thus needs to know what the other will do, but has no reason to hide its own preferences. Similarly, the misperceived actor, prepared to respond in kind to both cooperation and defection, has no incentive to mask its true preferences. Such a reciprocator does not wish to be seen as a capitulator by an opportunist, and, if it does not want war, it does not wish to be seen as an aggressor by another reciprocator.

It is important to note that one actor's misperception of another as having a dominant strategy can also facilitate the avoidance of war and mutual defection. If an actor inappropriately believes that the other has a dominant strategy when it really does not, the misperceiving actor has a cue as to how it should behave. The misperception transforms a fluid situation in which there is either no equilibrium outcome or two equilibria into one with a single equilibrium; it provides a clear course of action for a misperceiver with a contingent strategy. It can facilitate cooperation—for example, when a reciprocator misperceives another reciprocator as a cooperator. The potential outcome of

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mutual defection is avoided and the misperception facilitates the occurrence of the outcome of mutual cooperation.

The belief that an actor has a dominant strategy when it actually has a contingent one can also assure the avoidance of war by leading the misperceiver to capitulate. When an opportunist wrongly perceives another nonreciprocator to be bent on defection, its misperception ensures the certain avoidance of mutual defection by frightening it into cooperating. In such situations, the misperceived actor has some incentive to mask its true preferences in order to induce the other to capitulate. In a game of "chicken," for example, an actor has an incentive to mask its true preferences: to appear to have a dominant strategy of defection. In Figure 4, the actual game is "chicken," but actor *B*'s misperception of the situation as "called bluff" leads it to cooperate because it believes *A*'s dominant strategy to be defection. The misperception facilitates coordination since it leads *B* to cooperate and accept the equilibrium outcome in which it does not receive its best possible payoff. An accurate perception might have led *B* to expect the DC outcome and defect, or to signal its opponent that it would cooperate and thus expect the CC payoff. Understanding the true nature of the situation would lead *B* to do everything possible to avoid the CD outcome, but misperception facilitates coordination and leads *B* to accept the equilibrium outcome in which it gets its third-best payoff. In other words, misperception makes *B* into an unknowing altruist. This situation is one in which actor *A* has an incentive to deceive *B* about its true preferences and so to induce *B*'s charitable behavior.

FIGURE 4

ACTOR WITHOUT A DOMINANT STRATEGY MISPERCEIVES A DOMINANT STRATEGY

Situation perceived by B

ACTOR *A* \ ACTOR *B*	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3, 3	1, 4
Defect*	4, 2**	2, 1

CALLED BLUFF

Actual situation

ACTOR *A* \ ACTOR *B*	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3, 3	2, 4
Defect*	4, 2	1, 1

CHICKEN

Cell numerals refer to ordinally ranked preferences:
4 = best, 1 = worst.

* Actor's dominant strategy
** Equilibrium outcome

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The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis may be an example of such a situation. The Russians were certainly opportunists who cheated by placing missiles in Cuba on the assumption that the United States would capitulate and accept their presence; the Soviets were also prepared to withdraw the missiles if they believed at any point that the United States was prepared to launch an air strike. If we assume that the United States was similarly opportunist and not truly prepared to go to war, then what frightened the Soviets into backing down was their misperception of the United States as bent on standing firm. Such a misperception transformed a game of "chicken" into one of "called bluff." Deception facilitates the avoidance of conflict rather than exacerbates the possibility of its occurrence. In this case, the United States had an incentive to deceive the Soviets, and the Soviet misperception facilitated de-escalation and the avoidance of greater conflict.

MISPERCEIVING A CONTINGENT STRATEGY

The other major misperception for an actor without a dominant strategy is to assume that the other actor is also without a dominant strategy (see Figure 5). Here too, misperception can either lead to conflict or facilitate cooperation. The situation is transformed from one in which the misperceiver has a clear course of action because it knows the other's dominant strategy into one where it is uncertain. The misperception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for causing conflict or facilitating cooperation. This occurs, for example, when the misperceived actor has a dominant strategy of defection and the misperceiving actor is a nonreciprocator. An accurate assessment by actor *A* in Figure 6 would lead to CD as the equilibrium outcome. Actor *A*'s misperception, however, leads it to believe that DC is also an equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by *A*'s convincing *B* that it will defect, thus forcing *B* to cooperate. Actor *A*'s misperception can result in a DD outcome. In this case, the misperception does indeed affect the decision of the misperceiving actor and exacerbates the inherent conflict. It is not, however, the sole cause of the otherwise avoidable mutual defection; rather, the outcome is a result of the combination of the misperception and the opportunist's obstinacy.

This analysis of misperception suggests a number of important conclusions. First, misperception can affect an actor's choice only when that actor's decision is contingent on the behavior of the other actor: misperception is irrelevant for an actor with a dominant strategy. Second, despite the fact that misperception can affect an actor's choice, it need not necessarily lead to an undesired war (a non-equilibrium DD

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FIGURE 5

MISPERCEPTION WHERE THE MISPERCEIVING ACTOR HAS NO DOMINANT STRATEGY, BUT WHERE THE MISPERCEIVED ACTOR DOES HAVE A DOMINANT STRATEGY

	The misperceived actor actually has a dominant strategy of: Cooperation	The misperceived actor actually has a dominant strategy of: Defection
Misperceiving actor without a dominant strategy prefers: C when the other defects (and D when the other cooperates)	Outcome should be DC: Misperceiving actor sees no-equilibrium world or "chicken" world of two equilibria	Outcome should be CD: Misperceiving actor sees no-equilibrium world or "chicken" world of two equilibria
D when the other defects (and C when the other cooperates)	Outcome should be CC: Misperceiving actor sees no-equilibrium world or "tit-for-tat" world	Outcome should be DD: Misperceiving actor sees no-equilibrium world or "tit-for-tat" world

FIGURE 6

ACTOR WITHOUT A DOMINANT STRATEGY MISPERCEIVES OTHER ACTOR TO HAVE NO DOMINANT STRATEGY

Situation perceived by A
ACTOR *B*

ACTOR *A*	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3, 3	2, 4
Defect	4, 2	1, 1

Actual situation
ACTOR *B*

ACTOR *A*	Cooperate	Defect*
Cooperate	3, 3	2, 4**
Defect	4, 1	1, 2

Cell numerals refer to ordinally ranked preferences:
4 = best, 1 = worst.

* Actor's dominant strategy
** Equilibrium outcome

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outcome); it can also facilitate cooperation and prevent conflict. Moreover, misperception can cause conflict only if the misperceived actor has either a dominant strategy of defection or a contingent strategy of reciprocity. Third, in those cases in which misperception can cause conflict, the misperceived actor has no desire to mask its true preferences. When one actor does, in fact, wish to hide its true preferences, such a successful deception actually facilitates coordination and the avoidance of conflict.

MISPERCEPTION AND SEQUENTIAL CHOICE

The foregoing analysis does not specify whether the actors choose simultaneously or sequentially. A criticism often made of game-theoretic work is that it presumes simultaneous choice, and thus fails to capture the dynamic nature of international relations, which do not occur in a historical vacuum but in an ongoing context of action and reaction. Yet if international politics is indeed a dynamic sequence of actions and reactions, it becomes more difficult to argue that misperception is important in determining international outcomes. If misperception can only affect the decision of an actor whose choice is contingent on another's, then one must add more assumptions to make a case for the importance of misperception in a world of sequential decisions. After all, when an actor with a contingent strategy is responding to another's actions, it already knows how the other has acted. An actor with a contingent choice simply takes its cue from the immediately preceding behavior of the other.

For misperception to matter in a world of sequential decisions, the misperceiving actor's choice must be contingent on the other actor's *future* behavior—on how the other will respond to its current choice. Moreover, one has also to add the assumption that the other's future choice will differ from its previous behavior. In other words, two assumptions must be added if one wants to argue that misperception matters in a world of sequential decisions: that the misperceiver's decision is contingent on the other's future choice, *and* that the other's future preferences will differ from those reflected in its past choices. Given these two additional assumptions, the previous analysis of the situations in which misperception matters can be generalized. It is argued above, for example, that a reciprocator's misperception of another reciprocator as a cooperator leads to the avoidance of conflict. An example is perhaps provided by Neville Chamberlain's dealings with Germany in 1938. By the end of the Munich crisis, Chamberlain clearly knew Hitler's intentions regarding Czechoslovakia, but Chamberlain's decision as to what to do was contingent on his expectations of Hitler's future be-

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havior. Chamberlain was by then ready to reciprocate future German defection or cooperation, but can be said to have been uncertain about Hitler's future preferences. His misperception was to believe Hitler's assurances that these were his last demands. Chamberlain did not extrapolate from Hitler's past and current behavior; he made his contingent decision in 1938 based on his mistaken belief that Hitler would be a cooperator in the future.

The argument about the importance of misperception in the Soviet decision to deploy missiles in Cuba must also include these additional assumptions if it is to place the Soviet decision in a broader context that includes action and reaction. The Soviets were opportunists whose decision was contingent on their calculation of the likely American response to their action. Their mistake was to extrapolate from American behavior during the Berlin wall crisis, and thus expect the United States to cooperate and accept Soviet missiles in Cuba. In the Berlin crisis, however, the United States had had a dominant strategy of cooperation, whereas in the missile crisis it had a contingent strategy that led it to respond not by capitulating, but by standing firm.

To repeat: the above deductions of the situations in which misperception matters can be generalized to a world of action and reaction with the addition of two assumptions. These are that the misperceiving actor's choice is contingent on its expectations of the other's subsequent and future behavior, and that the other's preferences are different from those reflected in *its* past actions.

This change in the misperceived actor's preferences often lies at the root of the misuse of history. Incorrect historical lessons are often inappropriate extrapolations of others' preferences and behavior.[10] The historical interpretations may be, and indeed usually are, correct. A problem arises only when the misperceived actor's preferences change from what they have been in the past. Even so, the misperception that results from such inappropriate extrapolation matters only when the misperceiver's decision is contingent on its expectations of the other's subsequent response.

MISPERCEPTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The foregoing conclusions, derived from an analysis of all possible games, are obviously applicable to any subset that best exemplifies real-world situations.[11] In a major and wide-ranging empirical study of

[10] Cf. Jervis (fn. 2), 217-82; Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

[11] Anatol Rapoport and Melvin J. Guyer, "A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games," *General Systems,* XI (1966), 203-14, enumerate the 78 unique 2 x 2 games. Most do not have labels and probably not all have real-world equivalents.

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crisis dynamics, Snyder and Diesing find that all of the historical events they analyze can be represented by nine games (Figure 7). Some of the nine are familiar ones that already have well-known labels: *prisoners' dilemma, chicken, hero*, and *leader*. The five other games they find to represent common real-world occurrences are those they call *deadlock, called bluff, protector, bully*, and *big bully*. They argue that some of these games (*hero, leader*, and *protector*) characterize the relationships of allies, and that others (*bully, big bully*, and

FIGURE 7

NINE CRISIS SITUATIONS



* Actor's dominant strategy
** Equilibrium outcome

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deadlock) exemplify relationships between adversaries. Three of the games (*prisoners' dilemma, chicken*, and *called bluff*) may characterize relationships between either allies or enemies.

Snyder and Diesing provide numerous historical examples of misperception in both kinds of relationships. Their discussion of misperception is derived from their analysis of these historical cases, but it is also possible to assess the impact of misperception through the formal analysis of the nine games that, according to their argument, characterize international crises. Assuming that Snyder and Diesing's nine games constitute the universe of crisis situations, the implications of misperception can be assessed by separately analyzing the preference orderings of one actor (the row player, *A*) for all of these games (see Figure 8).[12]

Actor *A*'s preferences clearly define five of the nine situations in which it need not bother to assess *B*'s preferences—much less assess them accurately—as long as it knows its own. When *A* knows, for example, that it prefers the outcome DC to CC to CD to DD, then the game must be *chicken*. Moreover, if *A* knows its own preferences and knows that these nine games constitute the universe of situations, it can sometimes deduce *B*'s exact order of preference.

In the other four games, however, *A*'s preferences alone do not define the game. Thus, *A* must accurately perceive *B*'s preferences in order to know what the game actually is. Otherwise, *A* might confuse *bully* and *deadlock*, two games in which its preference orderings are the same. Similarly, *A* might confuse *prisoners' dilemma* with *called bluff*. Even in these four situations, misperception does not affect *A*'s behavior or, therefore, the game's outcome. In both *bully* and *deadlock*, *A* prefers to defect regardless of *B*'s actions. Mistaking one game for the other will lead *A* to expect the wrong equilibrium outcome (DC in *bully*, DD in *deadlock*), but will not change *A*'s course of action. Since actor *A* also has the same dominant strategy in both *prisoners' dilemma* and *called bluff*, misperception again will cause *A* to expect the wrong outcome but will not lead it to change its behavior.

Thus, misperception cannot affect the behavior of the row player (actor *A*) in any of the nine games found by Snyder and Diesing to characterize international crises. There are five games that *A* cannot

[12] The analysis that follows assumes that actors know that these games constitute the universe of crisis situations. Although Snyder and Diesing's (fn. 6) argument—that the universe of crisis situations they analyze reduces to these nine games—is convincing, there may, of course, be other games that capture the essence of situations which occur in international relations. Nevertheless, many preference orderings are nonsensical when applied to international politics; thus, decision makers may implicitly understand that the universe of possible situations is limited.

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FIGURE 8

PREFERENCES OF ACTOR *A* IN NINE CRISIS SITUATIONS



* Actor's dominant strategy

possibly mistake for one of the others. In the rest, misperception may lead *A* to mistake one game for another and thus expect the wrong outcome; but in each of these cases, *A* has a dominant strategy, and its course of action remains the same regardless of *B*'s intentions.

For actor *B*, life is not quite as simple, since its preference orderings define just three of the nine games unambiguously (see Figure 9).

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Only in *deadlock, prisoners' dilemma*, and *hero* are *B*'s preferences enough to let *B* know what game it is playing. On the other hand, actor *B*'s preference orderings are identical in *called bluff, bully, big bully*, and *chicken*, and *B* must accurately perceive *A*'s preference ordering to know what the situation is. Similarly, actor *B*'s preference orderings are the same in *protector* as in *leader*, and here too, a knowledge of *A*'s preference ordering is necessary for *B* to know the true context.

FIGURE 9

PREFERENCES OF ACTOR *B* IN NINE CRISIS SITUATIONS



* Actor's dominant strategy

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Actor *B*'s misperception of *A*'s preferences, and its possible confusion of *called bluff, bully, big bully*, and *chicken*, is more of a problem for it than is *A*'s similar confusion of *bully* with *deadlock* and *prisoners' dilemma* with *called bluff*, for *B* does not have a dominant strategy in any of these four games. Yet, because actor *A does* have a dominant strategy (D) in three of the four (*called bluff, bully*, and *big bully*), *B*'s behavior is not affected by its mistaking any of these three for one of the other two. *B* is forced to cooperate with *A* in these games, and the equilibrium outcome is always DC. *B*'s error does not affect the game's solution.

If, however, *B* believes *chicken* to be one of the other three games, its misperception *may* affect its behavior and the game's outcome as well. If *B* believes the game to be either *called bluff, bully*, or *big bully*, it will automatically cooperate with *A* rather than stand firm (which would have produced its most preferred outcome by forcing *A* to back down). In other words, *B* makes the error of believing it is weaker because it mistakenly assumes *A* to have a dominant strategy.

Yet, even when *B*'s behavior is affected by its confusion of *chicken* with one of these other games, the outcome may not be affected. The outcome changes only when *B* happens to be the actor who would not have backed down first had both parties correctly understood the game to be *chicken*. There are two equilibrium solutions to the game of *chicken*, CD and DC, as well as the natural outcome, CC. Actor *B*'s misperception guarantees the DC outcome, which is to actor *A*'s advantage. The DD outcome is also a possible (albeit unlikely) outcome to the game of *chicken*, however; *B*'s misperception, by forcing *B* to cooperate, thus insures that they avoid the disastrous DD outcome.

Another possible misperception is *B*'s belief that *called bluff, bully*, or *big bully* is actually *chicken*. Here, the problem is the opposite of the one discussed above. Actor *B* does not recognize that *A* has a dominant strategy of defection that requires *B* to cooperate. *B*'s accurate assessment of the situation would lead to a DC outcome, one of two possible equilibrium outcomes in the game of *chicken* (the other is *CD*). *B*'s error affects the outcome only if *B* insists on defecting since it expects that *A* will cooperate. In this case, CD would be the result. Actor *A*'s dominant strategy, however, is to defect. Even if the misperception is sustained, the end result should be the same, for in *chicken, B* must cooperate if *A* does not. In playing a game it believes to be *chicken, B* attempts to convince *A* that it will defect while at the same time it tries to determine whether *A* is more likely to cooperate or defect. This is a situation in which *B* should try particularly hard to determine *A*'s true

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preferences. Even if the misperception continues, the search should at least suggest to *B* that *A*'s commitment to defection is a strong one, thus inducing *B*'s cooperation (result: DC). Thus, even if *B* is mistakenly playing *chicken* rather than one of the other three games, the outcome should be the same; *B* will concede as it becomes clear that *A* intends to defect. The misperception heightens tension in that the DD outcome will occur if *B* insists on defecting; but DC, the equilibrium outcome for the real game, typically emerges despite the misperception. Even if DD does occur, the misperception is only one part of the cause; it must be conjoined with *B*'s obstinacy as well.

Finally, there is one other case of misperception that can occur. Actor *B*'s preference orderings are the same in both *leader* and *protector*. Once again, *B* has no dominant strategy, but the two games do differ with respect to *A*'s position. *Protector* refers to a relationship between allies in which *A* is *B*'s protector. In this situation, *A*'s dominant strategy is to defect, and *B* does not mind cooperating since it obtains its second-best outcome. *Leader*, also an alliance game, differs from *protector* in that *A* has no dominant strategy, and the two actors must coordinate their actions. If *B* mistakes a game of *leader* to be *protector*, then *B* is shortchanging itself by allowing *A* to defect and reap the benefits. The misperception provides *B* with its second-best outcome rather than the more preferred outcome it might have been able to achieve. In effect, the misperception solves the problem of coordination by leading actor *B* to forgo the possibility of the CD outcome and accept the DC outcome (both are equilibrium solutions).

The reverse misperception is more problematic. If *B* perceives the game to be *leader* when it is really *protector*, then *B* is in for a rude awakening if it attempts to lead by defecting. If *B* does defect, then it hurts itself by ensuring its own worst payoff and *A*'s second-best one. This misperception occurs among allies when the weaker party thinks of itself as being on an equal footing with the stronger one. The result is that the misperceiving actor deprives itself of the protection of the stronger party, a relationship of which it has the greater need.

The role of misperception in international relations is thus quite different from that suggested by Snyder and Diesing and many other misperception theorists. Misperception may well be a common occurrence in international relations, and may often affect an actor's expectation of the probable outcome. But the assumption that misperception affects an actor's choice and thus changes a game's outcome does not always hold, for an actor's course of action only sometimes depends on

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its correct assessment of the other actor's intentions. In other words, misperception is often irrelevant to the cause and escalation of crisis and war. If the actors know that Snyder and Diesing's nine games exemplify the universe of crisis situations, then there are instances in which neither actor requires an accurate knowledge of the other's preferences. For actor *A*, five of the nine situations are uniquely defined by a knowledge of its own preferences; for *B*, three of the games are so defined. Further, when *A does* mistake one game for another because it misassesses *B*'s intentions, its error does not lead it to change its course of action. In each of the possibly confused games, *A* has a dominant strategy; assuming that actors will always try to maximize their own returns, misperception will not lead any with a dominant strategy to alter their behavior. Only their expectations will be affected.

Misperception changes a strict maximizer's decision only when its choice is contingent on the other actor's choice. This situation arises for the row actor, *A*, in none of these nine key games. For the column actor, *B*, on the other hand, it is a problem. Ironically, however, *B*'s misassessment of *A*'s intentions does not always turn crisis into conflict. *B*'s errors exacerbate conflict only between allies. If *B* misperceives its adversary, however, the mistake will facilitate coordination between the two actors and thus allow them to avoid war.

MUTUAL MISPERCEPTION

In addition to instances of a single actor's misperception of the other, it is also possible for both actors to misread the other's intentions. There are three configurations of such mutual misperceptions that can occur (see Figure 10). If both actors have a dominant strategy but believe that the other does not, misperception has no effect on their behavior or on the outcome, for each does what it would have done anyway. If neither has a dominant strategy but believes that the other does, their errors facilitate coordination. In this case, each will try to feel the other out. If both insist on getting their own way, the DD outcome may result; if each mistakes the other to have a dominant strategy, however, both are more likely to defer to the other, so that coordination will result.

The final class of mutual misperception is one in which only one of the actors has a dominant strategy, and each believes that the other's strategy is like its own. The actor with the dominant strategy believes that the actor without one also has a dominant plan of action. Because it does not realize that the other actor's plans are *not* contingent on its own, it does not recognize the need to signal its true preferences.

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FIGURE 10

MUTUAL MISPERCEPTION

		ACTOR *B*	
		B has a dominant strategy	*B* does not have a dominant strategy
ACTOR *A*	*A* has a dominant strategy	*A* believes *B* does not *B* believes *A* does not NO EFFECT	*A* believes *B* does *B* believes *A* does not POTENTIAL DISASTER
	A does not have a dominant strategy	*A* believes *B* does not *B* believes *A* does POTENTIAL DISASTER	*A* believes *B* does *B* believes *A* does FACILITATES COORDINATION

The actor without a dominant strategy, meanwhile, believes that the other actor also has contingent plans. This actor may try to get a better outcome by pre-empting the other player—behavior that seems to confirm the first player's misperception that the second actor also has a dominant strategy. This situation is ripe for disaster; here, misperception may become the sole cause of an otherwise avoidable war.

CONCLUSION

In the simplest terms, therefore, *misperception need not cause conflict* even when it does affect the actors' choices and behavior. Indeed, misperception can facilitate conflict avoidance, interactor coordination, and even mutual cooperation. For misperception to cause conflict, the misunderstood actor either must have a dominant strategy of defection or must be a tit-for-tat reciprocator. In either case, it will have no desire to mask its true preferences. Indeed, if the misperceived actor recognizes the other's confusion, its incentive is to signal its true preferences. Moreover, the misperceived actor's only incentive to deceive will be its desire to facilitate the avoidance of conflict.

Implicit in discussions of the impact of misperception are assumptions about what guides the decisions of misperceiving actors; the study of the implications of misperception thus requires the explicit formulation of these decision criteria. If the misperceiving actors are rational maximizers of their own returns, it is clear that misperception cannot affect the decision of an actor with a dominant strategy. In such situations, misperception can affect the actor's expectations, but not its actions or the outcome of the situation. Misperception only affects the decisions of an actor whose maximizing outcomes are contingent on the actions of another. Even then, when misperception affects an

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actor's decision and is a determinant of the outcome, it need not necessarily result in conflict.

One cannot, therefore, conclude that misperception causes conflict simply because it occurs in crises that result in war. Misperception may be coincidental to—rather than determinative of—the occurrence of war, because war can be an equilibrium outcome that results from specific configurations of actor preferences. Even if misperception does sometimes play a causal role in the outbreak of war, its impact is situationally circumscribed. It is certain, therefore, that if one limits the empirical study of misperception to crises that do result in war, one ensures an inaccurate assessment of the overall impact of misperception in international relations.

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DISSIDENT MARXISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

By THOMAS OLESZCZUK*

Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. . . .
—*Karl Marx*[1]

IN the 1970s, dissent was once more on the agenda in Eastern Europe. Throughout the region, manuscripts were written, circulated, and in part even electronically disseminated via the Western airwaves. Although the content of this opposition is important to our understanding of communist systems and of increasing interest to the West, it has not been the object of systematic comparative analysis; nor has it been a major factor in the elaboration of theories of communist politics.

This essay is an examination of one immediate product of dissent in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany: the *samizdat* political thought of intellectuals who try to grasp the essentials of their countries' circumstances in order to change them. From such an examination it is possible to gain insight into both the minds of the dissidents and the sources of their discontent. Their prospects and long-term impact on the operations of their systems may thereby be evaluated.

The two major Western frameworks for the study of communist politics suggest differing sources of dissent and, thus, differing consequences. According to the "classical" approach—with totalitarianism as the framework—dissent of any sort is viewed by the political leaders as treasonous opposition, and is treated accordingly. Scholars using this approach admit that although "islands of separateness" have persisted, they remain the targets of repeated attacks by the secret police.[2] The source of the opposition to communism is seen to vary in specifics—from morality to ambition, from patriotism to scientific and artistic in-

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[1] Marx, "The German Ideology," in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, David McLellan, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 164.

[2] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York: Praeger, 1965); H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966).

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tegrity—but the fundamental cause is perceived to be human nature, which contains "the unquenchable thirst for freedom."[3]

The other approach is derived from structural functionalism. With its emphasis on the persistence of systems, this framework focuses on the fulfillment of such vital functions as political socialization and interest articulation, seen primarily as the tasks of the schools and the Central Committee of the party, respectively.[4] Dissent is perceived either as the result of the rise of new social forces such as trained managers and engineers (who are soon co-opted into the institutional structures),[5] or as caused by social atavisms, such as non-technical intellectuals with bourgeois backgrounds (who are repressed without adverse consequences to the state).[6]

The few publications on dissent under communism have been historical, and have not devoted much attention to the *content* of the dissidents' works; this neglect is wasteful because the dissidents are often highly trained intellectuals with detailed personal knowledge about institutions, power arrangements, and patterns of social inequality. Hypotheses can nonetheless be derived about the causes of dissent and the possible relationship of ideas to these causes. Antonin Liehm sees a "parallelism of ideological positions" that supports "democratic socialism" as being rooted primarily in the social context of intellectual activity in Eastern Europe: alienation and official repression, as well as mass acquiescence based on material benefits.[7] Rudolf Tökes, although characterizing the dissidents as partaking of both Marxist-Leninist and traditional authoritarianisms, posits as the basic cause of dissent the irreconcilability of Marxist egalitarianism with the reality of increasing social stratification.[8] Finally, in an interesting twist, Robert Sharlet suggests that attempts of the communist leadership to coerce dissidents into com-

[3] Friedrich and Brzezinski (fn. 2), 289; see also Skilling (fn. 2), 211.

[4] David Lane, *Politics and Society in the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), and *The Socialist Industrial State* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976).

[5] See, for example, Paul Godwin, "Communist Systems and Modernization," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, VI (Spring-Summer 1973), 107-34, and Zygmunt Bauman, "The Party in the System-Management Phase," in Andrew C. Janos, ed., *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies—University of California, 1976).

[6] Walter Connor, "Dissent in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism*, XXIX (January-February 1980), 1-17.

[7] Liehm, "The Intellectuals on the Social Contract," *Telos*, XXIII (Spring 1975), 161.

[8] Tökes, "Introduction," in Tökes, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), xx. One ought to mention that Tökes explicitly denies that he or other contributors to his book are building "elaborate taxonomies and social science models of unorthodox political behavior in Eastern Europe." According to him, the "rich complexity" of the phenomenon of dissent in the area prevents such a task from being done successfully.

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pliance are self-defeating, whatever the country or the content of dissident works: what is produced is only more dissent, leading to a widening spiral or "dialectic" of dissent and repression.[9]

No attempt will be made here to describe comprehensively the writings of any one dissident, much less the specifics of all available *samizdat* works from Eastern Europe. Instead, the major dimensions of several analyses from the 1970s will be discussed in three sections—criticism, vision of the future, and tactics—the components of any political ideology. It is assumed that the works examined are both "representative" in content (containing the major ideas being discussed among the dissidents in the area) and "unrepresentative" in possible impact (because of their retransmission to the East via Western radio broadcasts, or publication in the West and covert transport back East). The significance of the phenomenon of dissent, as rooted in the social, political, and psychological realities of the area, will be analyzed in the concluding section.

Criticism: Dictatorship and Its Destruction

Despite generally turgid and convoluted writing, harsh political criticism can readily be observed in the dissidents' works. In 1976, Jacek Kuron, a leader of Poland's dissident Committee for Social Self-Defense (KSS-KOR) and adviser to Solidarity, denounced the political system in his proposal for a unified opposition:

> [I]t is the totalitarian system itself that is at the root of the social evils restraining individual aspirations and producing endemic political and social crisis.[10]

In the following year, writing under the pseudonym of Marc Rakovski,[11] the Hungarians Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis described a similarly undesirable situation:

> [T]he demarcation between classes quite visibly corresponds to the primordial distinction in the all-embracing institutional organization of society, the distinction between those who have control over the activities of others and those who lack this control.[12]

[9] Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," *International Journal*, XXXIII (Autumn 1978), 763-95.

[10] Kuron, *Misli o programie . . . Zasady ideowe . . . Uwagi o strukturze . . .* [Thoughts on a Program . . . Ideological Principles . . . Considerations on Structures . . .] (Poland: Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza, n.d.); excerpts translated into French as "Pour une plateforme unique de l'opposition" [For a Unique Program of Opposition], in Z. Erard and M.G. Zygier, eds., *La Pologne: Une Société en Dissidence* [Poland: A Dissident Society] (Paris: Maspero, 1979), 114 (author's translation).

[11] Personal interview with Ivan Szelenyi, New York, May 19, 1980.

[12] Rakovski, *Towards an East European Marxism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 47.

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At about the same time, Rudolf Bahro, an East German, presented a lengthy analysis of society, culture, economy, and politics, one part of which focused directly on "the political":

> When all is said and done, the uncontrollability of the Politbureau and its apparatus presents the foremost political problem under actually existing socialism. . . .[13]

And in late 1980, a Polish dissident, writing under the pseudonym Felipe Garcia Casals, reiterated the censorious description of the state:

> [T]he command authority has to be: unique, hence extremely centralized; stable, hence not subject to competition or the whims of electoral systems; infallible, hence charismatic and placed above laws.[14]

In the above quotations, as throughout many of the available dissident writings, a common ingredient stands out: the basic idea that communist regimes are stagnant dictatorships that can and will be replaced. These dictatorships are seen to have the following features:

1. unresponsiveness to popular demands;[15]
2. arbitrariness in decision making, resulting in economic inefficiency;[16]
3. political and moral corruption of the elite;[17]
4. betrayal (or trivialization) of the ideals of "socialism";[18]
5. dependence on the secret police and censorship;[19]

[13] Bahro, *The Alternative in East Europe* (London: Schocken, 1978), 246.

[14] Casals, *The Syncretic Society* (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1980), 87.

[15] See, for example, *ibid.*, on "infallibility" (pp. 14-15) and "nonselectiveness" (p. 88); Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, 1979), 162-68, 170-71, 182-83; and Adam Michnik, "Vive la Pologne!", in A. Ostoje-Ostaszewski, ed., *Dissent in Poland* (London: Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, 1977), 178.

[16] See, among others, Casals (fn. 14), on the "lack of measure," throughout, but especially at pp. 14-19; Rakovski (fn. 12), 29; Robert Havemann, *Questions Answers Questions* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 33, 46-47; and "Charter 77," in Hans Peter Riese, ed., *Since the Prague Spring* (New York: Vintage, 1979), 12.

[17] Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 188-92, 211-15, 218; Vaclav Havel, "Letter to Gustav Husak," in Riese (fn. 16), 25-28; Bahro (fn. 13), 213, 226-27.

[18] Cf. Rakovski (fn. 12), 105-34; Alexander Dubcek, "Letter to the Federal Parliament of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak National Council," in Riese (fn. 16), 76; Edward Lipinski, "Open Letter to Comrade Gierek," in Ostoje-Ostaszewski (fn. 15), 35; and Havel (fn. 17), 29-31.

[19] See, among others, Wladyslaw Bienkowski, "Motory i halumce socializmu" [The Motors and Obstacles of Socialism], in Erard and Zygier (fn. 10), 155-66, esp. 155-62; and Bienkowski, "Open Letter to the Authorities of the Polish People's Republic on the Normalization of Relations with the Soviet Union," in Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland: 1954-1977* (London: Poets' and Painters' Press, 1978), 367-71; Dubcek (fn. 18), 64, 72, 74; Havemann (fn. 16), 33, 64-65; Bahro (fn. 13), 306; and Riese (fn. 16), 12-13.

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6. mass demoralization (fear, apathy, cynicism);[20]
7. national subservience to Soviet needs.[21]

In view of the fact that the states in the region *are* one-party dictatorships, this unanimity is far from surprising. Objective reality does provide the dissidents with common material to criticize. Indeed, the first clear objective cause of dissent is the system itself: the dictatorship in its day-to-day operations. These activities may directly impinge on the lives of dissidents, even prior to their becoming aware of their new "status." As Havel says, "not one of us decided to be a dissident. We became dissidents without even knowing why, and we began to live under arrest without knowing how."[22] A totalitarian system, however, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition: there have been periods when dictatorships, even of the communist variety, elicited little intellectual dissent.

An important hint about motivation is to be found in the optimism that generally permeates the analyses: dissenters see themselves as playing a major role in the future evolution of their societies. For example, according to the Hungarian dissidents Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, every society has one organizing principle that legitimates all political, economic, and cultural activity.[23] They maintain that in postcapitalist systems this principle is technocratic expertise. It supposedly determines the centralization of power, the use of planning, and the resistance by adherents of the "older principles" of private ownership and traditional social hierarchy. After displacing the more limited technical expertise of the party bureaucrats, the new principle eventually wins out over the older ones.

This assumption of the ultimate power of an idea or a motivational framework of ideas throughout the society is not a simple one, for it is embedded in a sociological discussion that focuses on the historical development of the class structure in Imperial Russia and Eastern

[20] Havel (fn. 17), 24-33; Casals (fn. 14), 54, 84; Havemann (fn. 16), 51-52, 64, and "The Socialism of Tomorrow," in Frantisek Silnitsky and others, eds., *Communism and East Europe* (New York: Karz, 1979, 175.

[21] Kuron (fn. 10), 115-17; Lipinski (fn. 18), 28-29; Bahro (fn. 13), 305, 334, 336-40; Havel and others, "A Ten-Point Declaration on the First Anniversary of the Occupation," in Riese (fn. 16), 3-8; at 3-4.

[22] Vaclav Havel, "The Age of Chicanery: Technical Notes on My House Arrest," *Encounter*, Vol. 53 (September 1979), 32-40, at 40.

[23] Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 47ff. Their "models of economic integration" explicitly focus on the "legitimization of social authority" (p. 47). Cf. T. H. Rigby, "Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society," in Janos (fn. 5), 31-80, and "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 539-57.

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Europe. Konrad and Szelenyi tie the rise of "intellectuals" (and the increasing acceptance of the need for expertise) directly to economic backwardness and the concomitant weakness of the nobility, entrepreneurs, and even the intellectuals. The tsarist state seemed to be the only instrument available to overcome this backwardness.[24] In addition, the rise of the new principle is seen to have real consequences for the Soviet system and its allies: economic problems will emerge as a result of the conflict of political and technocratic principles of authority. As a result, the political fortunes of the technocracy will rise in stages: first, de-Stalinization; then, political alliance with the political bureaucracy; and finally, technocratic leadership of the workers.

This linkage of new *ideas* (or "principles") to several "material" features—historical condition, economic development, changing social structure, and transformation of political dynamics—is the characteristic justification of the dissidents' optimism.[25] One of the most original of such discussions is by Rudolf Bahro, an East German technocrat-turned-dissident, who simultaneously emphasizes "material" forces and the power of ideas in current circumstances.[26]

Bahro starts out by suggesting that the Bolshevik Revolution was necessary to eliminate the class dichotomy of capitalism in an insufficiently developed capitalist country. Yet, he views that revolution as not fully "conscious," in that its leadership underestimated the immensity of the task of industrialization in an extremely hostile international environment when it started down a new ("non-capitalist") path of economic development. He argues that this task required more discipline and a strong, centralized dictatorship.[27] With that dictatorship, a new bureaucracy emerged which isolated itself from the immediate aspirations of the general population.

Despite this argument, Bahro maintains that the real gap between rulers and ruled did not mean that a new class had developed. His denial is rooted in part in the desire to see a more gradual change in socialist societies—rather than violent revolution, which might be implied by the existence of class divisions. Bahro asserts that no class domination

[24] Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 87-127, 133-42. Cf. Havemann (fn. 20), 180; and Bahro (fn. 13), 49-119, 131-36.

[25] Rakovski (fn. 12), 29-38; Casals (fn. 14), throughout (esp. 76-77); Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 65-142; Havemann (fn. 20), 174-75; Havemann (fn. 16), 44; and Bahro (fn. 13), 49ff.

[26] Bahro (fn. 13). See Ulf Wolter, ed., *Rudolf Bahro: Critical Responses* (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1980), for commentary on Bahro's work by West Europeans attending a special Berlin conference.

[27] Casals (fn. 14) also accepts this justification. Neither he nor Bahro seems to be embarrassed by the echo of Stalin's argument of the 1930s about the necessity to strengthen the state.

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existed, either objectively or subjectively. Objectively, the workers were too atomized to operate as a class, the bureaucrat-technocrats were too internally stratified to be one group, and the party—the very institution within which some kind of class consciousness was supposed to be possible—prevented the propagation of any but officially proclaimed dogma. Subjectively, the entire society and all of its members were riven by tension between attitudes: hierarchic deference versus self-actualizing efficacy.[28]

For Bahro, this tension carries the import that "classes" have in Marx's theory of society and social change: it is the motor force in modern society. The dynamism of the tension centers on "surplus consciousness"—the ability to know and manipulate the world. This surplus consciousness is admittedly distorted by the party bureaucracy for its self-preservation, and is concentrated among intellectuals. However, it is simultaneously diffusing among the general population and permeating even the elite's highest levels, the party's Politburo. That is where individuals with such attitudes and a desire to "liberate" the society will come to the fore.[29]

In a somewhat similar way, the optimistic expectation that dissent will have an effect is to be found even among those dissidents who focus on the political side of the dictatorship, among those Poles and Czechs who see dissent as the consequence of the aggressive dogmatism of the official ideology of anticapitalism. They suggest—in a way similar to Bahro (and Konrad and Szelenyi)—that internal pressures for reform are increasing as the centralized dictatorship becomes more dogmatic and conservative, in contrast to the rapidly changing industrialized economy and society. Such a contrast becomes a set of Marxian "contradictions." The "forces" of production are thereby seen to be in conflict with the "relations" of production in much the same way in which the capitalist era was seen by Marx: increasingly socialized and abundant production on the one hand, and increasingly restricted ranks of powerful controllers of the means of production on the other. For Marx, such internal tension was part of the dynamic of revolution, justifying the proletarian struggle and guaranteeing its ultimate victory. For the dissidents, the contradictions within their system—manifested by the rise of more educated workers and technocrats in opposition to party *apparatchiki*—are both an explanation of processes and a rationale for their expectation of success.[30]

[28] Bahro (fn. 13), 163-202, 247, 320, 326, 362.

[29] *Ibid.*, 271-74, 313-26.

[30] It is interesting to note that there is a similar perspective among Western social scientists who have *abandoned* the concept of "totalitarianism." Cf. Chalmers John-

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These East Europeans also employ the concept of "totalitarianism,"[31] despite the pessimism predominantly implied by the term in the West. Of course, the concept of "totalitarianism" is not totally outside the purview of 20th-century Marxist writings: Andreas Wildt reminds us that even Trotsky used the term in 1936.[32] Moreover, it was a singular mark of Milovan Djilas's original analysis of *The New Class*. Although both of these theoretician-revolutionaries are frequently mentioned by the current dissidents,[33] there is little evidence in the works of Poles and Czechs that the term is used in line with either of these Marxists' analysis: rare is the current dissident who focuses on class and calls for struggle against the "new class."[34] Instead, they abstract "totalitarianism" into a syndrome of systemic political features, as is characteristic of Western non- and anti-Marxist interpretations of Soviet and East European politics; however, the East Europeans do understand this syndrome to be rife with contradictions. They conclude that the natural consequence of those contradictions is political organization and struggle along the lines of "national liberation fronts": alliances of classes against a common external enemy and its domestic agents.

This combination of perspectives suggests that the training in Marxism which the intellectuals have received is a second, "subjective" factor producing dissent, but a factor supplemented by non-Marxist ideas. Marxism provides two basic elements: an analysis of capitalism (readily borrowed to fit the "socialist" societies of Eastern Europe) and an optimistic expectation (current realities can and will be transcended). The major non-Marxist component is that of "totalitarianism" in a

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son, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), esp. the selections by Johnson and Lowenthal.

[31] For explicit uses of the term, see Kuron (fn. 10), 113-16, 121-22; Michnik (fn. 15), 179-80; Dubcek (fn. 18), 64; Vilem Precan, "Letter to the Participants of the World Congress of Historians," in Riese (fn. 16), 123, 125; and Miklos Haraszti, "What is Marxism?" (from the *samizdat* collection *0.1%*), in Silnitsky (fn. 20), 148-55, at 154. Others have described the system as "monolithic" (see Casals [fn. 14] and Rakovski [fn. 12]) "centralist," or "centralist monopolization of all . . . decisionmaking" (see Bahro [fn. 13], 246). Also cf. Bienkowski (fn. 19).

[32] Wildt, "Totalitarian State Capitalism," *Telos*, XLI (Fall 1979), 48, n. 74.

[33] Trotsky is mentioned by Rakovski (fn. 12), 10, 115-20; Szelenyi in his introduction to Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), xiv; Havemann (fn. 20), 176; Bahro (fn. 13), pp. 19, 20, and throughout; and "Introductory Lecture to *The Alternative*," in Silnitsky (fn. 20), 226. Djilas is referred to in Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), xiv-xv, and Bienkowski (fn. 19), 162. Interestingly, Bukharin is cited in Rakovski (fn. 12), 118-22, and Bahro (fn. 13), 85 and throughout. Lukacs' name can be found in Rakovski (fn. 12), 131, and Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 4-5. Even Bakunin is cited: see Havemann (fn. 16), 133; and Bahro (fn. 13), 40-41, and throughout.

[34] Rakovski (fn. 12), esp. 98-104; Bahro (fn. 33), 202; Kuron, "Interview" by M. Lucbert, in Ostoje-Ostaszewski (fn. 15), 170-76. However, see Havemann (fn. 16), 160, for the idea that the working class must finish *its* revolution—distinctly a minority position among the dissidents.

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sense that is not derived from either Trotsky or Djilas: it obviously comes from the West.

Ironically, this influx of non-Marxist ideas seems to be attributable to three channels promoted in the 1970s by the official policy of lessening of East-West tensions, the policy of détente: (1) reduction of jamming of Western radio broadcasts; (2) greater participation in international conferences on philosophy and sociology (and related publishing ventures, such as the Yugoslav journal *Praxis*); and (3) Western publication and smuggling back into their own countries of works by recently exiled Marxist intellectuals (for instance, the continued influence of Leszek Kolakowski years after his exile from Poland in 1968), or covert *samizdat* replication of these works.

Here we have a third source of dissent in the 1970s: the more relaxed international climate. Yet one ought not to make too much of this, for the underlying power realities of Eastern Europe remain the same, and these realities are referred to in dissident criticism. Indeed, the present generation differs from earlier oppositionists on this point: the current dissidents understand the history of Soviet expansionism and the continuing realities of Soviet influence on all the communist parties of the area (which should probably be considered as a fourth source of dissent).

The earlier oppositionists did not see the international ramifications of the dictatorship with which they were confronted as clearly as the present dissidents do. As a result, they made no explicit suggestions about the need for a national mobilization against the Soviet bureaucracy—much less the paradoxical proposal for a national "internationalism" of all East Europeans against that enemy. (Unfortunately, none of the current dissidents is explicit on the makeup, organization, or the tactics to be used by this international alliance.)

One might ask why this idea of nationalism in an international struggle against the Soviet bureaucracy should have developed in the 1970s. A number of explanations appear to reinforce one another. First, as a result of the continued application of the Soviet model over the past three decades, the entire region in many ways seems to be becoming more homogeneous economically, socially, and politically. Shoup has argued that these systems have engendered increasing industrialization, proletarianization, collectivization of agriculture, and creation of a culture "socialist in content," regardless of the leadership in the various countries.[35] Ernst Kux notes that this "convergence" within East-

[35] Paul Shoup, "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: Convergence and Divergence in Historical Perspective," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tökes, eds., *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970s* (New York: Free Press, 1974), 340-68.

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ern Europe has led to common problems.[36] As elababorated by Liehm,[37] economic difficulties threaten the "social contract" created in the post-Stalinist period—that of mass obedience in return for general prosperity and rising living standards. The general problems created by the rigidity of Soviet planning in the face of the needs of "intensive development" have been examined by such reformist Czech economists as Ota Sik, and their arguments have not lost validity since the 1960s, the movement of Soviet tanks notwithstanding. Thus, economic difficulties are a fifth cause of dissent.

International resource constraints on growth have produced an increasing aggravation in the declining productivity of antiquated technology. The Soviets—and the East Europeans with the express approval of the Soviets—have therefore introduced the tactic of overcoming economic difficulties through use of the international economy—i.e., capital and technology importation from the West.[38] This tactic has only marginally and temporarily ameliorated the deterioration of the social contract, as the case of Poland in 1980 demonstrates.

Indeed, one might say that the East's dependence on the West has exacerbated some of the underlying economic problems by demonstrating the increasingly obvious need for assistance from non-Soviet sources, within a framework of restrictive Soviet policy on indigenous decisions pertaining to living standards. In such an economic environment, there is an increased likelihood that intellectuals will become aware of the disadvantages of the Warsaw Pact—a sixth factor promoting dissent.

Thus, in the economic and political climate of the 1970s, each country suffered from its close connection with the Soviet Union. This general observation, complemented by the historical memory of 1968—a seventh factor—implies that coordinated action would have to be taken to overcome the double bind of domestic and Soviet bureaucracy. Whether viewed as classes, elites, or organizations with international connections, the bureaucrats had to be challenged by dissidents operating in the national context. The dissidents believed that, given certain existing economic conditions, ideas are powerful, and that these ideas could lead to the building of national mass movements that would

[36] Kux, "Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism*, XXIX (March-April 1980), 21-37. See also Paul Maurer, "The Economic Aspects," and Jacques Rupnik, "The Political Aspects," papers for the panel on "The Impact of the World Economic Turmoil in Eastern Europe," American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, November 7, 1980.

[37] See fn. 7.

[38] Wolfgang Leonhard, "The Domestic Politics of the New Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52 (October 1973), 59-74, esp. 66-69; Liehm (fn. 7).

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change the entire configuration of politics and society. This conviction molded their choice of tactics, although not in isolation from other international phenomena.

Vision of the Future: Pluralism and Freedom

The mixed nature of dissident criticism yields a mixed concept of the better society—solidly pluralist without return to private ownership of industry. It is neither Western capitalism nor Soviet communism; Ota Sik calls it a "third way" to organize politics and society, in which the political and other problems associated with the current system are solved without entailing the acquisition of the problems of the West. The major features of this society are the following:

1. respect for individual rights, especially free expression;[39]
2. freedom of association, particularly in the form of trade unions that are independent of the party;[40]
3. the right of these associations to engage in political as well as economic activity, to present policy proposals as well as to strike;[41]
4. the rule of law—constitutional and international rights not circumvented by arbitrary regulation or disregard for procedure;[42]
5. democratization of the Communist Party, and its separation from direct control over the government;[43]
6. rejuvenation of the other *surviving* parties in "national fronts," without the revival of extinguished Social Democratic Parties;[44]

[39] See the "Letter of 59" as analyzed by Kuron (fn. 10), 118-20; Adam Michnik, "The Church and the Left," in Silnitsky (fn. 20), 51-95, at 54 and 83; Lipinski (fn. 18), 27, 32, 33; Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 245; Havel and others (fn. 21), 3; Dubcek (fn. 18), 84-85; of course, "Charter 77" (fn. 16); Frantisek Kriegel and others, "Letter to the Federal Parliament of Czechoslovakia," in Riese (fn. 16), 86-90; Havemann (fn. 16), 32-35, 213-14; and Bahro (fn. 13), 302, 308-9 (albeit only as a minimal program).

[40] Kuron (fn. 10), 120; Havel and others (fn. 21), 6; "Charter 77" (fn. 16), 13; Havemann (fn. 16), 214; Bahro (fn. 13), 274, 353; Konrad Szelenyi (fn. 15), 245 (for a "certain sort of pluralism").

[41] Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 226, 227, 230; Bahro (fn. 13), 260, 313, 448, 452; "Charter 77" (fn. 16), 13; Havel and others (fn. 21), 6.

[42] "Charter 77" (fn. 16); Havel and others (fn. 21), 5; Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 231-32.

[43] Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 245, call for the "democratization of political relations"; Bahro (fn. 13), 344, 365-76, calls for a new party in the form of a "League," and for its separation from the state apparatus (370).

[44] Here there are various indirect codewords: Kuron (fn. 10), 120-21 ("parliamentary democracy"); Lipinski (fn. 18), 33 ("political pluralism"); Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 232 ("contending political forces"); Zdenek Mlynar, "Letter to the Communists and Socialists of Europe," in Riese (fn. 16), 135-45 ("political democracy" and the "rights and freedoms of the bourgeoisie"); Bahro (fn. 13), 303 ("political democracy of the great bourgeois revolutions"), and 300 ("political representation of . . . particular interests"). Yet at 344-48, Bahro wavers on the question, and at 350 he

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7. decentralization of the economy and greater worker participation in decision making;[45]
8. abolition of pernicious censorship and harassment by the secret police.[46]

These features are the result of the dissidents' criticisms. If the societies are too complicated to be run from the center alone, if the economies require flexible and varying loci of decision making, if the party-state amalgam aggravates the serious problems facing the system, then it is clear that the party's monopoly on power (and the accompanying abuses) must be eliminated. The bent of the proposals is *not* toward the revitalization of Marxism-Leninism or the re-invigoration of the one-party system, but rather toward its transcendence by political actors "outside" it, in the society at large, without a return to private ownership in the economy.

In this way, too, the current approach is different from that of the "revisionists" of the 1950s, who accepted the need for change and for drawing the general population into the reform process, but assumed that the party itself would be both the major arena for debates about such changes and the major agency of change.[47] The current dissidents reject this notion in favor of a Western "pluralism" of political actors, which they see as a fundamental requirement for overcoming the problems that face the system.

Polish dissident Michnik is wrong to draw the line too sharply between the two generations of dissent, however. His assertion that the processes of change are not dependent upon currents in the party[48] is overstated, for the place of the communist organization is ambiguous in the improved society envisioned by both. Clearly, the members of the younger generation desire to release the reform process from the confines of elite politics, within which it is readily controllable (and

specifically rejects the notion of the revival of the Social Democratic Party. In general, he seems to endorse the idea of the acceptability of a multiparty system through the splitting of the ruling SED (see 250 and 380, for example). Havemann (fn. 16), 214, is one of the few to advocate the *right* to form new parties directly and without circumlocution ("right to form . . . organizations, and parties").

[45] Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 232-33, 249; Kuron (fn. 34), 172, 751; "Charter 77" (fn. 16), 13; Havel and others (fn. 21), 5-6; Bahro (fn. 13), 274-75, 426, 437, 438.

[46] Lipinski (fn. 18), 33; Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 232 ("legitimate expression of different interests"); Havel and others (fn. 21), 5; "Charter 77" (fn. 16); Bahro (fn. 33), 220; Zsolt Krokovay, "Reflections on Censorship," excerpt from *0.1%*, in *Index on Censorship*, IX (April 1980), 17-21, 47-49.

[47] See Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 458-62, for a discussion of the major demands of the dissidents of the 1950s.

[48] Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," *Survey*, XXII (Summer-Autumn 1976), 267-77.

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to a degree reversible) as the post-1956 and post-1970 Polish experiences show; yet they also realize that the party does indeed command the state through the *nomenklatura* and other mechanisms. Thus, the party is in their view part of the problem; but since it is still dominant in the politics of East European countries, it cannot be ignored as the most important potential level for change.

In line with this realization, many dissidents desire more tolerance by the party than currently exists. Non-communist institutions such as the Catholic Church would be allowed more autonomy in the presentation of reform proposals and in the mobilization of their adherents to obtain adoption of the proposals, although such coordinated action is not meant to extend to the formation of church-oriented political parties. This type of pluralism is more limited than in most Western countries; nonetheless, it is far closer to Western than to the Soviet or Chinese models of politics.

To be sure, the ideal society envisioned by these dissidents is not totally homogeneous in emphasis or content, but the differences are on dimensions other than the acceptance of pluralism *per se*. Many of the Poles conceived of democratic socialism as an independent national (as opposed to Soviet-directed) system, based on openly derived alliances among those with differing political views. A commitment to economic equality is to be balanced by a commitment to the political freedoms, lawfulness, government restraint, and public accountability of individuals. For Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring embodied the content of liberalization. An assumption of the possibility of unity in diversity is at the heart of the vision; institutional guarantees of the rights of citizens against the abuse of power are presumed to be effective. Dissidents in Hungary and East Germany had a combination of the Czech and Yugoslav experiences in mind: officially recognized "pluralism of interests," a multiparty system, workers' councils,[49] and so forth.

At this point it must be noted that, contrary to my interpretation, the dissidents have accepted some of the values of Western politics without becoming "antisocialist"; Tökes insists that the dissidents have *not* accepted "liberal" values—that they envision limits on pluralism in the party system and the continuation of an elite—themselves—that will manipulate the masses.[50] Of course, the dissidents would like to see

[49] However, Bahro (fn. 13), 98, 202, 307-9, and Bence-Kis (Rakovski [fn. 12], 32-34) express severe reservations about the trends embodied in the actual reforms espoused by the Czech Communist Party in 1968. They fear that, rather than widespread democratic control over industry, a new form of domination (technocracy) would result.

[50] Rudolf Tökes, "Human Rights and Political Change," in Tökes (fn. 8), 19-22.

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their advice and analysis acted upon by the masses, and a few do see technocrats as being "leaders" in some sense. And the "third way" is not that of Western bourgeois democracy in all its details: there is an additional commitment to organize the economy and to change social relations for the better via cooperation and education. However, the objections of this perspective are not valid. Many of the dissidents do call for the rejuvenation of the multiparty system and are explicitly in favor of the extension of political and civil rights to *all* persons, including those who disagree with them. This becomes even clearer as we examine the tactics they put forward.

Tactics: The Future in the Present Tense

The combination of pluralism and socialism embodied in the vision of the "third way" clearly influences the proposed tactics of the dissidents. There is less agreement here than there is on the vision itself, but the following are the most frequent suggestions for action:

1. respect for the legal framework and use of constitutional guarantees of free expression;[51]
2. dissolution of the official monopoly over information through continued dissident theorizing, open discussion, and informal publishing;[52]
3. creation of a loosely-knit and tolerant dissident organization;[53]
4. establishment of independent trade unions;[54]
5. coalition of differing discontented groups, including religious ones, in a nation-wide "social movement";[55]
6. within-system probing by such a movement to pressure the party leadership into making necessary changes and accepting changes made outside the party;[56]
7. international "solidarity" of East European and Soviet dissidents with each other, and with leftists and democrats of the West.[57]

[51] Havel and others (fn. 21), 6-7; the "Letter of 59" as discussed in Kuron (fn. 10), 118-20; Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 231-32; Bahro (fn. 33), 226, 232.

[52] Kuron (fn. 10), 117, 119, 135; Bienkowski in Erard and Zygier (fn. 19), 166; Rakovski (fn. 12), 138; Casals (fn. 14), 89-90; Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 251-52; Havemann (fn. 16), 166, 168-70, 177, 181-82; Bahro (fn. 13), 340-41, 363, 400.

[53] "Charter 77" (fn. 16), 13-14; Bahro (fn. 13).

[54] Kuron (fn. 34), 172; Havemann (fn. 16), 160. Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 174-75, suggest workers' councils and Soviets as "the first order of business" of any workers' uprising.

[55] Kuron (fn. 10), 117, 124, 130; Michnik (fn. 39), 93-95 (on the Catholic Church as an ally of reformers); Rakovsky (fn. 12), 69; "Charter 77" (fn. 16), 13-14; Bahro (fn. 13), 326, 371, 374.

[56] Michnik (fn. 48), 276; "Charter 77" (fn. 16), 14; Bahro (fn. 13), 318-20, 325, 344. Cf. also Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), 234-52.

[57] Kuron (fn. 34), 176; Havemann (fn. 16), 182; and Bahro (fn. 13), 333-34, are three major examples.

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In each of the above tactics, there is an implied or expressed acceptance of difference of opinion, of political conflict, or of autonomy of political actors—all entirely in line with the pluralist "third way." Ironically, the notion of autonomy seems to include, to a limited extent, the party leadership itself (see item 6). There is some hope of limited cooperation with old-line communists on elements of the new program. The dissidents seem aware that, even if they wished to eliminate the Communist Party, the Soviet leadership would not accept such a drastic change.

The liberal tactics of dissent are based on two assumptions. First, any "revolution" would require, at the least, a disciplined and ideologically unified organization to direct antiregime coercion; thus, the revolution would, by taking on the characteristics of the system to be overturned, defeat its purpose. Second, dissent is assumed to outlast any effort to repress those who advocate change. The bureaucrats will be defeated, it is implied, *not* by the dissidents, but by the very problems created by the bureaucrats.

The Marxian idea that circumstances will defeat the immense bureaucratic apparatus of the East European states does make a great deal of sense in general terms. Economic difficulties, international in scope, affect each state to some degree; they produce conditions for criticism and an audience willing to listen. Of course, the dissidents appreciate the power of the East European and Soviet apparatuses, but they suggest that the party has taken some steps (through industrialization, for example) which have social consequences that cannot be avoided. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, like the bourgeoisie in Marx's eye, the party cannot really control its magic.

Divergences from the tactics enumerated above derive from individual differences in optimism about reforms in the immediate future. Bahro is so hopeful that he sees no reason for any organization of "Social Democrats," despite their commitment to many values he espouses. He considers them to be an unnecessary and undesirable organization that may divert the League of Communists from its task ahead.[58] Some voices among the fragmented Czech opposition entirely reject the incrementalism of "within-system probing" (item number 6): they do not expect the party leadership to acknowledge "reality" in a reformist fashion. Dubcek even calls for "revolution" to create the groundwork

[58] Bahro (fn. 13), 365-76. One could make the case that this optimism is tied to a pessimism about the vulnerability of the masses to "bourgeois" ideas, much in the way that "reformist" Tito continued to press the idea of class struggle despite the optimism of the establishment of "workers' self-management." See Thomas Oleszczuk, "Group Challenges and Ideological Deradicalization in Yugoslavia," *Soviet Studies*, XXXII (October 1980), 561-79.

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for the program of human rights.[59] (Admittedly, this call for revolution seems, in the absence of an active mass base of support and a strong organization, to be rhetoric to dramatize the plight of the Czech dissidents under the Husak regime rather than an announcement of intended action.) Among the least optimistic dissidents, nearly all of the above tactics are unacceptable, for there is little expectation that anything can be done, despite the crises. Both Bence-Kis ("Rakovski") and Casals advocate only item number 2—continued dissident theorizing—until some unspecified future date when their activities might have an impact other than the stimulation of countermeasures by the secret police.[60]

Significance of Dissent under Communism

The foregoing examination of dissent in Eastern Europe suggests that this activity has been caused by a series of internal and international factors in the 1970s. Some of these factors relate to objective processes and problems of the societies themselves: the dictatorial nature of the system, increasing economic difficulties, and the counterproductive side of repression. On the other hand, there are clear signs that ideology has played a role, partly as the result of those objective factors, partly in tandem with them. Marxism and pluralism have provided the analytical tools for criticism, a politically centered framework to understand the dictatorship and its social roots, and a set of values in opposition to that dictatorship's dominant feature—i.e., tolerance and freedom as opposed to monopoly control. Dissent as the product of these several causes is not, strictly speaking, dependent on any *one* of them. Thus, the retreat of Soviet and American leaders to cold war positions may have an impact, but will probably not lead to the disappearance of dissent in the area. Indeed, such a retreat may exacerbate the economically related sources of dissent.

Generally, the above analysis implies that dissent runs deeper than it seems to at first glance. The differences of concept among the dissidents do not lead to substantially different interpretations of reality. There is, instead, an emerging common understanding, an alternate "construction of reality," as Berger and Luckmann have put it.[61] Political life has provided the dissidents with common experiences, demon-

[59] Dubcek (fn. 18), for example.

[60] Rakovski (fn. 12), 28, 42, 47, 65-66, 99-104; Casals (fn. 14), 45-49, 52-53, and throughout.

[61] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966).

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strated common problems, and convinced them of the uselessness of the "revisionism" of their counterparts of the 1950s—and of the danger of its concomitant dependence solely on the party for changes.

That common understanding is to a certain extent a direct result of the party's control of the entire cultural communications network. As noted by Jeffrey Goldfarb and others, that network continues to inundate the minds of intellectuals with the symbols of the official ideology, elements of which can form the base for a new, oppositional "subuniverse of meaning."[62] On the one hand, Marx's own critique of capitalism is a uniform intellectual heritage pertinent to the contemporary circumstance of the dissidents—the arbitrariness and hypocrisy (of bourgeois democracy), as well as economic disturbances and mass alienation. On the other hand, a "sedimented" reality of earlier antidictatorial communists, such as Trotsky and Djilas, is also available. Even the pre-Marxist and anti-Marxist "socialism" (buried under the Bolshevik and Stalinist re-interpretations) can be found, if only in the form of "refutations," in readily available official materials. That earlier socialism cannot be directly resurrected, but some of its downgraded symbols—respect for individual human dignity, concern for immediate social equality and justice, and so on—can be recombined by dissidents confronting the bureaucratic, dictatorial, and irrational aspects of their world.

Because of the official ideology's domination of the mass media and the educational system, such a recombination of symbols could have a great impact: attitudinal and behavioral data from Poland suggest the possibility of a "resonance" of dissident ideas among the "masses." A recent overview of 20 years of sociological surveys there[63] indicates that the dissidents' values are part of a *national* political culture. Strong acceptance of free expression and popular influence, as well as strong rejection of arbitrary central power, are shown to permeate all social groups and categories (with little "ideological" consistency among individuals who differ on any particular point from the majority opinion).

It is thus understandable that, in their new organization, Solidarity, the masses have accepted dissidents as advisers (e.g., Jacek Kuron), together with their suggestions for tactics and goals (Solidarity's program encompasses most of the goals and tactics outlined above). At first, this

[62] Goldfarb, "Social Bases of Independent Public Expression in Communist Societies," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 83 (January 1978) 920-39, at 927. The term is from Berger and Luckmann (fn. 61), 85-88.

[63] Stefan Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People," *Scientific American*, Vol. 245 (July 1981), 45-53.

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"resonance" through a mass organization was not complete: explicit political activity by the trade union, workers' self-management, and international solidarity were all recent developments of the Gdansk Congress of Solidarity (September-October 1981). Some points are only implied in the organization's program—e.g., democratization of the Communist Party and revitalization of other parties in the demand for "free elections." Nonetheless, the degree of congruity is striking.

To what extent such "resonance" exists, even potentially, in other East European states is difficult to ascertain. We have little direct attitudinal or behavioral evidence, but past political behavior in several states can be interpreted as implying the presence of comparable audiences for dissident ideas: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moreover, Nowak's argument about the causes of the Polish homogeneity of political values[64] seems to have some relevance elsewhere. Several features significant in the social transformation of Poland in the late 1940s are not unusual: tremendous social mobility as the old bourgeoisie and intelligentsia were replaced in their jobs by proletarians and peasants; elimination of the challenge of groups and parties that represented politically different alternatives in major values; and intense and coordinated indoctrination of all sectors of society.

Nonetheless, we must not forget that the revitalization of pre-Marxist elements in the ideological framework[65] seems to be partially a consequence of increasing contact with Western ideas through the loosening of constraints on international communication. Such a development has an unintended consequence of potentially greater magnitude: dissidents have an increasing possibility of contacts with each other. For example, the Pole Kuron is mentioned by the Hungarian Szelenyi;[66] the Hungarian Hegedus and the Spanish communist Carrillo are known to the East German Bahro.[67] Thus, the first tendrils of international *cooperation* by the dissidents of the area are in evidence today. There is a widespread recognition of the need for such mutual support;[68] some preliminary attempts have been made in recent years. For example, Czech dissidents, in addition to having "published" studies of Poland,[69] expressed solidarity with striking Polish workers

[64] *Ibid.*, 47, 49.

[65] Kolakowski (fn. 47), 467, 526-30, sees an "end of ideology" in Eastern Europe, which appears to be rebutted by the current dissidents.

[66] Konrad and Szelenyi (fn. 15), xiv.

[67] Bahro (fn. 13), 114, 339.

[68] See fn. 57, and Jiri Pelikan, *The Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 61, 64-65.

[69] For example, "Polska a my" [Poland and Us], as mentioned in "Culture Under Ground," *Encounter*, Vol. 53 (September 1979), 35.

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in December 1970, and again in the summer of 1980[70] In return, KOR and the Hungarians declared their support for Charter 1977 soon after it was established.[71] The few attempts at personal contact[72] have led to intensified repression, but the Hungarians prepared a collection of their works for the Poles (Michnik had asked for it).[73] There has even been a suggestion by Sakharov for the development of a joint human rights program on the part of dissidents in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union.[74]

The danger for the dissidents lies in the fact that much of their work illuminates pertinent aspects of the dictatorships under which they live—dictatorships that do not accept them. A favorite Stalinist and neo-Stalinist ploy is to link opponents to each other and to the international "class enemy," as participants in "imperialists' counterrevolutionary plots," and to proceed accordingly. But this very penchant on the part of the coercive apparatus decreases the *net* cost of real dissident cooperation: if one is going to be blamed and punished for it anyway, why not make the most of the possibility? Here is a hidden aspect of Sharlet's "dialectic of repression and dissent": the unintended *promotion* of cooperation among dissidents.

Dissent and international solidarity appear to these dissidents to be essential to positive changes in their societies. They view the periodic upheavals throughout the area in the past several decades as reflections of an underlying malady that Soviet military force will ultimately not be able to cure. This perspective is a healthy antidote to the tendency of Westerners to discuss dissent and the prospect for change in Eastern Europe from the limited vantage-point of the country specialist or the military analyst. There *are* certain features in the sociopolitical environment of each of the states in the area that are present throughout; these features are visible to the intellectuals in opposition, and they lead to pressure for transformation, Soviet tanks or not.

The dissidents see the future beyond immediate repression as a more pluralistic, more liberal system, in which they themselves play a greater

[70] Vladimir V. Kusin, *From Dubcek to Charter 77* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 156. Note also the Hungarian interest in Poles as "radical reformers"; Bence and Kis in *0.1%*, as translated and reprinted in *Index on Censorship*, IX (April 1980), 136-39; William F. Robinson and V. V. Kusin, "Reaction by Charter 77 and Hungarian Dissidents to Polish Strikers," Robinson, ed., *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland* (Munich: Radio Free Europe Research, 1980), 148-51.

[71] *Ibid.*; Raina (fn. 19), 431-32, n. 119; Connor (fn. 6), 11, n. 39, 40.

[72] Kusin (fn. 70), 321; Robinson and Kusin (fn. 70).

[73] Miklos Haraszti, "The Willing Intellectuals" (introduction to *0.1%*), in *Index on Censorship*, IX (April 1980), 9-12.

[74] *Pravozashchitnikam Pol'shi i Chekhoslovakii* [To Human Rights Activists of Poland and Czechoslovakia] (New York: Center for Appeals for Freedom, document No. 119, n.d.).

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role. Thus, although their works present programs of varying specificity (from Bence-Kis's vague hope of rejuvenation, to Bahro's hundred pages of proposals), the intended treatment is generally the same: more tolerance, more freedom, more participation. The method of administering the medicine corresponds to the desired healthy state: it is pluralist, liberal, gradualist, and populist. There are some gaps and foggy areas (what if the masses *want* to hang the *apparatchiki* from every lamppost?), but it is remarkable that the dissidents have proceeded so far in their analyses and have reached such similar conclusions.

The above evidence of the rise of an international liberal counterculture in Eastern Europe should not lead to a "roll-back" strategy of American foreign policy. The U.S. must continue to deal with these states as dictatorships with power. The chance is slight that Western-style democracies will emerge in the near future: in all of the countries except Poland, the numbers of dissidents are relatively small and "unstable" under regime pressure.

However, in light of the potential "resonance" of dissident ideas, one should not brush aside the dissident Marxists as insignificant outcasts. The foreign policy interests of the United States would be ill-served if anti-Stalinist Marxists were assumed to be totally unimportant, and if the need to avoid undermining their potential influence were ignored. Any hint of disinterest in the possible fate of Poland or Yugoslavia as models of national communism outside the tight constraints of Soviet domination would be as counterproductive as an all-too-dogmatic opposition to participation by reformist communists in the governments of the NATO countries. In either case, the preferred Soviet image—of a world divided into two competing and exclusive systems—would be supported by U.S. actions, and the dissident "third way" would be much more difficult to travel. If American decision makers wish to check Soviet expansionism in Europe, these dissident Marxists may be among their strongest allies.

In a more theoretical vein, since Eastern Europe is a crossroad between East and West, its intellectuals are more likely to produce a creative syncretism.[75] Their analysis suggests that the totalitarian model of communism does have some usefulness in reminding us of the concentration of power and authority in the party. At the same time, their use of Marxian ideas of "contradiction" and "crisis" implies that a

[75] Paul Piccone, "Czech Marxism: Karel Kosik," *Critique*, No. 8 (Summer 1971), 43-52.

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structural functional model is not without merit, provided that no automatic assumptions of functional stability are made and that rapid qualitative shifts in political processes are not ignored. The successful resurgence of critical thought after the Soviet attempt to prevent its consolidation in Prague reveals the limits of the party's concentrated power, supporting ideology, and organizational network.

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Research Note

PATRIMONIALISM

By ROBIN THEOBALD*

I. Introduction

IN 1968, Guenther Roth wrote an article in *World Politics* in which he criticized the indiscriminate use of the term "charisma," particularly in relation to the study of political change in underdeveloped societies. It seemed to Roth that political development in the new states was, at that time, conceived largely in terms of a dichotomy between charisma and rational-legal bureaucracy. As a consequence, Weber's broad typology of *Herrschaft* was generally underutilized—especially his conception of patrimonial domination.[1]

Possibly as a result of the lead provided by Roth and others during the sixties, in the seventies there was an upsurge of interest in patrimonialism; scholars resorted to the concept in a variety of attempts to explain both national integration and mass mobilization. Not infrequently, patrimonialism was linked with or treated as synonymous with patron-client relations. A few writers even based their analyses of political change in a particular country or region primarily upon the notion of patrimonialism.[2]

Now that the term is frequently used by both political scientists and sociologists, and employed by them in a wide variety of situations, it is perhaps time to take a critical look at it and to ask what precisely patrimonialism signifies and what, if anything, it explains. By way of a brief review of the relevant literature, I would like to move toward answering such questions and so attempt to evaluate the analytical utility of patrimonialism.

* This note is based upon a paper given at a meeting of the Political Change and Underdevelopment Study Group (a study group under the auspices of the Political Studies Association of the U.K.) at the University of London in January 1981. The author wishes to thank the participants at this meeting for their comments on the paper while emphasizing that the responsibility for the ideas expressed in it and in this note is entirely his own.

[1] Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-building in the New States," *World Politics*, xx (January 1968), 194-206.

[2] See, for example, James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *The Middle East: Politics and Power* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), esp. chap. 4; Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972); Jean-Claude Willame, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972).

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II. Patrimonialism: Some Contemporary Uses

Roth suggests that pre-modern forms of social organization may survive into the modern era even though the traditionalist legitimation that once underpinned them is in the process of disintegration. Patrimonialism is one such form, and Roth distinguishes two basic types. The first is to be found in those increasingly few regimes where legitimacy is still based primarily upon traditional grounds; he considers pre-revolutionary Ethiopia to be an example of this dying form. The second and much more common type of patrimonialism, which Roth terms "personal rulership," does not require any belief in the ruler/leader's personal qualifications, but is based mainly on material incentives and rewards. Personal rulership is usually subsumed under such terms as "cliques," "machines," and "factions"; it is by no means absent from modern industrial societies. In the United States, the old political machines have virtually disappeared, but personal rulership has not. Behind the alleged charisma of John F. Kennedy, for example, lay an organizational apparatus which, according to Roth, had a distinctly patrimonial flavor. Far from being a vanishing phenomenon, this modern form of patrimonialism has been encouraged by the expansion of the state's activities in both capitalist and socialist industrial societies. Among officials in the increasing number of semi-public agencies and corporations in the United States and Western Europe, patrimonialism involves, for example, access to various perquisites: expense accounts, residences, first-class travel tickets; it is also accompanied by the partial displacement of universalistic criteria in recruitment patterns.

In the underdeveloped world, personal rulership is probably the dominant form of government. The Thai bureaucracy—permeated by networks based upon the exchange of material and other rewards—which Edgar Shor regards as a deviant case[3] is, for Roth, by no means abnormal. In fact, some of the new states are, properly speaking, not states at all; rather, they are virtually the private instruments of those powerful enough to rule. A major reason for the survival of personal rulership in the underdeveloped world, Roth believes, is the cultural and political heterogeneity of the new states—a heterogeneity that confronts their governments with the task of welding diverse social units into a nation. He suggests that a bureaucracy run along patrimonial lines may be more compatible with the task of nation building (or perhaps more appro-

[3] See Shor, "The Thai Bureaucracy," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, v (June 1960), 66-86.

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priately—given the scale of the diversity of some of these states—the tasks of "empire-building").[4]

Gerald Heeger has imputed to patrimonialism a major integrative role in those new states where the political center tends to be organized around the division of "spoils" in the form of jobs, economic aid, loans, legal privileges, and so on.[5] Typically, these spoils are apportioned to the leaders of various groups or factions who then transmit to their followers such resources as are necessary to retain their support. An example of this kind of cohesion is particularly apparent in Morocco, where the political system is fragmented into a variety of primordial and interest factions. King Hassan II uses his virtual monopoly over major political appointments to play off one group against another, now rewarding this faction, now the other; it is a subtle power game in which the dominant aim is to prevent the crystallization of serious opposition to the palace.[6] However, like Roth, Heeger is quick to point out that patrimonial elite integration is by no means confined to traditional regimes such as the Kingdom of Morocco. Other Third World leaders, such as Nkrumah, Senghor, Touré, Bourguiba, and Boigny, have all sought to stabilize their rule through networks of "patrimonial retainers."[7]

For both Roth and Heeger, patrimonialism is characterized by a bureaucracy permeated by personal clientage-type relations. That is also basically the position of Legg and Lemarchand, who distinguish between feudal clientage systems and patrimonial clientage systems. The latter, unlike feudalism, operate through an administration whose officials are appointed by the ruler. Patrimonial systems further differ from the feudal in that, under feudalism, the tie between vassal and lord was both the expression and the cause of the political relationship. Legg and Lemarchand conclude that a patrimonial relationship is comparatively less personalized, and hence more precarious, than one that arises out of feudal homage.[8]

Legg and Lemarchand distinguish initially between two forms of patrimonialism: a traditional variant in which clientage relationships permeate the entire political system, and a modernizing one in which patrimonial features co-exist with incipient rational-legal tendencies—

[4] Roth (fn. 1), 204-6.

[5] Heeger, *The Politics of Underdevelopment* (London: Macmillan, 1974), esp. chap. 3.

[6] Heeger here cites John Waterbury's study of Moroccan politics, *Commander of the Faithful* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

[7] *Ibid.*, 54.

[8] René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics*, IV (No. 2, 1972), 149-78.

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tendencies that are to be found in more mobilized sectors of the society in question. However, the authors also talk about "industrial clientage systems"; they recognize that one cannot realistically assert that, in contemporary industrial societies, politics conforms closely to the ideal of rational-legal bureaucracies. The United States still has its political machines; in other industrial societies, both capitalist and socialist, family relationships and other personal ties continue to be important to political recruitment and elite cohesion. It is not clear from their discussion, however, how an industrial society with its residual clientelism differs from a "modernizing patrimonial" regime under which clientelism also co-exists with rational-legal relationships. At one point, Legg and Lemarchand suggest that affluence and opportunity have diminished economic insecurity sufficiently to make personalized political relationships unnecessary for the masses in an industrial polity. Personal ties are essential only for the minority that opts for a career in politics.[9]

The coexistence of a modern with a patrimonial sector is the central theme of Riordan Roett's study of politics in Brazil. He perceives patrimonialism as a highly flexible and paternalistic public order based upon the exchange of substantive favors, particularly in the realm of public employment where resources are utilized by Brazil's elite as a means of co-optation and control. The theme of political control is the core of Roett's analysis: he wants to show how, since independence, a minority has maintained a grip on Brazilian society even during the era of so-called democratic politics between 1948 and 1964. According to Roett, the survival of the patrimonial system has been made possible not simply by the elite's control over and careful distribution of the spoils, but also by the fragmentation of potential opposition to the regime. This fragmentation is the result of Brazil's size and heterogeneity; it is intensified by the political passivity of the masses. However, in those parts of Brazil—mainly the Center-South—that are characterized by high levels of urbanization with all that that entails in the form of concentration, higher levels of literacy, and so forth, the patrimonial regime has on occasion come under mass challenge. Consequently, patrimonialism in Brazil must periodically be buttressed by military authoritarianism. In Roett's view, then, patrimonialism and "modernity" do not really co-exist; they are in a state of tension.[10]

The theme of tension is also evident in Harold Crouch's study of patrimonialism in Indonesia.[11] As the basic characteristic of the pre-

[9] *Ibid.*, 160.

[10] See Roett (fn. 2), esp. chaps. 2 and 5.

[11] Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," *World Politics*, XXXI (July 1979), 571-87.

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colonial Javanese political system, patrimonialism has survived into the postcolonial period. In a patrimonial state, according to Crouch, the ruler's power depends upon his ability to maintain the support of key sections of the political elite. In the absence of sufficient coercive authority, the ruler seeks to win the support of strategically placed individuals through the distribution of "fiefs and benefices." Since 1966, General Suharto, in full control of the governmental bureaucracy, has been able to build up a substantial network of support, particularly within the armed forces. Army officers have been offered civilian posts that carry prospects of material gain, or have been encouraged to go into business with the promise of help in the form of credits, contracts, and licenses. However, whereas the precolonial patrimonial regime seldom, if ever, had to contend with a challenge from the masses—due primarily to their passivity and political isolation—the current regime in Indonesia, despite ruthless repression, increasingly faces popular disaffection. As in Brazil, so in Indonesia: the main threat to Suharto's regime comes from the mobilized sectors of the urban population.

III. Some Observations

It will be apparent that the writers discussed in this brief review[12] consider the essential feature of patrimonial regimes to be the exchange of resources (jobs, promotions, titles, contracts, licenses, immunity from the law, etc.) between key figures in government and strategically located individuals: trade union leaders, businessmen, community leaders, and so forth. In return for these resources, the government or heads of state receive economic and political support. The emphasis is on the personal nature of the exchange: virtually all the analyses that have resorted to the term have been informed, either explicitly or implicitly, by the model of the patron-client relationship.

This is not the place to engage in an extended discussion of the notion of patron-client relationships.[13] However, it must be pointed out

[12] I have chosen not to discuss Willame's study of patrimonialism in the Congo (fn. 2), primarily because he sees the essence of patrimonialism in its decentralized character. He thereby departs both from Weber's position and from the bulk of subsequent writing on patrimonialism. In addition to Weber's own discussion in *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), III, chap. 12, see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism* (London: Sage Publications, 1973), 15-17; Robert M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in Louis Hartz, ed., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1964), 157; and Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution From Above* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), 44-45.

[13] For an excellent critique of the uses of the patron-client concept, see Robert R. Kaufman, "The Patron-Client Concept and Marco-politics: Prospects and Problems," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIV (July 1974), 254-308.

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that the more the parties approximate each other in terms of their respective class and status positions, the less distinctive the relationship becomes. In other words, although in tribal and peasant societies it is not hard to identify unambiguous clientage relationships, in more open and more egalitarian social forms it is extremely difficult to say where clientelism ends and the reciprocity that pervades social life generally begins. With patrimonialism, the case is similar: in the absence of clear-cut social differences between the parties concerned—and no writer who has used the term has attempted to show consistently that such differences exist—the notion of patrimonialism loses specificity.

Rudolph and Rudolph have recently argued that patrimonialism is not only to be found in *all* bureaucracies but—since it provides an all-important counterweight to the potentially alienating effects of bureaucratic rationality—is indispensable to their efficient operation.[14] If that is the case, what then is a "patrimonial" society? The answer that emerges from the literature is that Third World polities are patrimonial in the sense that they are penetrated to a greater degree than others by patrimonial relationships. As these societies develop, they are gradually being replaced by "modern" types of relationships, whether they be rational-legal or horizontal class-type alliances. To respond to this view, one may advance criticisms similar to those that were directed against proponents of the "traditional-into-modernity" continuum of the fifties and the early sixties.[15] Personalism, far from becoming obsolescent (as "tradition" was once believed to become), has proved to be a remarkably resilient survivor in the maelstrom of bureaucratic rationality. Is it valid to say, as Legg and Lemarchand appear to argue, that patrimonialism has become something of a residual phenomenon in industrial societies, involving only the small minority making a career in politics? How does this position square with that put forward by the Rudolphs (and corroborated by much research in organizational sociology)[16]—especially in view of the fact that large numbers of individuals in industrial societies are constrained to spend much of their waking lives within a bureaucratic context? What is the difference in the nature of the relationship between, on the one hand, the corpus of

[14] Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy," *World Politics*, XXXI (January 1979), 195-227.

[15] See, for example, Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Re-considered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX (April 1967), 292-346, and Joseph Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 72 (January 1967), 351-62.

[16] See, for example, Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Organization and Bureaucracy, An Analysis of Modern Theories* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

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functionaries who attached themselves and their careers to Robert McNamara,[17] or the members of Harold Wilson's "kitchen cabinet," and, on the other hand, the junior executive who at some risk to himself helps one of his seniors out of a tight spot during a board meeting, or the foreman who bends the rules of safety to help his department manager achieve production targets? If the difference lies in the degree of political power possessed by Robert McNamara and Harold Wilson as compared to anonymous junior executives and foremen, the ramifications of this position—particularly the level of power at which the relationship would cease to be patrimonial—need to be thoroughly explored.

In Roett's model, a minority maintains its domination primarily by channeling resources through strategically located networks; but to what extent is such a situation peculiar to a particular type of patrimonial society? Governments in all complex societies are involved in the distribution of resources in one form or another. It would be naive to imagine that even in liberal democratic societies this distributive process is always conducted according to universalistic or affectively neutral criteria, or that it never involves the distribution of spoils by a minority bent upon limiting the formation of constellations of power against it. The fact that in some societies a near-monopoly on spoils is in the hands of a small group or a single individual—a Nasser, Suharto, or Hassan II—obviously makes the process different from that in liberal democratic societies (as well as more easily observable). But it is doubtful whether the differences can be explored or explained by simply labeling the former societies "patrimonial." In fact, the greatest difficulty with the term as used is that, rather than isolating a sociopolitical phenomenon, it tends to gloss over substantial differences—both within a society at different stages in time and between societies at quite different stages of socioeconomic development. Brazil has been a patrimonial society during the Old Republic, the Vargas era, the period of democratic politics, and since the coup of 1964. In addition, the Congo, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia, Thailand, Mali and numerous other polities are in some sense patrimonial. One must ask what these societies have in common other than that clientage networks play an important role in politics (as they also do, according to the literature discussed above, in industrial societies). In other words, it seems that the flexibility that Roett discerns in the institution of patrimonialism[18]

[17] An example of patrimonialism in a modern context cited by Rudolph and Rudolph (fn. 14), 224-25.
[18] Roett (fn. 2), 129.

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is located within the concept itself. Like its predecessor, charisma, patrimonialism is being used to explain political cohesion in virtually any society; it has become something of a catch-all concept, in danger of losing its analytical utility.[19]

IV. Some Suggestions

Just as the term "charisma" can be used in a meaningful way, so can "patrimonialism."[20] And, as in the case of charisma, it is instructive to refer back to Weber's writings.

Patrimonialism is one of Weber's main types of traditional domination; it derives from the household administration of a ruler/chief, specifically from the separation of followers/clients from the chief's household and the granting to them of fiefs, benefices, tax-farming opportunities and the like. Out of this situation arises a form of bureaucratic administration, but this administration differs from rational-legal bureaucracies in that the following are largely absent: clearly defined spheres of competence that are subject to impersonal rules; the rational ordering of relations of superiority and inferiority; regular systems of appointment and promotion on the basis of free contract; technical training as a regular requirement; and fixed salaries paid in money. In place of well-defined spheres of competence, the patrimonial bureaucracy is characterized by a shifting series of tasks and powers commissioned and granted on an *ad hoc* basis by the ruler/chief. In the absence of clear-cut spheres of competence and regular fixed salaries, there can be no unequivocal division between incumbent and office. Accordingly, some degree of appropriation of office is endemic; in extreme cases of decentralized patrimonialism, all government authority—with corresponding economic rights—may be treated as a private possession.[21]

Although the above characteristics are well known, a connection is infrequently made between patrimonial bureaucracies and the emergence of modern bureaucracy. Weber noted that modern bureaucracies depend upon continuous revenues to support them. They therefore re-

[19] See Claude Ake, "Charismatic Legitimation and Political Integration," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX (October 1966), 1-13. For a brief review of the main criticisms of "charisma," see Robin Theobald, "A Charisma too Versatile?" *European Journal of Sociology*, XIX (No. 1, 1978), 192-98.

[20] See, particularly, Richard H. Dekmejian and Margaret J. Wirszomirski, "Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Mahdi of the Sudan," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIV (March 1972), 193-214. See also Robin Theobald, "The Role of Charisma in the Development of Social Movements," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions*, XLIX, (No. 1, 1980), 83-100.

[21] See Weber (fn. 12), III, 1028-31.

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quire a stable system of taxation, and only a *fully developed money economy* offers a secure basis for such a system. Though large and complex bureaucracies have existed in non- or only partially monetized economies, the institutional stability that we associate with modern bureaucracies—salaried officials, training, and procedural regularity—is attainable only in a developed money economy. This means that modern bureaucratic structures are, as Weber clearly recognized, "everywhere a late product of historical development."[22]

This point, made by Weber over half a century ago, has been reiterated in various ways by a number of writers who have studied the emergence in Europe of the modern nation-state and its chief instrument, modern bureaucracy. It is now widely accepted that the consolidation of modern state power was indissolubly linked with the expansion of trade and the diffusion of capitalism. The progressive monetization of the European economies made it easier for state builders to cream off revenue and use it to streamline the state apparatus.[23] Clearly, it was not just a question of more efficient revenue gathering, but of a concatenation of factors—improvements in communications, transport, literacy, developments in accounting methods, and so on—that were part of that incredibly complex process out of which the modern bureaucracy as we know it eventually emerged.

This point is made with some cogency by W. F. Wertheim in an article that is particularly valuable because it juxtaposes observations on the emergence of modern bureaucracies with a discussion of the basic features of patrimonial bureaucracies.[24] Wertheim locates the prototype of the modern state bureaucracy in the Napoleonic reforms of the first years of the 19th century. Although it borrowed elements from revolutionary legislation as well as from Prussian experience, the Napoleonic polity was, according to Wertheim, the first to establish the basic features that were subsequently incorporated into Weber's ideal type of rational-legal bureaucracy which eventually produced the professional civil servant. This official is appointed, normally for life; is remunerated with a fixed salary in money; has the right to a pension;

[22] *Ibid.*, 968.

[23] See, for example, Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 72-73; Martin Krygier, "State and Bureaucracy in Europe; the Growth of a Concept," in Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier, eds., *Bureaucracy: The Career of a Concept* (London: Edward Arnold, 1979); and Eugene N. Anderson and Pauline Anderson, "Bureaucratic Institutionalization in Nineteenth-Century Europe," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), 91-105.

[24] Wertheim, "Sociological Aspects of Corruption in South Asia," *ibid.*, 195-291.

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and is able to count on a stable career structure with a prospect of promotion according to established criteria. Wertheim reiterates Weber's point that such a bureaucracy is a recent historical development.

Modern bureaucracies are then contrasted by Wertheim (again drawing initially on Weber) with the bureaucracies of pre-modern empires. In predominantly barter economies, officials were not remunerated with money but with a share in the produce of the land, which they obtained through fines, tributes, or "gifts" levied against peasant producers. The inherently centrifugal tendencies of such a system had been readily appreciated by Weber, who noted that even in Imperial China, with its relatively advanced bureaucracy, the central government found it very difficult to increase the amount of tribute it was able to levy at the periphery.

Wertheim goes on to cite data relating to the activities of the Dutch East India Company in 18th-century Java. Although formally a commercial body, the company operated in a way that bore many of the features of the patrimonial state. Its officials were paid a salary, but one sufficiently meager as to be of little more than symbolic importance. Consequently, the practice developed of supplementing this token income by such exactions as could be levied against the indigenous population. By the end of the 18th century, these perquisites were considered so normal that instead of the official receiving a salary from the company, he had to pay an annual "office charge" to it as well as to its local plenipotentiaries.

Wertheim is especially interested in the activities of a particular employee of the company, Dirk van Hogendorp, whom he considers to be a transitional figure. Although initially accepting the perquisites of office without question, van Hogendorp subsequently developed a "new conscience": he came to see these levies as abuses and fulminated against them in public. Wertheim clearly recognizes, however, that although such calls for reform might come on an individual basis from militants such as van Hogendorp, the widespread diffusion of a bureaucratic professionalism had to wait upon the advanced economic structure that could support the institutional stability required.

A patrimonial bureaucracy thus is the administrative instrument of an underdeveloped economy: that is to say, a primarily agrarian economy with limited trade and a large subsistence sector. The limited penetration of commercial transactions in such an economy constitutes a serious impediment to the appropriation of resources by the center, and hence to the development of an efficient "modern" administration. The personalism that most writers have fixed upon as the central fea-

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ture of patrimonial bureaucracies is, according to this view, actually a symptom of more fundamental structural conditions. In other words, patrimonial bureaucracies cohere, insofar as they do cohere, around personal ties precisely because of the absence or impermanence of other integrative mechanisms—most notably, a stable career structure and all that that entails.

V. Conclusion

It is surely no accident that many of the contemporary societies that have been classified as "patrimonial" exhibit to varying degrees the characteristics of the pre-modern empires which Weber and others have described: disarticulated economies with sizable non-monetized sectors, poor communications, low levels of literacy, and a general scarcity of resources (including skilled manpower). It is also not insignificant that substantial areas of Third World economies lie largely beyond the reach of the revenue collector. The collection of taxes on subsistence agriculture is difficult and provokes resentment among the poorest sector of the population; the absence of bookkeeping and accounting seriously impedes the raising of levies on small traders and artisans. Large property owners are invariably able to evade taxation because of their political and economic power.[25] Third World states thus tend to be caught in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment: their ability to appropriate resources is severely hampered by administrative weaknesses; but these weaknesses are, in turn, perpetuated by their restricted ability to appropriate resources. This dilemma is well brought out by Henry Bienen:

> Even in poor countries where the industry that exists may be nationalized, the greatest share of GDP usually comes from the agricultural sector. Perhaps a quarter or more of total GDP is in the subsistence agricultural sector. Weak administrative structures find it hard to tax and control rural incomes. . . . Thus these administrative structures find it difficult to build themselves up in a systematic fashion by appropriating national resources which could be used for further development of administration."[26]

If one accepts that there are vital links between the phenomenon of patrimonialism and broader socioeconomic factors, it would seem useful to relate specific instances of patrimonialism to these contextual

[25] See, for example, Nicholas Kaldor, "Taxation for Economic Development," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, I (No. 1, 1963), 7-23.

[26] Bienen, "The Economic Environment," in Goran Hyden, Robert H. Jackson, and John H. Okumu, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), 59.

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variables. Tentatively, one may delineate three sets of variables that bear upon this problem. The first two concern the general economic and political characteristics of the country in question. Examples of economic factors would be the size and composition of GDP, the character of trade and manufacturing, the size of the subsistence sector, the degree of internal economic integration, taxation potential, and size and apportionment of national budgets. Salient political factors might include the historical evolution and character of the state structure, the role of colonialism in this evolution, the degree of internal political integration (bearing in mind Roth's "empires"), and the general nature of the relationship between the political executive and the administration.[27] The third set of variables would consist of the characteristics of specific bureaucracies (although in relation to any one country it is invariably simplistic to talk of *the* bureaucracy). Here those who wish to continue using the term patrimonialism might do well to forge links with the substantial literature on development administration, which concerns itself with such areas as recruitment policy, training procedures, salary structures, methods of promotion, and other vital features of Third World bureaucracies.[28]

Taking account of these and other variables would help not only to *explain* why patrimonialism exists rather than simply describe it; it would also help to differentiate between bureaucratic structures in societies at different stages of socioeconomic development.

[27] For a useful discussion, see John J. Okumu, "The Socio-political Setting," *ibid.*, 25-42.

[28] In addition to Okumu, *ibid.*, see Colin Leys, "Administration Training in Kenya," in Bernard Schaffer, ed., *Administrative Training and Development: A Comparative Study of East Africa, Zambia, Pakistan and India* (London: Praeger, 1974), 161-210. See also Bernard Schaffer, "Administrative Legacies and Links in the Post-colonial State: Preparation, Training and Administrative Reform," *Development and Change*, IX (No. 2, 1978), 175-200.

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Review Articles

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

By ANN MOSELY LESCH*

Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, 448 pp., $18.95.

P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds., *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979, 323 pp., $18.00.

Walid W. Kazziha, *Palestine in the Arab Dilemma*. London: Croom Helm; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979, 111 pp., $21.50.

Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East*. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Study Number 38, Harvard University, 1979, 205 pp., $6.95 (paper).

Colin Legum and Haim Shaked, eds., *Arab Relations in the Middle East: The Road to Realignment*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, 104 pp., $6.95 (paper).

Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978, 320 pp., $20.00.

Edward W. Said, *The Question of Palestine*. New York: Times Books, 1979, 265 pp., $12.50 ($2.95 paper).

THE core of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians. The Palestinians' displacement in 1948, caused by the creation of Israel, has had profound repercussions across the Middle East. More than a decade elapsed before the Palestinians —in exile, and dependent on the hospitality of Arab states—began to reestablish political institutions and military bases. Since the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) was formed in 1964, the Palestinians' primary struggle has been against Israel. The contradiction between Israeli and Palestinian national goals and Israel's blanket refusal to negotiate with the P.L.O. have caused a basic impasse. Efforts to reach a compromise solution based on territorial partition have been continually frustrated. Moreover, Israel's policy of absorbing the lands it occupied in 1967 has increasingly undermined the possibility of repartitioning Palestine.

Given the protracted nature of the struggle and the Palestinians' dependence on their Arab hosts, the P.L.O. found itself caught in conflicts with Arab states as well as with Israel. Although the P.L.O. gained

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the moral and financial support of the Arab regimes in addition to their diplomatic backing in international forums, the presence of the Palestinians posed a threefold challenge to those states. In the first place, Arab rulers increasingly resented the military burden that they had to assume vis-à-vis Israel and were wary of the efforts by Palestinian guerrillas to draw them into battles for which they felt unprepared, at times not of their choosing. Thus, Egypt signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and Syria adhered to its 1974 disengagement accord with Israel despite the ongoing conflict over Lebanon and despite its outrage at Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981. Second, Palestinian raids into Israel precipitated retaliatory actions by Israel against Arab host territories, causing major population dislocations in Jordan in the late 1960s and in Lebanon in the 1970s. Retaliatory raids against Lebanon also accelerated the outbreak of that country's internal civil war; later, they hampered efforts to resolve the strife through political compromise. Finally, the presence of autonomous Palestinian political and military institutions in Jordan and Lebanon undermined the sovereignty of the host regimes, and the Palestinians' political ideology challenged the rulers' legitimacy. Radical groups within the P.L.O. strongly criticized the monarchical political system in Jordan and the religious-confessional system in Lebanon.

Despite its multiple lines of conflict with the Arab states and its weak military position vis-à-vis Israel, the Palestinian national movement grew in political strength, organizational complexity, and international legitimacy throughout the 1970s. The P.L.O. gained diplomatic recognition from over one hundred states, used its observer status to play a significant role at the United Nations, and articulated political views that won the support of most of the fragmented Palestinian community. How can these paradoxes be explained? How can there be such a discrepancy between the Palestinian movement's military weakness and its political strength? How can Arab regimes simultaneously support and constrain the P.L.O.? How can Israel, despite its military superiority, refuse to negotiate with the P.L.O.? How can Israel continue to stand against the international consensus favoring inclusion of the Palestinians in a negotiated settlement? What are the implications of these paradoxes for the prospects of resolving the Palestine problem?

The seven books under review provide a sample of recent scholarly writings on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Each book addresses certain aspects of the issue and dwells to some extent on the paradoxes raised here. Three of the studies focus directly on Palestine. In *The Question of Palestine*, Edward W. Said, a Palestinian professor of English litera-

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ture at Columbia University and the author of biting critiques of Western interpretations of the Middle East,[1] explores the nature of Palestinian identity, the Palestinians' confrontation with the Zionist movement and Israel, and the ways in which a solution compatible to both peoples might be attained. He focuses more on the Palestinian-Israeli contradiction than on Palestinian-Arab tensions. In contrast, the latter issue forms the primary theme of *Palestine in the Arab Dilemma*, a collection of essays by Walid W. Kazziha, a political scientist of Lebanese nationality who teaches at the American University in Cairo. He stresses the contradictions between the radical revolutionary philosophy of some Palestinian groups and the status quo-oriented, antidemocratic interests of Arab regimes.

In *Armed Struggle in Palestine*, Bard E. O'Neill, director of Middle East Studies at the National War College, concentrates on the Palestinian efforts to defeat Israel by military means, and the impact of Israel's retaliation policy on the P.L.O. and the Arab states. O'Neill argues that, given Israel's overwhelming military strength and the vulnerability of the host countries to Israeli counterattack, the P.L.O. can never succeed in its strategy of protracted armed struggle. He is therefore puzzled that the Palestinian movement has not only persisted, but has grown in international standing.

Israeli perspectives on the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole are provided by Shlomo Aronson in *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East* and by the contributors to *Arab Relations in the Middle East*, edited by Colin Legum and Haim Shaked. Aronson, a political scientist at the Hebrew University, describes the historical evolution of Israeli foreign policy, arguing that, rather than bearing any substantive responsibility for the Palestinian dispersion and the later diplomatic impasses, Israel has been reacting to the hostile attitudes and behavior on the part of the Arabs. Nevertheless, he faults the post-1967 Israeli leaders for their complacency with the territorial status quo, their insistence on absolute security, and their denial of the Palestinians' existence.

Legum and Shaked's collection of essays by researchers at the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University covers only one year, from October 1976 to November 1977. During that time, the Arab states tried to resolve the Lebanese crisis and establish a common diplomatic posture in anticipation of the resumption of negotiations in Geneva. In addition, according to Israel Altman's essay (p. 37),

[1] Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), and *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

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a substantial shift occurred in the P.L.O.'s policy at the March 1977 session of the Palestine National Council: the majority at the Council supported the P.L.O.'s entry into diplomatic negotiations and the establishment of an independent state in part of Palestine.[2]

The impact of the Palestinians on the Lebanese civil war is assessed in *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon* by Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian scholar at the American University of Beirut, and in *Lebanon in Crisis*, edited by P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider of Claremont University. Khalidi depicts the internal and external factors that propelled Lebanon into civil war and then sustained the conflict. He analyzes the interplay of domestic Lebanese political, religious, and socioeconomic issues with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the growth of Palestinian power in Lebanon, and describes the contradictions in the P.L.O.'s stance and its inability to keep out of Lebanon's spiraling internal conflict. The 16 contributors to Haley and Snider's volume stress external factors more than internal ones; that may be partly a result of the compartmentalization of the volume into separate chapters on the key Arab states, Israel, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, the United Nations, and the Arab League. The authors emphasize the entanglement of Lebanon in the Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab conflicts, and the near-impossibility of resolving its internal problems until the Arab-Israeli conflict is settled.

Taken as a whole, the seven books cover most facets of the contemporary Palestine problem. They do not, however, explore in depth such issues as the internal politics and society of the Palestinians in Israel, the occupied territories, and the Diaspora; the impact of the Palestinian presence and P.L.O. policies on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states; the superpowers' policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians; and the effects on the Palestine problem of Egypt's bilateral peace treaty with Israel. Studies that cover some of those issues more comprehensively are cited in the footnotes.

The Israeli Challenge

The exodus from Palestine in 1948 radically transformed Palestinian life.[3] Out of 1.3 million Palestinians, 780,000 were dispersed to the

[2] The volume by Legum and Shaked also includes an essay by Daniel Dishon that describes inter-Arab relations, and one by Elie Rekhess and Dan Avidan that analyzes the consolidation of support for the P.L.O. on the West Bank and Gaza following the municipal council elections in April 1976.

[3] For analyses of the mandate period, see the two volumes by Yehoshua Porath: *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974) and *The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-1939* (London:

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neighboring Arab countries. The structure and legitimacy of the political elite were undermined, and the bulk of the peasantry were forced into an alienated existence in refugee camps.[4] Although guerrilla movements began to emerge in the late 1950s, the Palestinians' political center was established only in 1964, when the Arab League formed the Palestine Liberation Organization. By 1969, the guerrillas dominated the P.L.O., under the chairmanship of Fatah's Yasir Arafat.

Edward W. Said analyzes the "collective national trauma" (p. xii) that the Palestinians faced from the exodus through the creation of the P.L.O. They experienced both a territorial trauma, losing their homeland, and a symbolic one, epitomized in their struggle for social justice and their rejection of outmoded forms of Arab political life (p. 125). Emphasizing that the Palestinians never agreed to assimilate in the Arab world, he argues: "Rather the Palestinians have repeatedly insisted on their right of return, their desire for the exercise of self-determination, and their stubborn opposition to Zionism as it has affected them" (p. 47). Through the P.L.O., Said maintains, the Palestinians have become a mature political community; they do not seek revenge, but a new vision. If the Palestinian movement had relied solely on armed struggle, it would have collapsed when the Jordanian army routed the guerrillas in 1970-1971. Instead, as a state-in-the-making, the P.L.O. gained a deeper legitimacy among the Palestinians than it would have by armed power alone.

That reality partly explains the paradox that military weakness has been coupled with political strength, and answers the perplexity of analysts such as Bard E. O'Neill. The latter makes clear the difficulty of conducting a protracted armed struggle in Palestine. The guerrilla forces could not establish secure bases inside Israel and the occupied territories, and became dependent on external sanctuaries for their operations. Forced out of Jordan, turning to transnational terrorism, and occupying militarily inefficacious bases in Lebanon, the commandos wielded little military power. Their capacity was eroded further by the fighting in Lebanon in 1975-1976, which diverted attention from the principal conflict with Israel. O'Neill's evidence leads him to posit the disintegration of the P.L.O.—and yet he recognizes

Frank Cass, 1977); see also Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979).

[4] Descriptions of the flight and of refugee life include Rosemary Sayigh, "The Palestinian Identity among Camp Residents," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, VI (Spring 1977), and *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* (London: Zed Press, 1979); Reja-e Busailah, "The Fall of Lydda, 1948: Impressions and Reminiscences," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, III (Spring 1981); and Nafez Nazzal, *The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978).

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that its international standing has grown since the October War. By attributing that growth to external factors, particularly the diplomatic backing of the P.L.O. by the Arab states, he underestimates the intrinsic political strengths of the P.L.O. that are stressed by Said, as well as the nonmilitary sources of its ability to assert itself internationally.

The core of the essay by Israel Altman in *Arab Relations in the Middle East* concerns the consolidation of the P.L.O.'s position at the critical 13th session of the Palestine National Council in March 1977. The majority voted to accept a Palestinian state on part of the territory of Palestine and to give the P.L.O.'s Executive Committee, under Arafat's chairmanship, the authority to negotiate on its behalf in any international forums. These decisions were essential to enable the P.L.O. to enter into international negotiations, since they approximated the American insistence that it accept a limited political settlement before it could be recognized. Moreover, the decisions were articulated at the same time that the new American President, Jimmy Carter, had begun to speak sympathetically about the need for a Palestinian homeland.[5]

Even though the P.L.O. accepted the idea of a negotiated and limited settlement, it failed to be admitted to any negotiations. In part, this failure was caused by America's continued refusal to talk to P.L.O. leaders and by inter-Arab disagreements over the optimal structure of a negotiating forum. However, the major factor has been Israel's refusal to recognize that the Palestinians have national rights, and to negotiate with the P.L.O. Since Israel has overwhelming military strength vis-à-vis the P.L.O., and has been bolstered by the United States in its refusal to negotiate, the Israeli government has not felt any serious need to alter its policy. The P.L.O. cannot overcome this inequality by launching commando attacks in Israel or by galvanizing international support and sanctions against Israel. At most, it can increase the moral and diplomatic pressure on the United States to ad-

[5] For Palestinian commentaries on the evolution of the P.L.O.'s political thinking and on possible political settlements, see Sabri Jiryis, "On Political Settlement in the Middle East: The Palestinian Dimension," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, VII (Autumn 1977); Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57 (July 1978); Abou Iyad and Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land* (New York: Times Books, 1981); and Emile A. Nakhleh, ed., *A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980). Former Israeli intelligence chief Yehoshofat Harkabi, in *The Palestinian Covenant and its Meaning* (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1979) denies that P.L.O. thinking has changed, although other writings by Harkabi indicate a more subtle understanding of Palestinian thinking; e.g., "The Palestinians in the Fifties and their Awakening as Reflected in their Literature," in Moshe Ma'oz, ed., *Palestinian Arab Politics* (Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1975).

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dress the problem, and it can harass Israel by conducting periodic commando operations across the Lebanese border. But the latter are limited by the presence of U.N. peacekeeping troops and the Israeli-backed enclave headed by Major Sa'd Haddad. If one accepts O'Neill's argument that the Palestinian guerrillas cannot defeat Israel militarily, it follows that Israel is free from serious military pressure to recognize the P.L.O. and to relinquish any of the territory occupied in 1967 in order to establish a Palestinian state.

Israel's refusal is based fundamentally on its inability to accept the legitimacy of the Palestinian national movement. Before 1948, Said argues, the Zionist movement perceived the Palestinian residents either as nonexistent politically or as a temporary obstacle to the realization of its dream of achieving a Jewish state. For Israeli Jews "to admit the existence of Palestinians with a national claim even to a part of Palestine meant contesting Zionist claims" (p. 223). Many Israelis fear that granting the Palestinians' claim to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would jeopardize Israel's right to its pre-June 1967 territory, since the whole area comprises historic Palestine. This deep-set fear is generally couched in other terms—the asserted historical right to all the Biblical land, the need for militarily secure borders, the perceived danger of Soviet domination of a Palestinian state, or the irredentist nature of a West Bank state. These terms disguise Israel's underlying inability to recognize that the land is claimed by two peoples whose demands must be reconciled if any lasting settlement is to be achieved.

In that regard, Said argues that a key requirement for a solution is "a Zionist acceptance of the fact that Jewish national liberation took place upon the ruins of another national existence, not in the abstract" (p. 52). He realizes that admission of Israel's historic responsibility and its subsequent acceptance of a compromise solution must be reciprocated by the Palestinians. He maintains that the P.L.O. has, in fact, shifted from a position that denied Israel's reality (p. 49) to one that recognizes that a solution can be based on territorial partition and Israel's continued existence. While the Palestinian leadership has made the painful transition from rejection to recognition, that shift has not been reciprocated by the Israeli government.

In fact, the current Israeli regime has acted decisively to preclude the realization of any Palestinian independence. The Likud government, in power since mid-1977, has honeycombed the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights with Israeli settlements; it has formally annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, clamped down on political and cultural life in the occupied territories, tied the

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territories' economy to Israel, and attacked Palestinian military positions and refugee camps in southern Lebanon and Beirut. All these actions are designed to lead to the absorption of the remainder of Palestine by Israel and the destruction of the Palestinian political community. In *Lebanon in Crisis*, Lewis W. Snider maintains that the Israeli government believes that its security depends "on causing massive dislocation in Arab lands and very heavy loss of life, together with the extension of Israeli control over Arab territory" (p. 103). Such measures are an extreme manifestation of Israel's long-term retaliatory/deterrence policy—detailed by Shlomo Aronson—which was implemented along the 1948 armistice lines during the 1950s and early 1960s.[6]

The Inter-Arab Dimension

The Palestinian cause has retained deep and abiding support in the Arab world, in recognition of the Arabs' failure to save their Palestinian brothers from exile and of the moral legitimacy of the Palestinians' effort to regain their homeland. Arab politicians feel obliged to back the "sacred cause," and the Arab states sponsored the formation of the P.L.O. to represent its stateless people. Nonetheless, relations between the Palestinians and the Arab states have been marked by continual tension, including ideological clashes, charges of betrayal, and traumatic military confrontations. Arab regimes have tried to manipulate and control the Palestinian movement; the P.L.O., in turn, has sought to influence Arab policies and to maintain its independence in a constantly shifting regional environment. Altman comments:

> Lacking an independent territorial base and substantial military and financial resources of its own, the PLO has traditionally sought to use inter-Arab discords to keep its freedom of action from being encroached upon by any single Arab government (p. 50).

Palestinian relations with the Arab states can be analyzed in their ideological dimension, as a clash of political systems and social goals; in their political dimension, as a clash of state interests; and in their military dimension, as a clash between a guerrilla movement and the

[6] Michael Brecher has written the most comprehensive studies on Israeli foreign policy: *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Image, Process* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), and *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). The Israeli autonomy plan is sharply criticized by Mark Heller in "Begin's False Autonomy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 37 (Winter 1979-80). Pre-1948 Jewish attitudes toward the Arab community in Palestine are critically assessed in Neil Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1926* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), and Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians* (London: Croom Helm; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979).

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states providing sanctuary. All three aspects combined in Lebanon, and have made that conflict particularly complex and difficult to disentangle.

On the ideological level, Said and Kazziha argue that the Palestinian movement is not simply a struggle to regain Palestine but is also revolutionary, in that it seeks to establish a new form of polity and a new set of social relations. The P.L.O. has created participatory structures that articulate the needs of the people and provide basic services in the refugee camps. At the center, the Palestine National Council sessions are the scene of vigorous and frank debate, and the Executive Committee balances the different political and military factions. Arafat is *primus inter pares*, not the sole leader. Moreover, both Said and Kazziha maintain that the Palestinians envision a nonsectarian, democratic political system emphasizing social welfare and justice. Such concepts appear threatening to Arab regimes that have narrow class or religious bases and follow autocratic political practices. Even though some P.L.O. leaders, such as Arafat, have sought to avoid entanglement in the internal politics of the Arab countries, they are automatically viewed with distrust. Said calls the relations an "ironic tension" (p. 154), while Kazziha sees "a basic . . . contradiction" between the political interests of the P.L.O. and its Arab hosts (pp. 35-36).

Kazziha articulates the perspective of radical, overtly oppositionist groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), which call for revolution in the Arab states prior to the liberation of Palestine. According to the P.F.L.P. cadres, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq serve bourgeois class interests, which cause their governments to fear mass involvement in politics and to avoid confrontation with the West and Israel. The ruling army officers are "more interested in enjoying the privileges they had acquired once they were in power rather than fighting the Israelis at the front" (p. 24). Therefore, a mass revolutionary movement is seen as the only way to revolutionize the Arab world: "the way to Tel Aviv had first to pass through the Arab capitals" (Kazziha, 24). That revolutionary slogan placed the P.F.L.P. in conflict with the host regimes, which opposed both the P.F.L.P.'s military acts (e.g., in Jordan in the late 1960s) and its potential political subversion (e.g., in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait). By the late 1970s, P.F.L.P. sanctuaries were limited to the refugee camps and squatter areas in Lebanon. Yet the Arab regimes remain concerned about the radicalizing potential of the Palestinians.

The Arab-Palestinian relationship also reflects strains between the states' interests and the Palestinians' needs. Said argues that

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> each state or regime feels it necessary to assure itself of some sort of influence, proxy voice, or an actual party at work in Palestinian politics, so powerful is the cachet of legitimacy and authority given Arab politicians by a connection with the Palestinian struggle (pp. 162-63).

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have substantial numbers of influential Palestinian residents, provide financial support in part to contain the movement and neutralize its radical elements. The ruling *Ba'th* parties in Syria and Iraq sponsor guerrilla groups—*al-Sa'iqa* and the Arab Liberation Front, respectively—that compete against each other while they attempt to hold the P.L.O. to a hard-line diplomatic posture. Jordan has fluctuated in its policy: it served as a reluctant host in the late 1960s, ousted the P.L.O. in 1970-1971, and resumed a cautious dialogue in 1977. In similar shifts, Egypt applauded the guerrilla activities along the Jordan River when the P.L.O. played an auxiliary role to Egypt's war of attrition along the Suez Canal. However, as soon as the P.L.O. denounced the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire in August 1970 and decried the Rogers Plan, Egypt curbed its political activities in Cairo and did not intervene diplomatically during Jordan's battles with the P.L.O. in September of that year until the Jordanian army had inflicted a stunning defeat on the Palestinian commandos.

At other times, the P.L.O. has maneuvered successfully among the Arab states, managing to sustain a margin of freedom. At the Riyadh summit conference in October 1976, the P.L.O. gained political support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt, thereby offsetting some of the heavy pressure that Syria was exerting on the Palestinian forces in Lebanon. Two years earlier, the P.L.O. had used its moral leverage to win recognition from the Arab League as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and to gain the League's assistance in securing an invitation for Arafat to address the United Nations. However, the P.L.O. found its room for maneuver severely limited when the Arab world became polarized after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and his subsequent conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty with Israel. The acrimony between Syria and Iraq, Jordan's support for Iraq in its war with Iran, and the aid provided by Libya and Iraq to dissident Palestinian groups further reduced the options for the P.L.O.'s leadership and increased its dependence on Syria and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Syrian and Saudi interests have not been congruent: Syrian pressure on the P.L.O. to maintain a rejectionist stand is countered by Saudi efforts to draw the Palestinians into a limited, negotiated settlement. These contradictory pressures were dramatized at the abortive summit conference in Fez in November 1981, at which discussion of the Saudi plan

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for a diplomatic settlement—backed personally by Arafat—had to be shelved when the President of Syria boycotted the meeting.

Finally, tensions have arisen between the P.L.O. and the Arab states over the role of the latter as a sanctuary for the guerrillas. Said calls this the unresolvable "predicament of territorial alienation" (p. 150). O'Neill describes the problem in detail: unable to gain a base in Israel and the occupied territories, the P.L.O. was "forced to operate from contiguous countries. In such a disadvantageous position, it was imperative that freedom of action be retained in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon" (p. 111). But the "fatal flaw" was that the fedayeen "were an affront to "the host states' sovereignty" (p. 156). In addition, the sanctuary country had to endure heavy military reprisals by Israeli forces. Snider assesses the resulting difficulties and the differing responses:

> Israel's policy of holding host governments responsible for guerrilla attacks originating from the territory eventually persuaded Jordan and Syria to become silent partners in controlling terrorists along their frontiers with Israel. . . .
>
> [In Lebanon, by contrast,] instead of strengthening the government, Israel's heavy-handed raids and reprisals hastened the downfall of organized political life in Lebanon by compromising the armed forces, polarizing Lebanese politics, and adding to the number of homeless refugees (pp. 100-101, 107).

The Lebanese civil war was caused primarily by internal social and political problems that had festered unresolved for decades.[7] Khalidi's sophisticated monograph and the essays by Halim Barakat and John K. Cooley in Haley and Snider's volume clarify those internal dimensions. The writers recognize, however, that the P.L.O.'s presence had significant accelerating effects:

> The appearance of the Palestinian Resistance on Lebanese soil had many consequences. Objectively, it upset the Christian-Muslim balance of power in favor of the Muslims. It offered not only a model to the radicalized Muslims but also a protective umbrella against Maronite high-handedness. It initiated a period of unprecedented tension between Lebanon and Israel. It mobilized the Palestinian refugee camp popula-

[7] Commentaries on Lebanese internal politics include Halim Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife: Student Preludes to the Civil War* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977); Kamal S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1976); Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic Revisited: Reflections on the Collapse of Pluralist Politics in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1977); and Marius Deeb, *The Lebanese Civil War* (New York: Praeger, 1980). On the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, see Adeed I. Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

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> tions, [and] exacerbated friction with their Maronite neighbors and the Lebanese authorities. It created a new area of explosive discord inside Lebanese society . . . [concerning] the control of commando activity (Khalidi, 94).

Moreover, the fluctuations in Arab-Israeli negotiations had immediate repercussions within Lebanon. Perhaps the most dramatic of these followed the second disengagement between Egypt and Israel, signed in September 1975. Sadat's pledge to refrain from the use of force, coupled with the U.S.-Israeli agreement to restrict the P.L.O.'s role in negotiations, caused the Maronite Lebanese to fear that Lebanon would be burdened indefinitely with the presence of the Palestinians. The Maronites therefore sought an immediate showdown with the P.L.O. in order to expel it from the country (Fred J. Khouri in Haley and Snider, 165). But the P.L.O. considered Lebanon as its last effective base of operations, which it could not afford to relinquish until it established a state inside Palestine. Therefore, the disengagement accords served as a "crucial catalyst," escalating the Lebanese crisis into a Maronite-P.L.O. confrontation (Khalidi, 87).

Conclusion

The hard reality remains that the Middle East lacks the elements for a durable peace: "Arab political and economic stability, Israeli moderation, Palestinian satisfaction and superpower consensus" (Kazziha, 80). Moreover, there is no "strong, unified Arab bargaining position" (Kazziha, 107) on the basis of which the Arab states could try to press the United States to persuade Israel to negotiate outstanding territorial and political issues. Without that Arab backing and consensus, the Palestinians cannot hope to attain statehood on the West Bank and Gaza and must concentrate on retaining their precarious base in Lebanon. Lebanon itself therefore has little prospect of setting its house in order, since it cannot defuse the tensions caused by the Palestinian presence and may be drawn more deeply into direct conflict with Israel (Khalidi, 150; Khouri in Haley and Snider, 176).

At present, Israel has decisive military superiority over the P.L.O., augmented by the separation of Egypt from its military alliances with the other Arab states. That superiority places Israel in a position to drive a hard bargain with the Palestinians. Israel could insist on security guarantees on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that would prevent any independent Palestinian state from threatening its existence. But Israelis rarely perceive that favorable balance. Instead, they fear that a P.L.O.-ruled state on the West Bank and in Gaza would be the first

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step toward annihilating Israel. Aronson observes that Israelis tend to believe that such a Palestinian state would be "strategically capable of launching attacks against Israel's heart," would be aligned with the Soviet Union, and would be supported militarily by the other Arabs. Its irridentism would be increased by the influx of refugees now living in Syria and Lebanon, who would use the West Bank as "a forward base" for their claim to Israel itself (p. 264).

Aronson himself questions the validity of that scenario. In spelling out the consequences of Sadat's peace initiative, he asserts that it is

> in the interest of Israel . . . to withdraw, allowing a reasonable compromise on the Palestinian issue; dominating the [West Bank] on both sides of the tiny Palestinian entity, Israel and Jordan will in fact control its behavior; Egypt's peace is a decisive guarantee against future threats and escalation" (p. 363).

His counterscenario pictures a West Bank state as a means for Israel and the Arab regimes to tame the Palestinian threat rather than a means to destabilize the region and cause Israel's destruction. Aronson concludes that Israel must recognize that it cannot have "absolute security" but only "relatively, attainable security" (p. 255), which would not be jeopardized by the formation of a Palestinian political structure on the West Bank.

Several of the other studies under review propose similar compromises in order to achieve an enduring settlement.[8] Khalidi comments, for example, that the Palestinians cannot expect complete justice but only "pragmatic justice" which takes "cognizance of the imperatives of both equity and reality" (p. 55). Khalidi, Said, and O'Neill (p. 215) emphasize that a P.L.O.-controlled state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could not threaten Israel, but would end the alienation of the Palestinians and would help to resolve the Lebanese problem. Said also sees statehood as a way to open the door to human contact between the Palestinians and the Israelis, in a manner that could lead to a firm and genuine peace (p. 178).

A stark contrast remains between the compromise solutions proposed by these writers and the current polarization in the Middle East. Left

[8] Other proposals for resolving the Palestine problem include Aryeh Shalev, *The Autonomy—Problems and Possible Solutions* (Tel Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1980); Simha Flapan, ed., *When Enemies Dare to Talk: An Israeli-Palestinian Debate* (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Emile A. Nakhleh, *The West Bank and Gaza: Toward the Making of a Palestinian State* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979); Avi Plascov, *A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives* (London: Adelphi Papers, 1981); and Ann Mosely Lesch, *Political Perceptions of the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1980).

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alone, the Palestine problem will continue to fester, irritating the P.L.O.'s relations with the Arab regimes and exacerbating the Arab-Israeli conflict. Short-term military measures by Israel that are designed to intimidate the Palestinians are likely to boomerang in the long run, since they deepen the antagonism and isolate Israel internationally. But the United States, Israel, and the Arab countries have lacked the political will to confront the basic issues and seek a compromise that would give the Israelis their relative security and the Palestinians their pragmatic justice. As time passes, the conflict becomes more intractable, and its repercussions more profound.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

By JACK DONNELLY

Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean, eds., *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979, 310 pp., $18.95.

Paula R. Newberg, ed., *The Politics of Human Rights*. New York: New York University Press (UNA-USA Policy Studies Books Series), 1980, 287 pp., $22.50 ($8.95 paper).

Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980, 231 pp., $17.50 ($4.95 paper).

Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A World Survey*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980, 248 pp., $16.25 ($8.75 paper).

Sandy Vogelgesang, *American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy*. New York: W. W. Norton (A Council on Foreign Relations Book), 1980, 303 pp., $13.95.

"WRITING about human rights, although an intractable task, has become a minor growth industry in the last several years" (Newberg, 5).[1] This essay is an examination of one aspect of that growth: the spread of concerns about human rights into discussions of foreign policy, and of American foreign policy in particular. It focuses on three issues that suggest some of the variety of recent work and raise a broad range of important policy questions: (1) the definition of human rights; (2) the practical political problems of implementing an international human rights policy; and (3) the legal and moral problems of intervention on behalf of human rights.

[1] That it is also something of an *infant* industry, outside of international law at least, is suggested by the prevalence of collections of essays, the essay being a particularly appropriate form for new inquiries. In addition to the three collections under review here, see, for example, Donald P. Kommers and Gilburt D. Loescher, eds., *Human Rights and American Foreign Policy* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); Natalie K. Hevener, ed., *Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980); Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, eds., *Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980); Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed., *The Philosophy of Human Rights: International Perspectives* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980); and Eugene Kamenka and Alice Ehr-Soon Tay, eds., *Human Rights* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).

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Conceptual Problems: Defining Human Rights

THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Claims of human rights, or actions on their behalf, have an unavoidable moral component. A claim of human rights is, at its core and whatever else it may be, a moral claim. Therefore, moral decisions have to be made in the formulation of a human rights policy, if only implicitly and by default. Even if the moral obligation imposed by human rights proves to be outweighed by other policy goals or by environmental constraints, a justifiable policy must account for this moral element. Therefore, at least a rudimentary philosophical theory of human rights is essential to a coherent international human rights policy.

The most prevalent conception of human rights draws on a theory of natural rights: human rights are the inalienable entitlements of individuals, based on their nature as human beings (moral persons); they protect those potentials, attributes, and holdings that are essential to a life worthy of a human being. In other words, human rights are the rights one has simply by virtue of being a human being. Thus they imply strong *prima facie* moral obligations, even across state boundaries.

Charles R. Beitz, in "Human Rights and Social Justice" (Brown and MacLean, 45-63), offers an alternative to a natural rights theory, the "social justice model."[2] He holds that human rights are "entitlements to the satisfaction of various human interests that would be guaranteed to members of a group by [Rawlsian] principles of social justice appropriate to that group" (p. 59).

Since Rawlsian principles of social justice are in considerable measure contextual, human rights would likewise be contextual. Therefore, one would have to adopt multiple definitions of human rights—taking into account, for example, culture and level of economic development—not merely as a political compromise or a strategy of implementation, but as a matter of principle. Since human rights are not universal under a social justice conception, pursuit of a single international standard would not be justified.

In addition, the list of human rights would have to be expanded considerably, since the demands of social justice are far more extensive

[2] For a detailed critical discussion of Beitz's essay, and an argument that a natural rights theory is superior to the social justice model, see Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights as Natural Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly*, IV (August 1982).

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than any widely recognized catalogue. For example, in a developed country, social justice might demand extended maternity (or paternity) leave with full pay, a free college education for all, and low-cost access to abundant cultural facilities. None of these are widely recognized today as a human right.

At the present time it is perhaps less important that we establish the correctness of either of these theories, or some third theory, than that such issues are beginning to be seriously explored in a policy context—and with considerable sophistication. The moral and conceptual issues examined in such a theory will inevitably shape policy in important ways, even if only implicitly, by specifying the force and extent of claims of human rights. The topic of human rights in foreign policy is an inherently "interdisciplinary" one, including moral, political, and economic considerations. In the sphere of morals, at least, we are seeing the beginnings of what promises to be important work in applied philosophical and conceptual analysis.

Whatever conception we finally choose, though, it must be remembered that human rights do not encompass the full range of national or international moral obligations. For example, Sandy Vogelgesang's remark that we need "some sense of what human rights—or more to the point, human wrongs—are" (p. 17) is seriously misleading. Knowing what human wrongs are is *not* what is essential, because not all human wrongs involve the violation of human rights.

Human rights and human wrongs are not logical contraries; not everything that human beings should have is a human right. It is wrong to insult a colleague, break a promise, litter a park, abuse an animal, or offer sexual favors in a business deal. By the same token, it is right (i.e., morally desirable or demanded) to help little old ladies cross the street, contribute to famine relief, and provide for one's family in one's will. However, none of these issues involve human rights—which is fortunate for an international human rights policy.

If human rights covered the whole of the moral spectrum, their pursuit would lead one to embark on a hopelessly ambitious and destructively self-righteous crusade. Instead, human rights—and a human rights policy—are concerned with the basic entitlements (rights) of human beings considered simply as human beings. Thus understood, the pursuit of human rights is certainly an ambitious undertaking, but it is not wildly absurd.

There has been a discouraging tendency in recent years to cloak everything that is good in the mantle of human rights, and to overlook the distinction between human rights and what it is right for human

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beings to do. This tendency runs the risk of turning "human rights" into little more than a trendy "Hurrah!" or an amorphous catchall for a wide range of moral concerns; it can only confuse and debilitate a human rights policy by conflating quite disparate issues, diffusing attention, and diluting the force of claims of (real) human rights.

Such confusion is suggested in the very name of the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Pursuing or protecting human rights is more than just the humane or humanitarian thing to do (such as contributing to famine relief). The pursuit or protection of human rights is morally *required*, and people are (morally) *entitled* to it. Although there is nothing wrong with combining functions into a single office so long as essential distinctions are maintained, the tendency of the Carter Administration to equate human rights with the good, and the current practice of referring to the Bureau as "H.A.," suggest that no distinction is being made.

A LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The second problem in defining human rights, whatever their essential nature may be, is to determine the *particular* things to which we have human rights—i.e., to formulate a list of human rights. Recent work in this area has been especially noteworthy.

The main issue of contention has been the relationship between economic, social, and cultural human rights (such as the rights to work, to social security, and to education) and civil and political rights (such as the rights to vote, to freedom of speech, and to *habeas corpus*). In the American case, dispute has centered on the priority given to personal rights such as life, liberty, and security. This priority has been expressed in international forums since the mid-forties, is codified in foreign assistance legislation (e.g., Section 116(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended), and can be seen in the practice, if not the rhetoric, of the Carter Administration.

In the recent literature, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Human Rights Covenants[3] have been understood to provide an authoritative list of human rights. Whatever the philosophical merits of this approach, there is little alternative in foreign policy. The widespread acceptance of this so-called International Bill of Rights, which prominently features personal, civil, political, eco-

[3] See General Assembly Resolutions 217A (III) of 10 December 1948, and 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. These treaties and resolutions have been widely reprinted. See, for example, Louis B. Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal, eds., *Basic Documents on International Protection of Human Rights* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), an especially useful collection of primary documents.

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nomic, social, and cultural rights, prevents states from excluding any major class of rights from their policy; otherwise, they would appear to be biased and partisan in their standards.

However, questions of priority among types of rights remain subject to considerable controversy. Hugo Adam Bedau, in "Human Rights and Foreign Assistance Programs" (Brown and MacLean, 29-44, esp. 36-39), offers five arguments in defense of assigning priority to personal rights.[4]

(1) "The argument from indifference to economic contingencies." Respecting personal rights is largely costless: "all that is required is governmental self-restraint." However, the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights requires high levels of economic (and political) development. Therefore, it is fair to demand universal respect for personal rights (but not for economic and social rights) since that would be feasible, at least in principle.

(2) "The argument from the functional interdependence among basic rights." There are two parts to this argument: (a) Many civil and political rights, like free speech and political participation, are impossible without the prior respect of personal rights such as due process and *habeas corpus*. (b) Without personal rights, economic and social rights are of little value, reducing people to "hostages of fortune and patronized victims of tyranny." Therefore, compared to the other basic types of rights, personal rights have a functional priority.

(3) "The argument from primary goods." A primary good is "anything whatever that 'a rational man wants whatever else he wants.'" Any rational man would want, at minimum and in particular, the protections provided by personal rights against state violations of his person. Therefore, personal rights have the special force of primary goods. (By implication, other rights do not).

(4) "The argument from analogy to crime." While torture and other such violations of personal rights involve the direct infliction of injury, and thus are strictly analogous to committing a crime, violations of other rights, especially economic and social rights, usually involve only the failure to confer a benefit.

(5) "The argument from cultural priority." The evolution of human rights in Western legal systems suggests priority for personal rights

[4] The best known, but certainly the crudest, defense of such a position is Maurice Cranston, *What are Human Rights?* (London: Bodley Head, 1973). A particularly interesting argument is presented by A. I. Melden, in *Rights and Persons* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chap. 6.

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because these permit one to fend for oneself and to take further action to secure other rights and benefits.[5]

Bedau's strongest arguments rely on a distinction between "negative" rights, which require only forbearance in order to be realized, and "positive" rights, which require the provision of goods and services, often in great quantity and at great expense.[6] Bedau argues that because personal rights are essentially "negative," they deserve priority —especially over economic and social rights, which are particularly "positive." The arguments from economic contingencies and analogy to crime rest on this distinction. However, Henry Shue, both in his essay "Rights in the Light of Duties" (Brown and MacLean, 65-81), and in his book, *Basic Rights*, argues that the distinction fails to match up with the division of rights into personal (or civil and political) and economic and social—and that, in any case, it is of no moral significance.

Shue maintains that even such a quintessential "negative" right as the freedom from torture generally has a major "positive" component. Simple restraint on the part of the government and its functionaries is necessary, but it is often insufficient by itself. In many countries, major changes in law, administrative practice, and personnel would be necessary to guarantee the right. Institutions with "positive" powers are needed to investigate allegations of torture and to prosecute accused torturers. As Shue puts it, "any reductions in torture are much more likely to be matters of prevention rather than self-discipline, and therefore of powerful positive initiatives against torturers" (Brown and MacLean, 70).

Shue also presents a striking example (pp. 41-46) to prove that even an archetypical "positive" right, such as the right to subsistence, may in some cases be essentially "negative." A peasant, who has traditionally produced a large proportion of his village's marketable food surplus, switches to growing flowers with the aid of labor-saving machinery, in response to a government program to increase export earnings from cash crops. Many other similarly situated peasants also alter their production in this way. As a result, there is a reduction in the supply of food, and its price increases sharply. In turn, most marginal families cut down on food consumption, which leads to severe mal-

[5] Exactly why this is called an argument from cultural priority, and how it is significantly different from the argument from interdependence, is unclear to me. I will therefore address only Bedau's first four arguments.

[6] Cf. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

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nutrition among the children of the workers displaced by the new machinery. These infringements of subsistence rights could have been prevented by simple ("negative") governmental self-restraint in agricultural and development policy.

A statement of the form "*A* has a right to *x*" simply will not tell us whether that right is "negative" or "positive." Shue argues that virtually all human rights are both negative *and* positive, entailing (negative) duties to forbear and (positive) duties to protect and to aid—although there may be no single duty bearer who stands under all three types of obligations. This is especially clear when we consider the varying actions that, depending on circumstances, may be required to discharge the obligation of the duty bearer or to guarantee the enjoyment of the right by the right holder.

Whether a particular right—as held by a particular person—is positive or negative depends at least as much on circumstances as on the essential character of the right. Protection from torture will be largely negative in Mexico or Costa Rica, but positive in Chile or Argentina. Subsistence will be a fairly negative right in the wheat fields of western Kansas, somewhat more positive in New York City, and very positive indeed in Bangladesh. The distinction between positive and negative is not characteristic of rights *per se*, but of *particular rights in real circumstances*. Therefore, the character of any single right may change with time and place.

Shue then argues that, even if some particular human right or class of rights were entirely negative, it would not, *ipso facto*, deserve (moral) priority. Here the key theoretical issue is the moral significance of the distinction between acts of omission and acts of commission. In contrast to, for example, Bedau's argument from analogy to crime, Shue maintains that there is no important moral difference.

He presents an example (Brown and MacLean, pp. 72-75) initially developed by Judith Lichtenberg. A man is stranded on an out-of-the-way desert island with neither food nor water. A sailor from a passing ship comes ashore, but leaves the man to die (an act of omission). This is as serious a violation of his rights as strangling him would have been (an act of commission): it is murder, just as surely, and perhaps even more cruelly, even though it is accomplished indirectly, through "inaction."

The moral difference lies not in the essential character of an act (omission or commission), but in contingent, empirical circumstances. Determinations of priorities among rights must be based on the moral importance of a right rather than on the changing, and largely

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arbitrary, nature of the ordinary type of violation of that right. Shue suggests, again following Lichtenberg, that the initial plausibility of the distinction rests on the fact that acts of commission are usually more likely to cause harm to the right holder, while obligations that require positive acts are likely to be more burdensome to the duty bearer. Where the costs and the consequences are the same, as in the above case, the distinction disappears.

Bedau's other arguments stand up even less well. The argument from primary goods (defined as whatever a man wants regardless of what else he wants) actually suggests that personal rights do *not* have priority: minimal food, water, shelter, and health care are certainly primary goods. The argument from the interdependence of basic rights fails because true *inter*dependence would rule out priority for any one class of rights. Interdependence suggests a mutual reinforcement, so that rights are more valuable together, as a complete package, than a simple summation of individual rights would suggest: the possession of personal and political rights without economic and social rights is not half a loaf, but substantially less.

The differences between personal and political rights on one hand, and economic and social rights on the other, are not such that, on moral and conceptual grounds, one class deserves priority.[7] There may be practical political reasons for stressing some particular set of rights. However, the relative controversiality of personal and political rights, compared to the near-universal acceptance of basic economic, social, and cultural rights, suggests that the latter have a strong practical claim as well.

Therefore, the traditional American refusal to give serious consideration to economic and social rights must be abandoned, not merely because the International Bill of Rights recognizes them, but because there are no sound philosophical reasons for doing otherwise. In this case at least, the burdens of philosophical argument and established international doctrine are the same.

Although President Carter talked about including all types of human rights in U.S. policy, he rarely acted on this rhetoric—and American foreign assistance legislation explicitly restricted human rights concerns to personal rights. Part of the reason would seem to have been the lack of a solid theoretical foundation for policy. Arguments such as Shue's would have provided a sound philosophical basis for a com-

[7] See Beitz (Brown and MacLean, 48-51), for additional arguments against priority for civil and political rights, on the grounds of inalienability, uncontroversiality, generality, and universality of economic and social rights.

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prehensive and well-rounded definition of human rights, such as that contained in Secretary Vance's speech at the University of Georgia in 1977,[8] and might even have improved the implementation of American policy. At the very least, it is clear that a secure conceptual foundation is necessary if a human rights policy is to be effectively expressed, "sold," and implemented.

Although there is no sure or immediate translation of theory into practice, theories can have an important impact. Since important theoretical decisions are made in policy formulation, even if only unconsciously, we must hope that greater attention will be paid to the increasingly subtle treatment that such issues have been receiving in the recent literature.

Acting on International Human Rights

Let us assume that we have adequately addressed the basic conceptual issues and, as a result, have adopted an "ideal" human rights policy which recognizes a strong *prima facie* moral duty to protect or promote a set of human rights that prominently features civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. We can then consider the implementation of this policy. In line with the books under review, we will concentrate on American human rights policy in the Third World.

THE PROBLEM OF COMPETING STANDARDS

Our first problem arises from the substantive conflict between this "ideal" U.S. policy and the human rights standard of many—probably *most*—of the countries to which it is to be applied. The essays in Kenneth Thompson's collection make this conflict especially clear by stressing the fact that what is, and has been, meant by "human rights" varies dramatically with time and culture.[9] In particular, non-Western societies place far less emphasis on the autonomous individual.

[8] This widely reprinted speech (see, for example, Kommers and Loescher [fn. 1]) is the clearest statement of the Carter policy. The absence of even a suggestion of a compelling theoretical reason for the list advanced is noteworthy; it may help to explain the ease with which the administration fell back into pursuing civil and political rights almost exclusively.

[9] Pollis and Schwab (fn. 1) cover similar ground, although the contributions to that collection are, as a whole, decidedly inferior. The issue is also addressed in Kommers and Loescher (fn. 1), part III, and Rosenbaum (fn. 1), part I. For a thorough, and largely critical, discussion of this literature, including a fairly extensive bibliography, see Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Human Rights Conceptions," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 72 (June 1982).

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> [In the West] there is a perpetual, and in our view obsessive, concern with the dignity of the individual, his worth, personal autonomy and property. . . . No aspect of Western civilization makes an African more uncomfortable than the concept of the sacralized individual whose private wars against society are celebrated (Asmarom Legesse, "Human Rights in African Political Culture," in Thompson, 124).

That is so in large measure because rights are, as Ronald Dworkin puts it, "trumps";[10] the protections they provide override—"trump"—even considerations of general utility and social policy. To be protected by a right is to have special claims which, in ordinary circumstances, will take priority over most other sorts of claims. Human rights, as the highest class of rights, are the "honor cards" of the suit and thus will override all but the most pressing policy considerations. And since human rights are held by individuals and are claimed primarily against the state, the individualism Legesse and others bemoan is central to the very nature of human rights.

Civil and political rights—such as freedom of speech and association, due process, or free elections (as those terms are understood in the West)—demand respect even at the expense of significant social costs. It is therefore often held that they ought to be set aside at least temporarily because they are incompatible with the strong central control and direction of political and economic activity needed for rapid economic development. The argument is that the individual interests protected by such rights cannot be allowed to take priority over the pressing needs of social mobilization for economic development.

However, civil and political rights are only the most prominent victims of this non-Western approach; economic and social rights are likely to be threatened as well. The experience of the last 30 years underlines the political problems of equitably distributing an increasing stock of goods and services so as to improve substantially the enjoyment of economic and social rights—especially in the absence of the political power provided by guaranteed civil and political rights. Per capita income may increase, but the average individual is little better off as a result. Caloric intake and protein consumption may increase in the aggregate, but nutrition does not improve for the masses of the population. Meanwhile, the "temporary" suspension of civil and political rights drags on, with no end in sight.

Even at the national level, such controversies are of great importance, although woefully understudied; unsupported assertions rather than

[10] Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), xi, 90ff., and throughout.

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soundly backed arguments are the rule.[11] At the international level, there are special difficulties because the emphasis that an ideal human rights policy places on civil and political rights and an equitable, nondiscriminatory distribution of social goods and services is in conflict with the political practice and even the professed human rights standards of many countries.

Ideological, political, or personal reasons probably best explain the subordination of human rights to the (alleged) demands of rapid development. For example, there is a near-universal failure to preserve deeply ingrained traditional values that are inconvenient to a regime—such as collective decision making and communal restraints on the exercise of power. Furthermore, torture, although incompatible with all major cultural traditions, is practiced widely. But even where alleged traditional cultural values are only an ideological cover for unjustified human rights violations, they can provide a powerful counterargument against the pursuit of an ideal human rights policy, in view of the force of claims of cultural relativism and the American sensitivity to charges of neocolonialism.

A least-common-denominator strategy of pursuing only relatively uncontroversial rights—such as the right to food—has been advocated as a solution to the problems of competing standards.[12] However, while this strategy may have some merits as a practical, political compromise, it fails as a general, theoretical solution. The demands of basic, inalienable, and universal human rights cannot be so easily circumvented. Furthermore, if whole classes of human rights are written off simply because they are controversial, there no longer is a true human rights policy.

With a lowest-common-denominator approach, a human rights policy becomes virtually identical with economic development or humanitarian relief policies. Is it then still really a *human rights* policy? Perhaps, but only incidentally. Furthermore, there are important limits to what we can recognize as genuine, competing conceptions of human rights. We cannot just say, "well, if that's how you define human rights, it's OK with us"—at least not without some major limitations.

This is not the place to rehash old arguments over cultural relativism and value noncognitivism. However, three points must be made. First,

[11] One recent exception is Robert E. Goodin, "The Development-Rights Tradeoff: Some Unwarranted Economic and Political Assumptions," *Universal Human Rights*, 1 (April-June 1979), 31-42.

[12] See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, "Human Rights: To Act or Not to Act?" in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, eds., *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World* (New York: Longman, 1979), 193.

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just because a government *says* it is pursuing a special conception of human rights, that does not make it so. Regardless of the number of times Ugandan representatives to the U.N. rose to explain their government's scrupulous regard for human rights, Idi Amin was violating human rights—or the term is utterly without meaning.

Second, even if a genuine and distinctive approach to human rights is being implemented in a country, that does not assure that the approach is a "better" one, or even that it is appropriate to that country. The problems of comparatively evaluating standards of human rights are admittedly severe, and these problems present reason for restraint. However, "different" is not necessarily good or appropriate.

Finally, even if we accept the most stringent value relativism, the moral demands of international human rights, as we understand them, are not obviated. The fact that our values are our own, and differ from someone else's, does not mean that we should not act on them. In view of the force of claims of human rights, we would appear to be morally bankrupt if we renounced pursuing them simply (or primarily) because of existing cultural or moral differences over their definition. (Cf. Douglas MacLean, "Constraints, Goals and Moralism in Foreign Policy," in Brown and MacLean, 93-108.)

Moral bankruptcy may prove to be the ultimate price of effective international action, as advocates of *Realpolitik* have long contended. However, a strong argument for the case of human rights—not just vague warnings against "moralism" in foreign policy—is required: we can't simply assume that, because the issue of human rights is (at least partly) a moral one, it is not also important to the national interest.

INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Serious problems are caused by the fact that *any* action on behalf of human rights in a foreign country—whether based on a conception of human rights that is in agreement with that country's or not—is likely to raise the charge of intervention. Human rights are primarily concerned with the domestic political affairs of a country, the ways in which a government treats its citizens. Therefore, action on behalf of international human rights, except by invitation, is likely to involve intervention, in violation of the most fundamental principles of international law.[13]

[13] The first part of Richard A. Falk, "Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights," in Newberg, 65-109, provides a nice analytic survey of competing conceptualizations of, and systems for dealing with, the behavior that is considered "intervention" in international law. The essay has been reprinted, along with several of Falk's other recent articles, in *Human Rights and State Sovereignty* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981).

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Thomas Buergenthal, in "Domestic Jurisdiction, Intervention, and Human Rights: The International Law Perspective" (Brown and MacLean, 111-20), attempts to show that human rights intervention is an exception to this general rule. He argues that only intervention in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," as Article 2.7 of the U.N. Charter puts it, are illegal under international law—and what is essentially a matter of domestic jurisdiction is determined by international law, not state fiat.

According to Buergenthal, there has been a "gradual internationalization of human rights" since World War II (p. 114), making them no longer essentially a domestic matter. This change has supposedly taken place through the pledge, in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the U.N. to promote human rights; through the authoritative definition of the Charter's references to human rights in the International Bill of Rights; and by the creation of legal obligations under international human rights treaties. Therefore, intervention—at least in cases of gross and persistent systematic violations of human rights—is, in principle, legally permissible.

Buergenthal is technically correct in asserting that Articles 55 and 56 imply that "no U.N. member state can claim that human rights *as such* are a matter within its domestic jurisdiction" (p. 115, emphasis added). However, this relatively innocuous, and quite minimal, "internationalization" will not support the conclusion that the Charter justifies human rights intervention. Ratification of the International Human Rights Covenants does not even authorize one party to file a complaint against another, let alone intervene actively.[14] And if the (relatively) strong and explicit provisions of the Covenants do not justify intervention, neither will the vague passages in the Charter.

In adhering to the Charter, a state merely accepts a duty to promote human rights. That does not entitle others to enforce these provisions. If state *A* accepts an obligation to promote human rights, it does not *ipso facto* authorize states *B* or *C*—or even the international organization to which they all belong and in whose charter the obligation is stated—to enforce that obligation. Not just *any* international obligation establishes sufficient "internationalization" to overcome the strong systemic presumption against intervention.

[14] No formal complaints are possible under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Article 23 lists the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, technical assistance, and regional and technical meetings as the appropriate means of international action under the treaty. In the case of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a special (revocable) declaration is required to authorize the receipt of complaints (see Article 41).

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Of course, not *all* action to promote international human rights necessarily involves illegal intervention. As Buergenthal suggests, "cutting off diplomatic or military aid, for example, would not be unlawful" (p. 117). But this is because a state may give or withhold support more or less as it pleases. Although withholding aid may be "intervention," broadly defined, it is not a clear interference in the domestic affairs of a country, and it is therefore not illegal. That is true whether the aid is withheld because of human rights violations, power considerations, ideology, or simply personal pique.

Humanitarian intervention to remedy the grossest violations of human rights might be a possible exception to the general legal prohibition.[15] For example, the reaction to the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda has been, if uncomfortable, by no means entirely negative. However, the potential for abuse of such a notion makes widespread acceptance of the doctrine improbable—particularly in light of incompatible and competing standards of human rights and the fact that individual states would be deciding whether or not to intervene. In any case, today and for at least the medium run, human rights intervention—even on humanitarian grounds—is not a widely accepted principle of international law.

But what about the *morality* of intervention? Largely in response to Michael Walzer's important book, *Just and Unjust Wars*, an excellent literature is beginning to develop on this topic.[16] Walzer adopts a strong anti-interventionist position, based on the rights of peoples to self-determination, which in turn gives expression to the liberty or potential liberty of foreign citizens. He treats the presumption of noninterference in the communal expression of this liberty as so strong that intervention is ruled out (so long as the country is not wracked by major internal war) even in most cases where the existing government violates accepted moral standards.

Whether this position is tenable is an issue beyond our scope. How-

[15] On the general topic of humanitarian intervention, see Richard B. Lillich, ed., *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973); Thomas M. Franck and Nigel Rodney, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 67 (April 1973), 275-305; and John Norton Moore, ed., *Law and Civil War in the Modern World* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

[16] Aside from Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chaps. 4 and 6, see Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), part II; David Luban, "Just War and Human Rights," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, IX (Winter 1980), 160-81; Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, IX (Spring 1980), 209-29; and replies to Walzer by Beitz, "Nonintervention and Communal Integrity," Luban, "The Romance of the Nation State," and Gerald Doppelt, "Statism Without Foundations," in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, IX (Summer 1980), 385-403.

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ever, even Walzer allows for intervention "when the violation of human rights is so terrible that it makes talk of community or self-determination . . . seem cynical and irrelevant."[17]—i.e., when it becomes undeniable that nonintervention would no longer contribute to the realization of the rights and values it is intended to protect.

Once we move below the level of human rights violations that shock the moral conscience of mankind, substantial disagreement emerges. What should we do about regimes that are persistent violators of human rights, but do not necessarily stir the world's conscience?

Western and Soviet-bloc countries regularly accuse each other of such abuses. Even if political realities largely preclude action on whatever *prima facie* moral duty one might have in such cases, an assessment of the moral dimensions of the situation is essential to the evaluation of, say, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, or whether to press the topic of human rights in the follow-up meetings to the Helsinki Accords. It is relevant to a state's policy whether intervention for human rights violations at this level of severity is morally demanded, desirable but not demanded, morally inconsequential, or prohibited.

What about withholding aid in cases of relatively limited persecution or repression of political opposition (as in Zambia, in Nigeria under military rule, or in Kenya under Kenyatta)? What is the (morally) appropriate response to regimes based on distributions of income, resources, or power—such as El Salvador or pre-revolutionary Nicaragua—which preclude the realization of economic and social rights? It would be coercive to withhold aid; but would it amount to unjustified intervention?

Paradoxically, such cases, which raise few legal problems, are the most problematic from the moral point of view. And it is these lesser but still significant violations that present most of the policy choices—not only because of their frequency, but because political prudence and the relatively low cost involved are most likely to permit action if the moral stake is high enough.

However, the current philosophical literature instead focuses either on the most severe types of violations or on the question of whether human rights intervention of any type is in principle justifiable. For example, Mark R. Wicclair's argument in "Human Rights and Intervention" (Brown and MacLean, 141-57), that human rights intervention is not necessarily morally unjustifiable, is not of much significance because it is not in opposition to any widely held contemporary view; most radical noninterventionists argue on legal or political, not moral,

[17] Walzer (fn. 16), 90.

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grounds. We can only hope that this important gap in the literature will begin to be closed as the general positions sketched in the last few years are worked out in greater detail and applied to particular issues.

Finally, beyond the legal and moral issues of intervention lie the practical and political problems. If intervention is legally and morally justifiable, is it politically wise or affordable? However, rather than discuss only intervention from this perspective, let us consider the questions of practicality, competing values, and tradeoffs more generally.

Integrating Human Rights into Foreign Policy

Competing values, tradeoffs, and the problem of consistency

Human rights are but one concern of foreign policy; the objectives of promoting and preserving human rights may conflict with the national interest more broadly conceived. However, the relationship between human rights and the national interest is neither as clear nor as simple as critics often make it out to be.

One of Vogelgesang's recurrent themes is the possible *contribution* that a human rights policy may make to national security. In numerous instances, the human rights violations of foreign governments have contributed to reverses of U.S. foreign policy. For example, one of the main reasons for the "loss" of Nicaragua was the feudal style of rule, with its attendant human rights violations, of the Somoza regime which was established and maintained in power by the United States. Likewise, the real cause of the "loss" of Angola was the colonial policy of the American-backed Portugese regime. The case of Iran needs no comment.

There is a profound tension between long-run and short-run interests. In many cases, the short-run advantages of overlooking the human rights violations of "friendly" governments are more than counterbalanced by the long-run risks and costs of radical revolution induced in part by the very human rights violations ignored by Washington. And, if we are to take seriously the newly repopularized distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism,[18] it is precisely the authoritarian regimes which the U.S. tends to back that are most vulnerable to overthrow. By tying future American interests in a coun-

[18] Whatever value this typology has as a tool of comparative analysis (and even here it is rather crude), its relevance to human rights questions is at best dubious. Many authoritarian regimes have absolutely abysmal human rights records. For a powerful personal account of torture and other violations of human rights in "merely authoritarian" Argentina, see Jacobo Timerman, "Reflections: No Name, No Number," *The New Yorker*, Vol. 57 (April 20, 1981), 45-130.

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try to a relatively unstable type of regime, the United States assures that when today's friendly leader becomes tomorrow's enemy of the people (or just another dead dictator), it is out in the cold for what is likely to be a long time; at the least, it will have given its opponents the inside track to the new government.

The essential point is that often human rights are not *merely* moral concerns.[19] Morality and reality are not necessarily incompatible, and to treat them as if they were can harm not only a state's human rights policy, but its broader foreign policy as well.

Sometimes a country can afford to act on its human rights concerns and other times it cannot. Politics involves compromise—a result of the multiple and not always compatible goals that are pursued and the resistance of a world that is not always responsive. Human rights, like other goals of policy, must at times be compromised.

In many instances there is little one can afford to do even in the face of major human rights violations. For example, because of other interests in the relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., not much can be done about Soviet violations of human rights—either in a period of cold war or of détente. In the case of some repressive Third World regimes, support may be the only viable option.

But won't such compromises make a country's human rights policy "inconsistent"? One might argue that, as economic interests, historic ties, strategic location, or ideology are properly given precedence in many instances, a broad and vocal human rights policy will create widespread cynicism. It will appear as if one's human rights concerns can be bought off—and at times rather cheaply. Or, if a country can afford to pressure only the weak or its "friends," it will create the cynical impression that the strong are exempt from international human rights standards.

If prudence requires major tradeoffs—and it clearly does—it also dictates substantial retrenchment. At the very least, embarrassing claims

[19] This point is especially worth considering in American foreign policy. Vogelgesang suggests that pursuit of human rights is essential to the American dream. Tracy Strong, in "Taking the Rank with What is Ours: American Political Thought, Foreign Policy, and Questions of Rights" (Newberg, esp. 43-45 and 50-54), presents a similar argument. Even if only an expression of an "ugly American" self-righteousness, it is a self-righteousness that runs deep and must be accounted for in the formulation of policy.

Vogelgesang also suggests that "promotion of human rights may be most significant, not for the answers it gives, but for the questions it raises" about American domestic and international priorities (p. 157). She concludes: "Violations of human rights constitute a global nightmare. How Americans deal with that nightmare may determine what happens to their Dream" (p. 271). Although that is something of an overstatement, it is an important point to consider.

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that human rights constitute the "soul" of one's foreign policy must be avoided, lest that policy appear crude and soulless. Abraham Sirkin has even suggested that it can be argued that "the only way to achieve some measure of consistency is to do nothing at all" ("Can a Human Rights Policy Be Consistent?" in Brown and MacLean, 212).

However, a concern for human rights cannot be unilaterally willed out of existence. In the case of American foreign policy, although President Carter popularized the issue, he did not create it; and President Reagan or some other leader cannot expunge it, even if he should want to. Domestically, congressional and interest-group lobbies are active on behalf of human rights; internationally, it is beyond the power of any one country or group of countries to excise the issue.

Actually, unless exorbitant claims have been made for the place of human rights, there need be no real inconsistency in treating similar violations differently. Coherent and justifiable tradeoffs, and discrimination among cases, do not constitute an inconsistent policy.

Sirkin writes that "the groundwork is laid for an apparently 'inconsistent' human rights policy from the very start—in the setting of different goals for different countries" (Brown and McLean, 201).[20] But, if these different goals are justified and justifiable, they are merely differences, not inconsistencies. Differing conditions and capabilities, as well as competing values, *must* be taken into account in the formulation and implementation of a coherent policy.

A blind demand that violation x produce response y is simplistic and silly. If the problems differ substantially, so must the (immediate) aims and instruments of policy. That is no more inconsistent than giving a first offender a suspended sentence while sending a repeat offender to prison, or landing a man on the moon but not on Mars.

However, if variations in the treatment of human rights violators are to be part of a consistent policy, human rights concerns need to be explicitly and coherently integrated into the broader framework of foreign policy. A human rights policy must be part of, not tacked on to, a country's overall foreign policy. Such an approach requires more than mere institutional restructuring—such as upgrading the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, or putting a human rights officer on the Arms Export Control Board.

Difficult decisions have to be made about the weight to be given to

[20] Cf. Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 125: "Equality consists of treating different things differently, not equally. And inconsistencies are inevitable, for many reasons." Hoffmann defends such "inconsistency," much as I do; but the term "inconsistency" misses, or misrepresents, the point.

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human rights. And they need to be made in general, as a matter of principle, and as early as possible. *Ad hoc* responses to immediate problems and crises, which seemed to be the rule at least during the early years of the Carter Administration, are almost sure to lead to inconsistencies, both in appearance and in fact.

A loosely hierarchical ordering of foreign policy goals and values must be undertaken. Broad objectives (e.g., national security, economic interests, human rights) need to be disaggregated, and the particular interests in each area should be ranked, at least roughly—for example, as first-, second-, and third-order concerns. This must be done both for human rights and for competing concerns, and then the lists must be cross-tabulated.

In addition, rules for comparing competing values and for making the tradeoffs will be necessary. For example, what is the initial presumption in the case of a conflict between a first-order human rights concern and a third-order economic interest? Such standards are necessary to integrate moral, political, economic, and other considerations into a coherent structure. They are undeniably difficult to formulate. Without them, however, "tradeoffs" will remain quite literally unprincipled.

The basic structure of principles must then be made public, at least in its general outlines, in order to forestall charges of arbitrariness or inconsistency when the prescribed tradeoffs are made. Publicity may prove to be embarrassing in the short run—although, if the policy is a good one, it ought to be able to withstand scrutiny—but it certainly will be less embarrassing, and far less debilitating, than the cumulative impact of unprincipled or apparently corrupt *ad hoc* decisions.

Admittedly, no actual government would, or even could, undertake such an enterprise with sufficient rigor to satisfy a sophisticated casuist. Nor would rigid application of even an excellent set of rules necessarily make for a good human rights policy. Hard cases and exceptions are unavoidable. So are grey areas and fuzzy boundaries. However, unless the effort is seriously undertaken, the resulting policy is likely to appear baseless or inconsistent, and probably will be so in fact.

EVALUATING PAST POLICY

Fortunately, the problem of evaluation need not be dealt with entirely in the abstract, nor must we start from scratch. We now have substantial experience on which to draw. Individual case studies can offer considerable guidance by providing examples with which to test our theories, proposed policies, and intuitions. They are prominently

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featured in both the Brown-MacLean and Newberg collections, and they provide the basic structure for Vogelgesang's book.

Perhaps the best of the case studies under review is Jerome Alan Cohen's excellent examination, "Arms Sales and Human Rights: The Case of South Korea" (Brown and MacLean, 255-80). The United States has provided support for the South Korean regime even though its human rights violations are well documented; they include the crudest forms of torture, systematic denials of freedom of speech and assembly, political control of the judiciary, and the manipulation of elections. American security interests in the region may require acceptance of such reprehensible practices. However, since 1965, the U.S. has been generally enthusiastic—not reluctant—in its embrace of the South Korean regime; reluctance has been reserved for the use of American leverage.

Probably the most damning aspect of Cohen's account is his comparison of the extreme pressure brought to bear on the South Korean government during the "Koreagate" investigation (including the threat of cutting military aid) with Washington's meek response to human rights violations. "It appears that the United States is not prepared to do for human rights in the ROK what it did to protect the integrity of its own legislative process" (Brown and MacLean, 273). While torture and dictatorship have produced no major response, simple bribery aroused the full wrath of the American government. Substantial leverage obviously exists, and if it could be exerted for the meager show of Tongsun Park's testimony, surely it can be applied, with at least equal force, to protect the supposedly shared ideals of human rights—if the U.S. really takes human rights seriously.

There are similar studies in Brown and MacLean of security assistance to the Philippines and Iran: Richard P. Claude, "Human Rights in the Philippines and U.S. Responsibility" (pp. 229-53) and Richard W. Cottam, "Arms Sales and Human Rights: The Case of Iran" (pp. 281-301).[21] These three cases, although part of a special class, provide particularly good tests of American policy: they couple clear violations with considerable American leverage as well as participation in the

[21] The case studies in the other books reviewed here are of a different sort. Vogelgesang, in line with her more journalistic approach, examines three "typical" individual victims—a Cambodian refugee, a Soviet dissident, and a Salvadoran peasant. These cases present an often very effective depiction of the practical, personal consequences of human rights violations. The essays in Newberg's collection tend to be more concerned with economic tradeoffs; see, for example, Richard J. Barnet, "Human Rights Implications of Corporate Food Policies" (pp. 143-60), and Joseph W. Elder, "Social Justice and Political Equality: Land Tenure Policies and Rural Development in South Asia" (pp. 161-86).

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maintenance of the ruling regimes. Such cases contribute some substantiation of the charge that "human rights" has been used largely as a new weapon in waging the cold war or practicing neocolonialism.[22]

Relatively small amounts of additional security have been "purchased" at the price of relatively high levels of violations of basic personal and political rights. The violations are of special significance because of American complicity in maintaining the governments and in training and equipping government torturers. These case studies suggest less a tradeoff than a sellout under the guise of national security.

The more prominent cases of economic tradeoffs—such as financing purchases of Iranian oil through political support and arms sales, or protecting corporate investments and bank loans in South Africa—also suggest an unwillingness to risk much (if anything) for the sake of international human rights. Perhaps cynicism is indeed the appropriate response until U.S. human rights policy is substantially reformed.

The comprehensive assessment of goals and priorities suggested above would be an important first step in such a reform. At the very least, it should restrain rhetoric and produce more consistency, so that a human rights policy does not prove to be embarrassing or actually detrimental to the realization of human rights. One lesson of the Carter experience may be that some "human rights" policies can be worse than none at all.

There have been a few successes, such as the 1978 election in the Dominican Republic. However, such results have been scarce, not just because international human rights efforts are relatively new in national foreign policy, but also because of the low level of exertion that tends to characterize these efforts. More typically, "success" has involved the use of diplomatic pressure to secure the release of political prisoners or to obtain an amelioration of their treatment—for example, in Argentina, South Korea, and the Soviet Union.

Such victories should not be denigrated. Their beneficiaries have consistently and strongly encouraged their continuation. Nonetheless, they are tainted. They reach only a few of the victims, and usually even only a handful of the prisoners of conscience in a given country.

The use of "quiet diplomacy" to redress violations of political, economic, and social rights is even more difficult. Moreover, quiet diplomacy does not address the systemic character of the violations. It may treat some of the more prominent symptoms, but it does not cure the

[22] See, for example, Noam Chomsky, *"Human Rights" and American Foreign Policy* (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1978).

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disease itself. In fact, a regime can make such "concessions" to outside pressure without significantly altering its practices; it can even use them to defuse criticism, buy some cheap good press, and perhaps mobilize additional domestic support against "outside intervention."

Focusing primarily on prisoners of conscience runs all the risks of a lowest-common-denominator strategy. An international human rights policy that rarely extends beyond quiet diplomacy at this level may well engender another type of cynicism: human rights concerns may appear as an afterthought, or a costless concession for show. Unfortunately, the more one examines recent American practice, the stronger this impression becomes.

Some recent diplomatic initiatives have improved the atmosphere in a few countries. As Claude notes, "verbal behavior in politics does bring about marginal changes which can be important" (Brown and MacLean, 247). However, words and atmosphere are not enough; or rather, even just a continuation of an improved atmosphere increasingly requires action rather than mere words. We have now had five years of experience—and expectations. The hard decisions we have been discussing can no longer be ignored or delayed, except at the risk of losing recent openings.

Thus, concrete problems of tactics and implementation bring us back to basic conceptual issues. The centrality of conceptual and moral clarity to an effective human rights policy is once more underscored.

Inexperience and simple ineptness obviously contributed to the failure, or at least the embarrassment, of the Carter Administration's human rights policy. Human rights advocates will be saddled with this sad experience for many years to come. But a large part of the failure can be attributed to the administration's lack of answers to—perhaps even lack of thought concerning—problems of the sort we have been discussing. All these problems are remediable; the books reviewed here are part of a new and ongoing effort that points the way to substantial improvements in the integration of human rights concerns into national foreign policy.

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

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

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INDEX TO VOLUME XXXIV

Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust, by Helen Fein, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90

Adam, Uwe, D., *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich*, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90

Alt, James E., *The Politics of Economic Decline: Economic Management and Political Behaviour in Britain Since 1964*, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62

American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy, by Sandy Vogelgesang, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574

Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions, by Karl F. Spielman, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418

Arab Relations in the Middle East: The Road to Realignment, by Colin Legum and Haim Shaked, eds., reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560

Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis, by Bard E. O'Neill, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560

Armstrong, J.D., *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*, reviewed by Rong Zhi, II:285

Aronson, Shlomo, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560

Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism, by Gino Germani, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114

Axelrod, Robert, and William Zimmerman, The "Lessons" of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy, I:1

Bates, Robert H., *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437

———, *Rural Response to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437

Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Henry Shue, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574

Bendix, Reinhard, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114

Beres, Louis René, Tilting Toward Thanatos: America's "Countervailing" Strategy, I:25

Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry, by Goran Hyden, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437

Bobrow, Davis B., and Robert T. Kudrle, U.S. Policy toward Foreign Direct Investment, III:353

Boserup, Ester, *Women's Role in Economic Development*, reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267

Boulding, Elise, *Women in the Twentieth Century World*, reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267

Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, The, by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114

Brecher, Michael, and Joanthan Wilkenfeld, Crises in World Politics, III:380

Brown, Peter G., and Douglas MacLean, eds., *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574

Buchanan, James M., and Richard E. Wagner, *Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes*, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62

Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, by Zillah H. Eisenstein, ed., reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267

Chan, Anita, Images of China's Social Structure: The Changing Perspectives of Canton Students, III:295

Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Détente as a Problem of Stabilization, by Kjell Goldmann, II:230

China: foreign policy, *see* Rong; social structure, *see* Chan

China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy, by Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, reviewed by Rong Zhi, II:285

Colburn, Forrest D., Current Studies of Peasants and Rural Development: Applications of the Political Economy Approach, III:437

conceptual map of international crisis variables, *see* Brecher and Wilkenfeld

Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective, by Shlomo Aronson, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560

conflict and misperception, *see* Stein

Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, by Walid Khalidi, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crises in World Politics, by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, III:380
Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States, by Raymond Grew, ed., reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Current Studies of Peasants and Rural Development: Applications of the Political Economy Approach, by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
Cutler, Robert M., The Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy: Organizational and Cognitive Perspectives, III:418

de Jong, Louis, *Het Koningkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90
Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, by James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Democratic Development, Breakdowns, and Fascism, by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Dependence on Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World, by Robert W. Jackman, II:175
détente and stabilization, *see* Goldmann
development: democratic, *see* Merkl; economic and political, women, *see* Jaquette
developmental theory, *see* Eckstein
Dissident Marxism in Eastern Europe, by Thomas Oleszczuk, IV:527
Dixon, William J., The Emerging Image of U.N. Politics, I:47
Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy, by Dina Rome Spechler, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
Domestication of Women, The: Discrimination in Developing Societies, by Barbara Rogers, reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267
Donnelly, Jack, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, IV:574

Eastern Europe, dissidents, *see* Oleszczuk
Eckstein, Harry, The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency, IV:451
economic behavior and policy implementation, *see* Vig
economic growth, Third World, *see* Jackman
Eisenstadt, S.N., *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Eisenstein, Zillah H., ed., *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267
Emerging Image of U.N. Politics, The, by William J. Dixon, I:47
End of the Keynesian Era, The: Essays on the Distintegration of the Keynesian Political Economy, by Robert Skidelsky, ed., reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Eran, Oded, *The Mezhdunarodniki: An Assessment of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy*, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
expectational adaptation and democratic stability, *see* Vig

Fascism in the Contemporary World: Ideology, Evolution, Resurgence, by Anthony James Joes, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Fein, Helen, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust*, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90
feminist criticism, *see* Jaquette
foreign investment and economic growth rates, Third World, *see* Jackman
foreign investment policy, *see* Kudrle and Bobrow
foreign policy: stabilization, *see* Goldmann;
China, *see* Rong;
U.S.: human rights, *see* Donnelly; investment, *see* Kudrle and Bobrow; ocean, *see* Laursen;
U.S.S.R., *see* Cutler; Zimmerman and Axelrod
Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy, The: Organizational and Cognitive Perspectives by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
From Mobilization to Revolution, by Charles Tilly, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114

Germani, Gino, *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Goldmann, Kjell, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Détente as a Problem of Stabilization, II:230
Goldthorpe, John H., and Fred Hirsch, eds., *The Political Economy of Inflation*, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Gregor, A. James, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Grew, Raymond, ed., *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gurtov, Melvin, and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, reviewed by Rong Zhi, II:285

Haley, P. Edward, and Lewis W. Snider, eds., *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Het Koningkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, by Louis de Jong, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90
Hirsch, Fred, and John H. Goldthorpe, eds., *The Political Economy of Inflation*, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Holocaust, *see* Mason
Human Rights and Foreign Policy, by Jack Donnelly, IV:574
Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean, eds., reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574
Hwang, Byong-Moo, and Melvin Gurtov, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, reviewed by Rong Zhi, II:285
Hyden, Goran, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437

Idea of Political Development, The: From Dignity to Efficiency, by Harry Eckstein, IV:451
Images of China's Social Structure: The Changing Perspectives of Canton Students, by Anita Chan, III:295
Imponderables of the Holocaust, by Henry L. Mason, I:90
In Defense of the Irrational Peasant: Indian Agriculture after the Green Revolution, by Kusum Nair, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
international relations, and misperception, *see* Stein
international system, and recognition, *see* Peterson
Islam, Soviet, *see* Olcott
Israel, and PLO, *see* Lesch
Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship, by A. James Gregor, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114

Jackman, Robert W., Dependence on Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World, II:137
Jaquette, Jane S., Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism, II:267
Joes, Anthony James, *Fascism in the Contemporary World: Ideology, Evolution, Resurgence*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Jönsson, Christer, *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case*, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, by Uwe D. Adam, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90

Kass, Ilana, *Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966-1973*, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
Kazziha, Walid W., *Palestine in the Arab Dilemma*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, by Christian Streit, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90
Khalidi, Walid, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule, by Reinhart Bendix, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Kirp, David L., Professionalization as a Policy Choice: British Special Education in Comparative Perspective, II:137
Kudrle, Robert T., and Davis B. Bobrow, U.S. Policy toward Foreign Direct Investment, III:353

Laursen, Finn, Security versus Access to Resources: Explaining a Decade of U.S. Ocean Policy, II:197
Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues, by P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds., reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Legum, Colin, and Haim Shaked, eds., *Arab Relations in the Middle East: The Road to Realignment*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Lesch, Ann Mosely, The Palestine Problem, IV:560
"Lessons" of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy, The, by William Zimmerman and Robert Axelrod, I:1
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114

MacLean, Douglas, and Peter G. Brown, eds., *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign*

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Policy, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574
Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies, by Robert H. Bates, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
Marxism, dissident, *see* Oleszczuk
Mason, Henry L., Imponderables of the Holocaust, I:90
media analysis: dissident literature in Eastern Europe, *see* Oleszczuk; U.N., *see* Dixon; U.S.S.R., *see* Cutler; Zimmerman and Axelrod
Merkl, Peter H., Democratic Development, Breakdowns, and Fascism, I:114
Mezhdunarodniki, The: An Assessment of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy, by Oded Eran, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
misperception, *see* Stein
mobilization, social and political, *see* Merkl
modernization: and feminism, *see* Jaquette; China, *see* Chan; Third World, *see* Jackman
Moral Imperatives of Human Rights, The: A World Survey, by Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574

Nair, Kusum, *In Defense of the Irrational Peasant: Indian Agriculture after the Green Revolution*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
Netherlands, Holocaust, *see* Mason
Newberg, Paula R., ed., *The Politics of Human Rights*, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574
Nicholson, Norman K., and Clifford S. Russell, eds., *Public Choice and Rural Development*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
nuclear strategy, U.S., *see* Beres

ocean policy, U.S., *see* Laursen
Olcott, Martha Brill, Soviet Islam and World Revolution, IV:487
Oleszczuk, Thomas, Dissident Marxism in Eastern Europe, IV:527
Ondergang, by Jacob Presser, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90
O'Neill, Bard E., *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560

PLO, relations with Arab states and Israel, *see* Lesch
Palestine in the Arab Dilemma, by Walid W. Kazziha, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Palestine Problem, The, by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Patrimonialism, by Robin Theobald, IV:548
peasants and political economy, *see* Colburn
Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism, by Mitchell A. Seligson, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
Peterson, M.J., Political Use of Recognition: The Influence of the International System, III:324
policy choice, U.K. and U.S., *see* Kirp
policy making: U.S.: foreign investment, *see* Kudrle and Bobrow; ocean, *see* Laursen;
U.S.S.R.: *see* Cutler; Zimmerman and Axelrod
policy, public, and feminism, *see* Jaquette
political development, *see* Eckstein
political economy, and rural development, *see* Colburn
Political Economy of Inflation, The, by Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe, eds., reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Political Use of Recognition: The Influence of the International System, by M.J. Peterson, III:324
politics, U.N., *see* Dixon
Politics of Economic Decline, The: Economic Management and Political Behaviour in Britain Since 1964, by James E. Alt, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Politics of Human Rights, The, by Paula R. Newberg, ed., reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574
Popkin, Samuel L., *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
Post-Keynesian Economics and Politics: Toward an Expectationist Theory of Democracy? by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Presser, Jacob, *Ondergang*, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90
Professionalization as a Policy Choice: British Special Education in Comparative Perspective, by David L. Kirp, II:137
Public Choice and Rural Development, by Clifford S. Russell and Norman K. Nicholson, eds., reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, II:437

Question of Palestine, The, by Edward W. Said, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560

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Rational Peasant, The: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, by Samuel L. Popkin, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
recognition, political use, *see* Peterson
Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations, by S.N. Eisenstadt, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine, by J.D. Armstrong, reviewed by Rong Zhi, II:285
Rogers, Barbara, *The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies*, reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267
Rong Zhi, Two Views of Chinese Foreign Policy, II:285
rural development: economic and political decisions, *see* Colburn
Rural Response to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia, by Robert H. Bates, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
Russell, Clifford S., and Norman K. Nicholson, eds., *Public Choice and Rural Development*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437

Said, Edward W., *The Question of Palestine*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Security versus Access to Resources: Explaining a Decade of U.S. Ocean Policy, by Finn Laursen, II:197
Seligson, Mitchell A., *Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism*, reviewed by Forrest D. Colburn, III:437
Shaked, Haim, and Colin Legum, eds., *Arab Relations in the Middle East: The Road to Realignment*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
Shue, Henry, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574
Skidelsky, Robert, ed., *The End of the Keynesian Era: Essays on the Disintegration of the Keynesian Political Economy*, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
Snider, Lewis W. and P. Edward Haley, eds., *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues*, reviewed by Ann Mosely Lesch, IV:560
social structure, China, *see* Chan
Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case, by Christer Jönsson, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision, by Jiri Valenta, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966-1973, by Ilana Kass, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
Soviet Islam and World Revolution, by Martha Brill Olcott, IV:487
Spechler, Dina Rome, *Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy*, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
special education, U.K. and U.S., *see* Kirp
Spielman, Karl F., *Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions*, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
stabilizers, *see* Goldmann
Stein, Arthur A., When Misperception Matters, IV:505
Stepan, Alfred, and Juan J. Linz, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Streit, Christian, *Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945*, reviewed by Henry L. Mason, I:90

Theobald, Robin, Patrimonialism, IV:548
Third World: foreign investment and economic growth rates, *see* Jackman; patrimonialism, *see* Theobald
Thompson, Kenneth W., ed., *The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A World Survey*, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574
Tilly, Charles, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, reviewed by Peter H. Merkl, I:114
Tilting Toward Thanatos: America's "Countervailing" Nuclear Strategy, by Louis René Beres, I:25
Two Views of Chinese Foreign Policy, by Rong Zhi, II:285

U.K., special education policy, *see* Kirp
U.N., politics, *see* Dixon
U.S.: foreign investment, *see* Kudrle and Bobrow; foreign policy and human rights, *see* Donnelly; nuclear strategy, *see* Beres; ocean policy, *see* Laursen; special education policy, *see* Kirp
U.S. Policy toward Foreign Direct Investment, by Robert T. Kudrle and Davis B. Bobrow, III:353

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U.S.S.R.: foreign policy, *see* Cutler; Zimmerman and Axelrod; Islamic revival, *see* Olcott

Valenta, Jiri, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision*, reviewed by Robert M. Cutler, III:418
Vietnam War, Soviet "Lessons," *see* Zimmerman and Axelrod
Vig, Norman J., Post-Keynesian Economics and Politics: Toward an Expectationist Theory of Democracy? I:62
Vogelgesang, Sandy, *American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy*, reviewed by Jack Donnelly, IV:574

Wagner, Richard E., and James M. Buchanan, *Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes*, reviewed by Norman J. Vig, I:62
When Misperception Matters, by Arthur A. Stein, IV:505
Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, and Michael Brecher, Crises in World Politics, III:380
Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism, by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267
Women in the Twentieth Century World, by Elise Boulding, reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267
Women's Role in Economic Development, by Ester Boserup, reviewed by Jane S. Jaquette, II:267

Zimmerman, William, and Robert Axelrod, The "Lessons" of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy, I:1

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CONTENTS

No. 1—October 1981

"The Lessons" of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy — *William Zimmerman and Robert Axelrod* — 1

Tilting Toward Thanatos: America's "Countervailing" Nuclear Strategy — *Louise René Beres* — 25

Research Note

The Emerging Image of U.N. Politics — *William J. Dixon* — 47

Review Articles

Post-Keynesian Economics and Politics: Toward an Expectationist Theory of Democracy? — *Norman J. Vig* — 62

Imponderables of the Holocaust — *Henry L. Mason* — 90

Democratic Development, Breakdowns, and Fascism — *Peter H. Merkl* — 114

No. 2—January 1982

Professionalization as a Policy Choice: British Special Education in Comparative Perspective — *David L. Kirp* — 137

Dependence on Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World — *Robert W. Jackman* — 175

Security versus Access to Resources: Explaining a Decade of U.S. Ocean Policy — *Finn Laursen* — 197

Research Note

Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Détente as a Problem of Stabilization — *Kjell Goldmann* — 230

Review Articles

Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism — *Jane S. Jaquette* — 267

Two Views of Chinese Foreign Policy — *Rong Zhi* — 285

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No. 3—April 1982

Images of China's Social Structure: The Changing Perspectives of Canton Students — *Anita Chan* — 295

Political Use of Recognition: The Influence of the International System — *M. J. Peterson* — 324

U.S. Policy toward Foreign Direct Investment — *Robert T. Kudrle and Davis B. Bobrow* — 353

Research Note

Crises in World Politics — *Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld* — 380

Review Articles

The Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy: Organizational and Cognitive Perspectives — *Robert M. Cutler* — 418

Current Studies of Peasants and Rural Development: Applications of the Political Economy Approach — *Forrest D. Colburn* — 437

No. 4—July 1982

The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency — *Harry Eckstein* — 451

Soviet Islam and World Revolution — *Martha Brill Olcott* — 487

When Misperception Matters — *Arthur A. Stein* — 505

Dissident Marxism in Eastern Europe — *Thomas Oleszczuk* — 527

Research Note

Patrimonialism — *Robin Theobald* — 548

Review Articles

The Palestine Problem — *Ann Mosely Lesch* — 560

Human Rights and Foreign Policy — *Jack Donnelly* — 574

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

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